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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This is a research about the limits and the conduct of normative political thinking. 
When we take a normative perspective about political matters, we essentially engage in 
an attempt to figure out how our political practices ought to be, compared to what they 
are. By being so characterised, however, it looks sensible to wonder whether this sort of 
theoretical endeavour ought to be somehow disciplined and constrained. Are there any 
limits with respect to the political worlds that we can imagine as normative? Is there 
some kind of relation between the world as it is and the world as it should be?  
In the present study, I explore this fundamental problem. The four essays that 
together compose this thesis analyse the relationship between political reality and 
normative theory from different viewpoints. In doing so, they try to offer a better 
understanding of the limits of political possibility for normative political thinking. The 
first essay asks what is the appropriate procedure to tackle the problem of the limit of 
political possibility for normative political theory. The second essay investigates whether 
political theories ought to identify the desirable political worlds by relying on some 
features of the actual world, namely by following a bottom-up procedure. The third 
essay follows a similar lead and defines what sort of theoretical structure would result 
from the employment of a bottom-up procedure – that is to say, the third essay clarifies 
how political theories ought to manage the factual knowledge that the bottom-up 
procedure regards as normatively relevant. Finally, the fourth essay investigates whether 
the bottom-up theories defended in the second and third essays have to be subjected to 
some sort of feasibility requirements.  
In sum, I affirm that the limit of the political possibility for normative political 
theory ought to be traced where the political worlds which are practically possible, and 
which are compatible with the instantiation of the values that concrete agents deem 
important, can be found. This conclusion has important consequences with respect to 
the conduct of normative political thinking. I maintain that the theorist ought to be 
primarily an attentive observer and interpreter of concrete political practices. Moreover, 
the arguments that I outline suggest that we ought to look at our own world primarily in 
a spirit of reconciliation, rather than criticism. These two ways of looking at our 
practices are both fundamental, but I suggest that we should first and foremost look at 
our world and observe whether something makes sense in it and can be valued, rather 
than focusing on what could be subverted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This is a research about the limits and the conduct of a specific form of 
imaginative thinking – normative political thinking. When we take a normative 
perspective about political matters, we essentially engage in an attempt to figure out how 
our political practices ought to be, compared to what they are. The ultimate purpose of 
normative political theory is to identify what sort of political arrangements ought to be 
regarded as desirable to pursue and, correspondingly, to offer us some insight about 
how present circumstances ought to be assessed. It is, therefore, definitely peculiar as an 
exercise of imagination, insofar as it plays some crucial practical functions: by providing 
some insights about what ought to be done, normative political thinking defines criteria 
to evaluate present circumstances, orients collective action, and allows to have a critical 
grasp of the world that surrounds us. 
By being so characterised, however, it looks sensible to wonder whether this sort 
of imaginative endeavour ought to be somehow disciplined and constrained. Are there 
any limits with respect to the political worlds that we can imagine as normative? More 
specifically, is there some kind of relation between the world as it is and the world as it 
should be? If normative political theory is supposed to play a practical function in our 
world, it would seem sensible to believe that some form of interaction between the 
status quo and the envisioned normative alternatives should subsist. In fact, we might 
wonder how political models that are significantly distant from our political realities 
could offer some indications about how our political world ought to be organised.  
In the present study, I explore this fundamental problem. The four essays that 
together compose this thesis analyse the relationship between political reality and 
normative theory from different viewpoints. In doing so, they try to offer a better 
understanding of the limits of political possibility for normative political thinking. 
Ultimately, this research seeks to get a better sense of the maximum distance that ought 
to be set between the actual world and the possible worlds we might regard as having a 
normative valence for us. Therefore, this inquiry is methodological in nature: the 
objective that I set is understanding how normative theories about politics ought to be 
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structured, not that of proposing a self-contained normative theory – even though these 
two issues are in an important sense connected. 
Even though this topic resonates classical philosophical controversies, it is only in 
recent times, that it has gained the attention of political theorists as a self-standing 
problem. When the present research began to take shape, in 2012, the problem of the 
interdependence between theory and reality in political thinking had just started to attire 
a lively discussion. As the wide majority of contemporary debates in political theory, the 
discussions about the appropriate methods to employ in normative reflection took 
origin from some claims by John Rawls. By grounding his normative research on two 
fundamental ideas, Rawls brought to the attention of political theorists two 
methodological controversies. In an attempt to make explicit the fundamental 
methodological assumptions behind his normative inquiry, he firstly claimed that: 
 
the intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. The first or 
ideal part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that 
characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances […] ideal 
part presents a conception of a just society that we are to achieve if we can. 
Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of this conception (Rawls 
1999, 216) 
 
But he added also a second point: 
 
Political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are 
ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility […]. 
We have to rely on conjecture and speculation, arguing as best we can that 
the social world we envision is feasible and might actually exist, if not now 
then at some future time under happier circumstances. (Rawls 2001, 11-12) 
 
These two clauses stand at the base of Rawls’s normative theory of politics, and 
determine the pillars around which the whole methodological debate has developed 
since then. For one thing, by explaining that normative political reflection needs to be 
split into an ideal and a non-ideal counterpart, Rawls explicitly admitted that, in order to 
get a proper sense of what would be a desirable political world for us, political theories 
ought to be construed by making use of some specific idealisations – like strict 
compliance. Furthermore, Rawls also specified that his theory was meant to offer a 
realistic utopia, namely that it was designed in order to satisfy certain specific feasibility 
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requirements. Both these requirements – the level of idealisation admitted by the 
theoretical framework, and the degree of feasibility expected by the theory – were meant 
to impose some descriptive constraints on the possible political worlds that the theory 
could prescribe. These requirements set, in other words, a certain conception of the 
maximum distance between the actual political world and the possible political worlds 
that the normative reflection could admit. 
So, complicit Rawls’ claims, the question of the relationship between reality and 
theory re-gained attention in the form of an interest into the factual assumption that a 
theory ought to start from, and the feasibility constraints that it ought to abide by. Since 
then, a large amount of work has been done to support, dismantle, or simply overcome, 
Rawls’ methodological commitments. More generally, efforts have been put into the 
endeavour of understanding the boundaries of imagination for normative political 
thinking. Yet, a lot still needs to be done. Indeed, as I will show all along the present 
study, the current debate largely appears unsystematic. This is partly a natural 
consequence of the fact that, as I said, a systematic analysis of the problem of the 
relationship between reality and theory in normative political theory has become an 
object of interest only recently. But this is also due to the fact that, being a 
methodological – and hence metatheoretical – dispute, this debate engages political 
theorists who come from diverse theoretical traditions and who, therefore, conceive the 
task and the limits of political theorising in radically different ways. Notably, whether a 
theorist regards herself as a moralist or a realist political thinker plays a fundamental role 
in her conception of the method that normative political theorising ought to follow. A 
large part of the present study will be dedicated to the divergence between moralism and 
realism and its methodological impact. The essays that follow will offer a contribution 
to this wide and thorny debate by providing some interpretive keys to systematise the 
discussion, and by offering a general answer to the problem of the distance that 
normative political theory can set between the actual and the possible political worlds.  
However, before turning to the substance of the thesis that I am going to defend 
in the course of my research, let me spend a few words on the reasons that motivate this 
kind of inquiry. Indeed, I said a few times that this sort of inquiry looks crucial for 
political reasoning – why? The conception of the boundaries of political possibility for 
normative political theory that we adopt shapes political reflection along three 
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fundamental dimensions: the structure of political theorising, the vocation of the 
political theorist, and the way in which we relate to our own practical world. Depending 
on the distance between the actual world and those that will be judged admissible to 
envision, the structure of political theories will be more or less abstract; 
correspondingly, the political theorist will be more or less concerned with having a clear 
empirical grasp of actual political practices. Moreover, we will tend to develop different 
sorts of judgments towards our own world: the further we will locate the ideal political 
arrangements from present circumstances, the harsher the dissatisfaction towards our 
own world will be. Hence, by delving into the relationship between reality and 
normative theory we will be able to inform and determine the conduct of political 
reasoning. As I will extensively explain in the analysis that will follow, the boundary to 
political possibility traced by the methodological research defines to what extent 
normative political theory needs to be interested in this political world. The 
methodological inquiry determines how we ought to look at, relate, and judge, actual 
political circumstances. For this reason, a study into the political possibilities that are 
accessible to normative political theorising must be regarded as a crucial step towards an 
adequate assessment of political practices. 
I do not pretend to have addressed the methodological issue in its entirety. But I 
do not regard this as a shortcoming, rather as a necessary consequence of the 
complexity of the subject at stake. For this reason, also, the present study has been 
developed as a series of independent papers. Indeed, I regard such argumentative choice 
as the best way to address the problem at hand: by construing independent papers, my 
intention was to tackle the methodological issue from different perspectives, thereby 
making explicit the precise and narrow questions examined each time, but providing 
also a sufficient number of answers to suggest an overall interpretation of the 
methodological issue. I will shortly explain what I take to have left aside, and what are 
the further directions that the methodological research should follow to increase our 
understanding of the relationship between theory and reality that political reasoning 
ought to consider. However, let me get clear about the positive contribution I provided 
first.  
The four essays are deeply connected and represent different steps of a single 
research path towards a first clarification of the appropriate boundaries of political 
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possibility for normative political theory. Overall, the research aims to take a stand with 
respect to both the Rawlsian claims above-mentioned – respectively, the degree of fact-
sensitivity and feasibility expected by political theories – by defining a procedure to 
analyse them, and offering separate answers to each of those methodological 
controversies. The order of the topics addressed is not casual but follows a 
systematisation of the literature that I offer in the first essay. 
In the first paper, I explain that the methodological debate has developed upon 
fragile basis, and I propose a way to reframe the research accordingly. Indeed, in the 
first step of my analysis, I argue that in the contemporary methodological literature two 
major strategies to justify the border of political possibilities can be identified: the 
output strategy and the input strategy. On the one hand, according to the output 
strategy, the border of political possibilities is defined by placing constraints on the 
conclusions of theories: the distance between the actual and the possible normative 
political theory can admit is given by the required degree of feasibility of the worlds the 
theory recommends. On the other hand, according to the input strategy, the border of 
political possibilities is defined by placing constraints on the premises of theories: the set 
of political possibilities admissible is given by the description of political reality we 
should start from, and hold fixed, when we are construing normative frameworks. 
Crucially, in the first paper I argue that these two methodological strategies are 
independent: a theory admissible according to the first strategy – because appropriately 
applicable – could be refuted by the second one – because inadequate premises make it 
invalid (and vice-versa). And yet, this diversity in methods has remained largely 
unrecognised, especially because political realism – which I take to be the most 
developed and compelling input approach – has been often misinterpreted as a thesis 
about output requirements, i.e. as a call for action-guidance. As I show along the paper, 
this serious misinterpretation of the realist approach has given rise to a flawed 
methodological debate, because largely incomplete and structured around disputes that 
talk past each other. Therefore, in the first paper I conclude that, in order to properly 
understand the boundary of political possibilities for normative political theory, the 
methodological inquiry ought to be reframed by taking into account both input and 
output arguments, and assessing their relative merits. Accordingly, I propose a unified 
framework of analysis through which intersecting both methodologies. Following a 
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combined understanding of the two strategies, I argue that politically possible worlds 
must be defined as representations of states of affairs consistent with the descriptive 
constraints placed both on inputs and on outputs of theories. 
Accordingly, the second paper provides an argument in favour of  the adoption of  
some specific input constraints by outlining a justification of  the realist approach. 
Notably, indeed, political realism defends a bottom-up, and contextualist, approach to 
political theorising. For political realists, what ought to be done in a given practical 
context must be a function of  (a suitable interpretation and assessment of) the beliefs 
of  the participants: political practices ought to be structured in order to abide by what 
agents find valuable in a given context. But why should we endorse a similar approach 
to political reasoning? Despite the recent attention political realism has gained, I explain 
that the question of  its justification has been somehow neglected or underestimated. I 
argue that the most compelling reason to adopt political realism is prudential, and I 
outline an argument in its favour. I contend that political realism should be adopted as a 
guide for practical political life because to propose and defend normative paradigms is 
not a mere theoretical exercise: to implement and follow the prescriptions of  a 
normative paradigm bears with it concrete consequences and costs. For this reason, my 
contention is that the choice of  the methods to employ in normative political reasoning 
could be the fruit of  a prudential assessment. In particular, since, as I explain, the 
implementation of  normative proposals which clash with what actual agents deem 
valuable is costly (because politics entails the use of  force), and the gains are uncertain 
(because normative knowledge is subject to deep disagreement), we can motivate the 
choice to follow a realist methodology on the basis of  a prudential calculus: we have a 
reason to prioritise realism as a method to define prescriptions and locate the site of  
normative authority on participants’ beliefs, because this choice safeguards the concrete 
interests of  actual agents. 
If the second paper provides a justification for the adoption of some input 
constraints, the third one allows us to understand how those constraints shape the 
conception of the political worlds we deem desirable. Precisely, I argue that the most 
appropriate way to conceive the structure of realist theories is to see them as 
consequences of a practice-dependent procedure. As I explain in detail, practice-dependent 
methodologies construe normative proposals by making a specific use of actual agents’ 
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beliefs: they identify the point and purpose of the practices under exam from the point 
of view of their participants, and define how the actual world ought to look like if it 
were to perfectly abide by the values those practices safeguard. Does this mean that 
political realism cannot revise actual circumstances? Is political realism a markedly 
conservative approach to political theorising? I claim that this would represent a wrong 
interpretation of the realist bottom-up methodology. In fact, a practice-dependent 
procedure might justify a severe revision of the status quo, in case actual practices failed 
to appropriately fulfil their alleged purposes. Moreover, the interpretive process might 
lead us to realise that some of the participants beliefs are inconsistent or fragile, thereby 
inviting a revision both of participants’ beliefs and practices. Therefore, I explain that 
the bottom-up methodology political realism embraces ought to be interpreted as a 
form of reformist conservatism, in which the political proposals envisioned are linked to a 
substantive extent to the actual world – since they are built from what concrete agents 
value – but might also depart from it – in the measure that the interpretive process 
allows us to revise concrete practices and actual beliefs. 
However, as anticipated by the arguments outlined in the first essay, to define 
how input constraints affect the structure of a theory does not imply anything, in itself, 
about the output constraints that ought to be applied. Accordingly, the fourth essay 
aims to propose an analysis of feasibility requirements that realist political theories 
ought to follow. Are there any additional factual constraints, besides the ones set by the 
bottom-up procedure, that realist political proposals ought to follow? The last step of 
my research claims that realist proposals ought to be designed as to consider the 
ultimate border of practical possibilities – hence, there is no specific additional feasibility 
condition that they ought to fulfil. This might sound at first bizarre: isn’t political 
realism precisely supposed to guide us here and now? As recalled in the first paper, and 
as I emphasise here, this is a misinterpretation of the realist approach. Rather, as I argue, 
political realism is required to explore all the political possibilities that are achievable to 
us and that abide by the bottom-up procedure which characterises this approach. As I 
explain, this is due to the fact that, for realists, a proper assessment of the costs and risk 
that we should face in actual circumstances requires a complete knowledge of the 
alternatives at our disposal. This means also that political realism might admit as 
normatively relevant possible worlds relatively far from actual circumstances. 
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Accordingly, in the fourth essay I analyse how the relationship between the actual and 
the envisioned political worlds ought to be conceived and structured in realist 
paradigms.  
Now that I have outlined the argumentative path I followed, let me briefly sum up 
what I take to be my achievements. Above, I said that I regard the present analysis as 
relevant along three dimensions of political reasoning: the structure of political theories, 
the vocation of the theorist, and the relationship that we come to entertain with our 
own practical context. First of all, I affirm that the limit of the political possibility for 
normative political theory ought to be traced where the political worlds which are 
practically possible (output constraint), and which are compatible with the instantiation 
of the values that concrete agents deem important (input constraint), can be found. 
Relatedly, I maintain that the theorist ought to be primarily an attentive observer and 
interpreter of concrete political practices. In fact, the theorist is not meant to dictate 
what ought to be done: such knowledge is gathered from concrete practices. The 
theorist importantly clarifies our beliefs and provides a correct interpretation of the 
practical context. However, the theorist might also exercise another fundamental role: 
even though she cannot dictate what ought to be done from a context-insensitive 
perspective, she might nonetheless provide tools to criticise, and possibly change, our 
own beliefs; she might, that is, exercise an auxiliary and external critical role by fostering 
debates and fomenting discussions. Finally, with regard to our own relation to the 
practical context, the arguments that I outline suggest that we ought to look at our own 
world primarily in a spirit of reconciliation, rather than criticism. These two ways of 
looking at our practices are both fundamental, but I would like to suggest that we 
should first and foremost look at our world and observe whether something makes 
sense in it and can be valued, rather than focusing on what could be subverted. 
Before turning to what I take to be the further research paths that ought to be 
pursued in the methodological inquiry, I would clarify some of the doubts that might 
arise during the reading. As I said, I favoured a paper-based approach, because I regard 
it as the best way to tackle the methodological issue. This choice has shortcomings too, 
since the different steps are not immediately connected with the others, despite being 
part of a single project. So, let me get clear about two possible sources of confusion that 
the discussion that will follow might generate. A first one concerns the conclusions I 
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reach in the first paper. As the reader will notice, the research path I outline at the end 
of that paper is composed by three steps. The third step, however, remains unanswered 
by the present thesis. Indeed, though I regard the third step as necessary to provide a 
complete answer to the problem of political possibilities for normative political theory, 
its solution would require an attentive empirical and interpretive analysis. This is 
something that goes beyond the intents and the possibilities of the present research, 
through which I tried to offer a general framework to analyse and understand the 
problem of the border of political possibility for normative political theory. However, 
this would represent the natural continuation of the present study. A second possible 
source of confusion is instead conceptual. I refer to “ideal theory” both in the first and 
the fourth paper, but I use this concept in slightly different ways. This different usage is 
due to the diverse purposes that the two papers have, and it is made possible by the fact 
that the concept of ideal theory is versatile and that has been subjected to different 
interpretations. In both cases, ideal theories are meant to portray desirable and possibly 
unfeasible states of affairs. In the first paper, however, I talk about ideal theories adding 
a further specification: I refer to ideal theories as to those theories which employ severe 
abstraction or idealisations in their premises. This is a specification absent in the fourth 
paper, and this conceptual diversity allows me to introduce the notion of “realist ideal 
theories” in the final part of the paper. 
To conclude, I would like to indicate three further directions that, I believe, the 
methodological inquiry ought to follow. First of all, there is ample scope to refine the 
notion of practical possibility. To provide a full-fledged descriptive account of the 
distance between the possible and the actual that normative political theory could admit, 
we would have to substantively specify what the notion of practical possibility does 
entail. Secondly, even though in the fourth essay I extensively deal with the problem of 
the relationship between theory and actual judgment, I do not directly address how 
political judgments in concrete circumstances ought to be formulated. This would 
require an attentive analysis of concrete cases and scenarios, which would have brought 
me far from the purposes of my discussion. However, if normative political theory aims 
to offer some insight about how we should improve present circumstances, a detailed 
examine of the methodology of political judgment is of primary importance. Finally, the 
methodological inquiry would necessitate a detailed analysis of how we can come to 
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make sense of our practical context and of the values we deem important for our 
collective life. We would need, in other words, to provide a full-fledged account of how 
an interpretation of the sense and purpose of our practical life could be conducted. With 
my essays, I attempted to provide a stable basis on which to systematize methodological 
researches, and on which to develop these further lines of inquiry. 
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I. 
TWO WAYS TO JUSTIFY THE LIMIT OF POLITICAL POSSIBILITY 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Possible worlds for normative political theory  
Political theory might endorse several functions. Among these, political theory 
might play a normative role. When political theory is conceived as endorsing such a 
normative function, its main concern consists in defining – broadly speaking – what 
politics should be and, accordingly, what are the goal(s) towards which our actions ought 
to be directed1.  
The aim of  this paper is to offer a contribution to the methodological understanding 
of  normative political theory (henceforward, NPT). That is to say, this paper will deal 
with the conduct, not the content, of  normative political theorising. In particular, the 
present study will clarify how a fundamental problem which is at the very heart of  the 
methodological inquiries about NPT – namely the problem of  the relationship between 
facts and principles – ought to be systematised and analysed. 
Let me exactly explain the nature of  the problem I am going to deal with by 
making use of  a jargon external to political philosophy. Let’s say that the status quo is 
the actual political world, and that the totality of  arrangements that NPT prescribes to 
achieve is an envisioned political world, alternative to ours, and (for some reason) more 
desirable2. Let’s call this alternative world a possible political world. Indeed, in a 
straightforward and minimal sense, the desirable world that the theory prescribes is a 
“possible” political world, because it depicts an imaginary vision of  how coexistence 
could be organised. However, we might also wonder whether this is sufficient, or 
satisfying, characterisation of  the tasks of  NPT. In fact, we could think that not every 
                                                 
1 Following the introduction to the methodology of  political theory proposed by Christian List and Laura 
Valentini, I can say that with NPT I am referring to that part of  political theory which deals with 
normative principles, where “A principle is normative if  it has normative content; for instance, it includes 
deontic operators such as ought, may, permissible, obligatory, right, or wrong” (List and Valentini 
2016, 536). 
2 The idea of  possible worlds has been largely employed in contemporary modal logic as a tool define and 
formalise the notions of  possibility and necessity. For a useful overview, see Cresswell and Hughes 
1996. 
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conceivable world alternative to ours might constitute a normative alternative, namely 
something that we ought to achieve. Maybe some worlds are just too far away, or are too 
fanciful, to be considered desirable political alternative for us. So, we could try to offer a 
more refined definition of  “possible” political world, and restrict the notion of  political 
possibility by analysing whether the worlds NPT prescribes ought to satisfy some 
descriptive requirement. Hence, we might wonder whether there is a maximum distance 
that should be set between the actual political world and the political worlds we envision 
as normatively authoritative for us. Is there a specific relationship between reality and 
principles that NPTs ought to take into account? Is there, in other words, a limit to the 
possible political worlds that NPT can demand to achieve? 
At first sight, a negative answer would seem the most appropriate. Given Hume's 
Law, it would seem improper to let factual considerations regarding our own political 
world to shape the conception of  what ought to be done politically – and this might 
well be the right answer. Yet, it seems that we cannot get rid of  such a methodological 
issue so quickly. Indeed, some insights in the opposite direction have been recently put 
forward. Specifically, two orders of  considerations have been advanced. On the one 
hand, it has been stressed that if  the political worlds we envision aims at being 
normatively relevant for us, they should be somehow consistent with what is practicably 
possible for us: 
Political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are 
ordinarily thought to be the limits of  practicable political possibility […]. I 
recognize that there are questions about how the limits of  the practicably 
possible are discerned and what the conditions of  our social world in fact 
are. The problem here is that the limits of  the possible are not given by the 
actual, for we can to a greater or lesser extent change political and social 
institutions and much else. Hence we have to rely on conjecture and 
speculation, arguing as best we can that the social world we envision is feasible and 
might actually exist, if  not now then at some future time under happier circumstances. 
(Rawls 2001, 11-12, emphasis added) 
On a different note, but with a similar intent to state a connection between reality 
and political norms, it has been claimed that political theory should be practically-
informed; that is, any appraisal of  what ought to be done ought to start from an 
understanding of  practices as they are. What ought to be done is, in this sense, 
dependent on practices as they happen to be:  
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Political philosophy must be realist. That means, roughly speaking, that it 
must start from and be concerned in the first instance not with how people 
ought ideally (or ought “rationally”) to act, what they ought to desire, or 
value, the kind of  people they ought to be, etc., but, rather, with the way the 
social, economic, political, etc., institutions actually operate in some society 
at some given time, and what really does move human beings to act in given 
circumstances. (Geuss 2008, 9) 
So, in the light of  some recent methodological suggestions, it looks legitimate to 
ask whether NPT should be considered constrained by reality in some ways.  
Clarifying this issue looks crucial for at least two reasons. Firstly, if  we had to 
admit that reality has a role to play in envisioning how politics should be, depending on 
how we are going to conceive such relationship, the content of  our normative theories 
is going to change substantially. We could come to reject some normative proposals 
because they fail to meet some requirements dictated by reality. Secondly, if  facts and 
principles proved to be somehow related, this would also affect the “vocation” of  the 
political theorist3. Depending, indeed, on the degree of  relevance that we are going to 
attribute to the empirical knowledge in political theory, the interaction between 
philosophy and social science is going to be shaped differently, and the tasks that a 
political theorist is expected to accomplish will vary accordingly. 
In this paper, my intention is to show that scholars have discussed such 
methodological problem in the wrong terms. My central task will be to define an 
appropriate research method to address the issue at stake. So, I am not going to give any 
substantive answer to the methodological problem raised; rather, my main attempt will 
be to outline an adequate procedure in order to reach a satisfactory solution.  
 
2. Descriptive constraints on NPTs: Two criteria of  methodological 
adequacy 
As I said, this paper is motivated by a dissatisfaction towards the way in which the 
current methodological debate addresses the problem of  the relationship between facts 
and principles in NPT. So, how has the issue been approached so far, and what are the 
main shortcoming of  the current analysis? 
As said, I define the problem raised as the problem of  the border of  the possible 
                                                 
3 Here I am borrowing a terminology introduced by Marc Stears (2005). 
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worlds for NPT; and, from now on, I will refer to “political possibilities” to indicate 
those possible worlds which NPT can legitimately refer to. I am going to show that, in 
the literature, there can be traced two fundamental strategies to justify the imposition of  
a certain distance between our real political world and the political world as it should be: 
the output strategy and the input strategy. These two justificatory strategies arise from two 
different ways of  interpreting the methodological adequacy of  theories. According to 
the output strategy, the border of  political possibilities is defined by placing constraints 
on the conclusions of  theories: the distance between the actual world and the possible 
worlds NPT can admit is given by the required degree of  applicability of  the worlds the 
theory recommends, i.e. by the description of  those facts that the theory must not 
attempt to change. According to the input strategy, the border of  political possibilities is 
defined by placing constraints on the premises of  theories: the set of  political possibilities 
admissible is given by the appropriate sources of  normativity of  political theory, i.e. the 
description of  political reality we should start from, and hold fixed, when we are 
construing normative proposals. Usually, the output strategy is mostly found in the 
debates on ideal theory4 and feasibility5, whereas the input strategy mainly characterises 
the political realist tradition6.  
Unfortunately, these two strategies do not recognise each other and they are never 
brought into dialogue; this, I think, is the main shortcoming of  the current 
methodological debate. As I am going to illustrate, such failure to acknowledge the 
existence of  these two diverse justificatory strategies weakens the methodological debate 
and compromises the chances of  providing a satisfactory solution to the problem 
highlighted. In fact, the two strategies contrast with respect to the stages of  theories on 
which they apply their methodological criteria of  adequacy. The failure to appreciate this 
distinction implies a failure to appreciate the different sources from which a constraint 
upon the set of  possible worlds for NPT might arise. Hence, disregarding one of  the 
two available justificatory strategies means providing just a partial answer to the problem 
of  the border of  political possibility for NPT. For this reason, I will argue that both 
strategies must be taken into account and discussed in order to reach a sound answer. 
                                                 
4 For a useful overview, see Stemplowska and Swift 2012. 
5 On this debate, Brennan and Pettit 2007 and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012 offer useful 
introductions. 
6 For a general account of  the realist tradition see Galston 2010. 
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Accordingly, in the final part of  the paper, I will propose a unified framework of  
analysis through which intersecting both methodologies. 
In the following, I am going to illustrate both strategies in detail. Once the two 
methodologies will be unfolded, it will become clearer how a unified framework of  
analysis should look like, i.e. which are the steps and the elements that we must focus on 
in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the question at stake. 
 
3. The output strategy 
The most common way to establish a relationship between real politics and the 
idea of  politics that should guide our actions consists in affirming that the goals towards 
which we ought to move need to be practicably reachable. This is precisely the point 
John Rawls raises in the above-mentioned quotation, when he says that we must argue 
“as best we can that the social world we envision is feasible and might actually exist” 
(2001, 12). This claim recalls the commonly accepted, but also much disputed, ought 
implies can principle. For those who accept such relationship between facts and norms, 
our practical duties should be informed by ideas of  politics which we could, in principle, 
realise. In this sense, the methodological adequacy of  theories is expressed through the 
adoption of  feasibility thresholds for NPT: NPTs are said to be methodologically 
adequate when they are consistent with a certain – still to be specified – level of  
applicability. Thus, as anticipated, the methodological adequacy of  political theories is 
here discussed as a constraint which applies to the outcomes of  theories. In case the 
prescriptions of  a theory prove to be feasible in the specified sense, the theory can be 
judged methodologically adequate.  
In the literature there are two separate ways to discuss which feasibility threshold 
NPTs ought to satisfy. Let us see them in turn, as they offer two much different 
interpretations of  the set of  possible worlds NPT would be allowed to refer to. 
 
3.1. Output Realism 
A first and typical way of  endorsing output constraints sounds as follows: 
there is some conceptual incoherence involved in saying ‘This is what justice 
involves, but there is no way it could be implemented’ (Mason, 2004, p. 
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255). This incoherence stems from the fact that a theory of  social justice, 
and the principles of  justice it endorses, must function as an adequate guide 
for our collective action. A theory of  social justice that yields impotent or 
misguided practical prescriptions is a deficient theory of  justice. If  the 
collective aspiration to implement the conclusions of  a theory would not 
result in any noticeable increase in the justness of  one's society, then it fails 
as a normative theory. (Farrelly 2007, 845) 
The above quotation comes from Colin Farrelly's “Justice in Ideal Theory: A 
Refutation”. However, a number of  similar claims can be traced in the recent literature. 
David Miller, for example, emphasises: “I start from the assumption that political 
philosophy is a branch of  practical reason – it is thought whose final aim is to guide 
action, as opposed to having a merely speculative purpose” (Miller 2008, 44). Similarly, 
John Dunn affirms that “the purpose of  political theory is to diagnose practical 
predicaments and to show how best to confront them” (Dunn 1990, 193). Thus, 
according to some commentators, a political theory which is unable to offer effective 
action-guidance proves to be a flawed NPT, as the main task of  a political theory is to 
address the concrete practical dilemmas that we happen to face in the actual world. 
Recalling the terminology I have adopted in the previous section, the authors who 
underline the fundamental practical role of  NPT argue in favour of  a specific criterion 
of  adequacy for political theories: NPTs are methodologically adequate when the 
prescriptions they advance can be usefully followed by real-word agents.  
However, a similar requirement still does not give us a picture of  the border of  
possible worlds those authors judge appropriate for political theory. After all, it might 
well be the case that ideas of  better political worlds much far from ours could fruitfully 
inspire our actions here and now. So, how do scholars who emphasise the practical role 
of  political theory come to interpret the border of  political possibilities? 
The question is clarified once we read such methodological interest towards the 
feasibility of  theories in light of  their polemic target. Here, indeed, it is worth noticing 
that Farrelly explicitly refers to Andrew Mason in the quotation proposed above; his 
comments are meant to address the article “Just Constraints” in which Mason defends 
ideal theorising as a crucial element of  NPT (Mason 2004). Indeed, the discussions 
around the required applicability of  normative principles arise precisely as a response to 
the (so-perceived) excessively idealised character of  contemporary political theory. The 
target view challenged is the one, famously defended by Rawls, according to which “the 
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reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides (…) the only basis for the 
systematic grasp of  these more pressing problems [that we are faced with in everyday 
life]” (Rawls 1999, 8). According to this view, which is undoubtedly widely shared in 
contemporary political theorising, inquiring justice in ideal theory is a first necessary 
step in order to appropriately grasp what ought to be done in actual circumstances. 
Anyway, for those who have recently emphasised the need for NPTs to be practically 
relevant, the ideal theorising which characterises contemporary political theory 
represents a substantive departure from this original goal. In fact, ideal theory, it is 
claimed, is neither sufficient nor necessary in order to understand what ought to be 
done here and now. This is the substance of  – what has been efficaciously called – the 
“Guidance Critique” (Valentini 2009).  
If  the target is ideal theorising, what is an ideal theory, then? The notion will recur 
several times in the paper, as it is a key notion in methodological debates. The concept 
of  ideal theory itself  is widely disputed. Here, I will refer to ideal theories as to those 
theories which make use of  idealisations7, and which are meant to indicate how a 
political Paradise Island8 would look like in order to set a critical standard of  assessment 
of  current practices. Even if  it is not clear whether the two features must hold together 
in order to make a theory “ideal”, many contemporary theories do display both features, 
as Laura Valentini notices – this is the crucial aspect that matters for my present 
purposes (Valentini 2009, 338). Indeed, this twofold characterisation opens up two 
orders of  possible criticisms against contemporary ideal theories: the ones directed 
against their goal (the mythical Paradise Island which gives us a picture of  a fully just 
society), and the ones focused against their premises (the use of  an implausible image 
of  political reality as a starting point). One of  my objectives will be to show that the 
main shortcomings of  the current methodological debate are related to a failure to 
recognise these two diverse possible orders of  criticism against contemporary political 
theories – but I will get back to this point later on. 
I have said that many recent contributions to the methodological debate are 
motivated by a critical reaction against the ideal character of  much contemporary 
                                                 
7 I am here using the term “idealisation” in a non-technical sense to indicate the use of  assumptions 
which represent a world distant enough from the actual one to be judged false representations of  
political reality. If  I had to use the terminology Onora O'Neill (1996, 39-44) proposes, I would say 
that in this context idealisations mean both false assumptions and severe abstractions. 
8 I borrow the expression from Ingrid Robeyns (2008). 
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political theory and that such unease is grounded on a defence of  the fundamental 
practical role of  political theory. Why is that so and how do they think, in response, 
NPT should be pursued? Colin Farrelly and, especially, Amartya Sen offer two 
compelling explanations of  why we should reject ideal theory in favour of  non-ideal 
approaches. 
Both Farrelly and Sen argue that ideal theories are unable to provide any kind of  
advice in order to orient our practical conduct. Farrelly argues in favour of  his own 
position commenting both Rawls's (1996) and Dworkin's (2000) theories of  justice. For 
the present purposes, offering a brief  outline of  his criticism against Rawls will suffice 
to reconstruct his argumentation. Farrelly argues that Rawls's theory proves to be 
practically irrelevant, because fundamentally utopian and unable to offer guidance with 
respect to those dilemmas which we will have to face in real circumstances. This is due 
to a fundamental error that Rawls makes in the construction of  his theory. Rawls, 
Farrelly says, elaborates his normative principles starting from particular assumptions 
responsible of  making his proposal deeply unsatisfactory: the assumptions of  moderate 
scarcity of  resources and strict compliance. Such assumptions, united with the fact that 
(in real circumstances) rights have costs and that Rawls chooses to order his principles 
of  justice lexicographically, makes the Rawlsian theory completely inapt to address 
concrete scenarios. In Farrelly's own words:  
Perhaps the most pressing failure of  Rawlsian moderate ideal theorizing is 
that it fails to take scarcity seriously. This is a particularly troubling problem 
for Rawls’ theory because he serially orders his two principles of  justice. 
Such ordering yields impotent prescriptions for real societies that face conditions 
of  scarcity. (Farrelly 2007, 848) 
In fact, for Farrelly, Rawls's theory proves to be completely unable to address real-
world trade-offs. In particular, his framework cannot offer any indication to manage 
trade-offs on two levels: as regards to which basic liberties to prioritise and how to 
allocate resources between the protection of  basic liberties and other social needs. 
According to Rawls's theory, indeed, two principles ought to govern societies; these are 
the principles of  basic liberties and the difference principle. These two principles of  
justice are considered lexicographically ordered. This is because, according to Farrelly's 
reading of  Rawls, the protection of  basic liberties is meant to have absolute priority 
within a just social system – rights have all equal importance among each other and their 
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defence has unconstrained priority over the advancement of  other goods. Such a lexical 
order, according to Farrelly, is adopted and defended by Rawls only because he ignores 
that rights have costs. The fact that rights have costs, and that we do not live in society 
full of  saints, nor we dispose of  infinite resources, make trade-offs between basic 
liberties inevitable: real societies do not have enough resources to guarantee the equal 
protection of  every right. Moreover, if  Rawls's lexicographic order had to be followed 
in concrete circumstances, the enterprise of  guaranteeing basic liberties would prove to 
be endless, because resources are scarce and violations are many. This, Farrelly goes on, 
means that following Rawls's proposal we would have no theoretical tools to allocate 
resources in order to guarantee the pursuit of  other goods, such as public health. 
However, in our actual world, we are obliged to make similar choices as we cannot 
absolutely prioritise the endless pursuit of  basic liberties: in case, as it happens to be, we 
had to guarantee other goods, we would not have any indication as to how to make 
public choices. This happens precisely because Rawls orders the two principles of  
justice and gives absolute priority to basic liberties; however, as soon as we focus on 
real-world circumstances (hence noticing how implausible is to start from assumptions 
of  moderate scarcity and strict compliance) we recognise that such a theory is 
completely inadequate to address justice in our world (Farrelly 2007, 855). So, Farrelly 
concludes, even if  Rawls describes his proposal as a “realistically utopian” one, his 
theory of  justice cannot be considered “realistic” enough. Indeed, he fails to consider 
some crucial real-world facts and, because of  this, his prescriptions end up being 
“impotent” (Farrelly 2007, 845). 
Along similar lines, Sen offers harsh remarks against “transcendental theories” – 
the name Sen adopts to define ideal political theories, and which he contrasts with the 
alternative model he favours, the “comparative theory”. Starting from a similar unease 
against the Rawlsian theory of  justice, Sen argues against transcendental theories 
claiming their practical impotence. Transcendental theories are, in Sen's definition, those 
theories that answer the question “What is a just society?”; in this sense, a 
transcendental approach to justice focuses on “identifying perfectly just societal 
arrangements” (Sen 2006, 216). However, according to Sen, identifying a perfectly just 
society cannot help answering real-world dilemmas – transcendental theories are, he 
says, insufficient to understand what ought to be done here and now. This happens 
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because, when we try to establish what to do in actual circumstances making reference 
to a conception of  the perfect society, at least three problems emerge: 
The main difficulty lies in the fact that there are different features involved 
in identifying distance, related, among other distinctions, to (1) different 
fields of  departure, (2) varying dimensionalities of  transgressions within the 
same general field, and (3) diverse ways of  weighing separate infractions. 
The identification of  transcendence does not yield any means of  addressing 
these problems to arrive at a relational ranking of  departures from 
transcendence. (Sen 2006, 221) 
So, the problems that Sen notices are similar to the ones raised by Farrelly. The 
main difficulty with transcendental theories of  justice consists in their incapacity to offer 
guidance to address concrete trade-offs. If  we merely dispose of  a conception of  what 
is the best we can aspire to, such acknowledgement, by itself, does not offer any tools to 
compare concrete cases. Indeed, in complex circumstances, we cannot establish what 
option would qualify as an improvement with respect to justice, especially because, Sen 
says, “the identification of  the best does not specify a unique ranking with respect to 
which the best stands at the pinnacle; indeed the same best may go with a great many 
different rankings with the same pinnacle” (Sen 2006, 221). And so, he adds, the fact 
that we might regard the Mona Lisa as the best picture in the world cannot help defining 
a unique ranking of  all the paintings of  the world. 
Hence, if  transcendental theories of  justice cannot help assessing what should be 
done here and now, because they cannot help assessing concrete trade-offs, should the 
project of  NPT be abandoned? Actually, in Sen’s opinion, we do not lose much in 
avoiding transcendental theories. For Sen, besides being insufficient, transcendental 
theories are unnecessary to address real-world dilemmas. To support his idea, he 
proposes the much-cited example of  mount Everest: 
we may indeed be willing to accept, with great certainty, that Everest is the 
tallest mountain in the world, completely unbeatable in terms of  stature by 
any other peak, but that understanding is neither needed, nor particularly 
helpful, in comparing the heights of, say, Kanchenjunga and Mont Blanc. 
There would be something very deeply odd in a general belief  that a 
comparison of  any two alter natives cannot be sensibly made without a 
prior identification of  a supreme alternative. (2006, 222) 
In particular, what Sen emphasises is that we can usefully decide between two 
social states of  affairs without completing the work of  ideal theory first. We can 
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recognise what represents a case of  injustice and proceed to its remedy without 
assessing what would constitute the best achievement for us. 
Indeed, Sen's idea of  theorising about justice comes close to what Farrelly has in 
mind as a possible solution to the ineffectiveness of  contemporary political theories. 
Both favour a discursive approach to justice, in which contingent problems are assessed 
in light of  the concrete alternatives that are available to us and, most importantly, in 
light of  a process of  mutual recognition of  what circumstances require a remedy 
because are perceived as unjust (Farrelly 2007, 859-62 and Sen 2006, 224). Then, 
according to both Sen and Farrelly, what ought to be done should be established 
through a case-by-case analysis in which empirical inquiry plays a crucial role and every 
judgement must be considered “provisional” in character. Political judgments are seen as 
the result of  an ongoing knowledge, rather than a once-and-for-all appraisal of  what 
perfect justice requires (Farrelly 2007, 860).  
From this picture, we can conclude that the authors who give specific emphasis to 
the practical role of  NPT, thereby proceeding to a rejection of  ideal theories, defend a 
particular restrictive view of  the border of  possible worlds appropriate for political 
theory. As ideal theories ought to be dismissed in favour of  a non-ideal (comparative, in 
Sen's terminology) approach to justice, the worlds that NPT could legitimately consider 
(in order to prescribe which courses of  action ought to be pursued) are those which are 
recognised as accessible from the point of  view of  the agents deliberating. For this 
reason, I call this methodological approach an output realist one: in fact, those authors 
appeal to a more empirically-aware political theory, and seek a restriction of  the possible 
worlds considered, in search for practically effective prescriptions. 
 
3.2. Output Idealism 
So far, we have seen a first argument in favour of  output constraints for NPT. 
However, in the literature, the output strategy has been defended also in a slightly 
different form. In fact, this second way of  dealing with methodological constraints 
placed on the outputs of  theories arises as a critical reaction against the first 
methodological approach just introduced, namely output realism. 
The bulk of  the argument against output realists, as it typically sounds, consists in 
saying that the criticism against ideal theory is fundamentally misplaced, because it is 
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grounded on a misunderstanding of  the very role played by ideal theories in NPT. 
Moreover, the argument goes, if  ideal theories are interpreted according to their proper 
role, their function looks as a necessary component of  NPT. Hence, the detractors of  
output realism claim, even though ideal theories are not action-guiding theories, they are 
a necessary part of  NPT. 
Indeed, those who argue in favour of  a revision of  the criterion of  adequacy just 
discussed maintain that output realists make a crucial categorical mistake. They conflate 
“NPT” with “action-guiding theory” and, as a consequence, they substantially 
misunderstand the role ideal theories are meant to play in NPT9. However, the critiques 
of  output realism claim, ideal theory is not supposed to provide guidance to address 
concrete dilemmas. As Ingrid Robeyns affirms, “ideal theory plays a limited role: it looks 
like the Paradise Island where we ideally would like to be, but it does not tell us how to 
get closer to the island. That work has to be done by nonideal theory, and justice-
enhancing action design and implementation” (Robeyns 2008, 361, emphasis added). 
That is, in order to come up with an effective understanding of  our practical duties, we 
need to complement ideal theory with other theoretical tools. Therefore, it looks surely 
true that ideal theorising, by itself, cannot be sufficient to establish what ought to be 
done here and now – simply because ideal theory is not conceived to be directly 
effective in actual circumstances. As a consequence, the reasons put forward for 
rejecting ideal theory sensibly weakens. We should not create “false oppositions” (Swift 
2008, 370): the charge of  ineffectiveness is not a good argument for supporting a turn 
to non-ideal methodologies in political theory. 
Moreover, the critiques of  output realism continue, ideal theories – understood as 
theories which inquiry what a full just society would look like – constitute a fundamental 
part of  NPT, pace Sen's and Farrelly's beliefs. The usual target of  these observations is, 
indeed, Sen's defence of  a comparative approach to justice. In fact, while the critics of  
output realism admit, with Sen, that there might be cases in which the comparison 
between two political states of  affairs is unproblematic, as we can easily discern which 
one approximate justice the most without recurring to any “ideal” of  perfect society 
(e.g. comparing a society that bans slavery with one that allows it), the majority of  cases 
                                                 
9 David Estlund sharply points out “if  a theory of  social justice is offered, and it is objected, 'But you and 
I both know people will never do that,' I believe the right response is (as a starter), 'I never said they 
would.'” (2014, 114). 
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are not likewise straightforward (Robeyns 2012, 160-61; Stemplowska 2008, 334-38; and 
Swift 2008, 372-75). Many cases of  injustice are too complex, and often hidden behind 
the veil of  cultural acceptance, to be addressed as self-evident truths. Moreover, it looks 
reasonable to say that political theorists should precisely concentrate their efforts on the 
most disputable cases: on those injustices that are still far from been eradicated because 
largely unrecognised. As Charles Mills and Ingrid Robeyns remind us, gender and race 
are clear examples of  issues that cannot be addressed without a serious theoretical 
inquiry that call into question our ideological beliefs (Mills 2005, 165-83 and Robeyns 
2012, 161). How do we know when justice about gender or race has been fully realised? 
Thus, in order to adequately understand about what should be done in the actual 
political world, it looks necessary to elaborate theories of  justice. Merely resorting to a 
comparison between the political arrangements that are currently implementable will 
not allow, most of  the times, to acknowledge what justice entails10.  
On a similar note, it is also often added that an idea of  what full justice requires is 
indispensable in order not to worsen the circumstances in which we live in, by 
obstructing (unwittingly) the progress towards justice. In fact, looking once again at 
Sen's thesis, if  non-ideal theory aims at advancing justice, we cannot always know, just 
by comparing actual circumstances, what choice would qualify as a progress towards 
justice. Actions that appear appropriate now could prevent the achievement of  future 
states of  affairs which best approximate justice. Hence, we need to know the full 
“navigation map” in order to be sure that present choices are just choices (Robeyns 
2012, 160). For this reason, non-ideal theory necessitates ideal theory because, as John 
Simmons points out: “we, as theorists of  justice, simply should not care which policies 
are politically possible (etcetera) unless those policies are also on an acceptable path to a 
just institutional structure. To dive into nonideal theory without an ideal theory in hand 
is simply to dive blind, to allow irrational free rein to the mere conviction of  injustice 
and to eagerness for change of  any sort” (2010, 34).  
That is why, those who reject output realism say that we should better conceive 
NPT as a manifold discipline in which each part has its own indispensable function. In 
this sense, it is observed that “there is no real conflict between ideal and nonideal theory. 
                                                 
10 Adam Swift, moreover, suggests that even in cases of  recognition of  basic and manifest injustice we are 
implicitly making reference to a fundamental reason that justifies our belief. According to Swift (2008, 
375), ideal theories help to justify and clarify those fundamental reasons. 
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Indeed, we should see all normative theorizing as part of  a common project: the use of  ideal 
theory techniques contributes to the use of  nonideal theory techniques (and vice versa)” 
(Stemplowska 2008, 339; emphasis added). 
Then, if  NPT might have different dimensions and roles, what kind of  feasibility 
concerns should matter? That is, if  ideal levels of  theorising are not meant to offer 
effective prescriptions but are, nonetheless, a necessary part of  NPT, what kind of  
methodological constraints should apply to those levels? In this respect, those who seek 
a revision of  output realism claim that feasibility constraints ought to be sensibly 
reduced, or even completely ignored, when the goal is defining what full justice requires. 
In fact, two possible analysis of  feasibility constraints for ideal theories can be identified 
in the literature. I will call them the logical analysis and the normative analysis respectively. 
Let us see them in turn: 
 
Logical analysis of  feasibility constraints: according to the proponents of  logical 
arguments, justice must be conceived as a notion that is logically independent from the one 
of  feasibility. Hence, following this path, a valid theory of  justice needs to explicitly 
avoid any reference to feasibility constraints. Versions of  this argument in favour of  the 
logical independence of  justice from feasibility can be found both in Pablo Gilabert and, 
most notably, in Gerald A. Cohen. Gilabert defends a version of  the independence 
thesis explaining that the predicate 'just' cannot be subsumed under the predicate 
'feasible'; this happens because we can perfectly make sense of  states of  affairs which 
are just, and yet not feasible (and, crucially, vice-versa too). Drawing from an example 
proposed by Gilabert himself, the (supposed) analytic independence between justice and 
feasibility can be emphasised by comparing three societies s1, s2 and s3 according to 
both standards. In fact, we could perfectly make sense of  a situation like the following: 
suppose that our conception of  justice is given by a single egalitarian principle which 
allows us to rank the three society from the more to the less just in the order s1 → s2 
→ s3. Suppose now that s1 is not implementable and, therefore, we should choose to 
pursue s2. Would this mean that s1 ceases to be preferable from the point of  view of  
justice? For Gilabert (2009, 662), such conclusion certainly looks awkward11. Therefore, 
                                                 
11 On a similar note, Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012) who propose a methodological schema of  analysis 
in which ideals are to be conceived as categorically independent from considerations of  feasibility. 
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we should be careful to distinguish – for the sake of  analytic clarity – what is a 
requirement of  justice and what is required of  us to do, also on the basis of  feasibility 
considerations also. 
Cohen, similarly, argues that justice is logically independent from issues of  
feasibility and human nature. In his much-cited article “Facts and Principles”, Cohen 
(2003) argues that, in order to properly understand what justice requires, it is necessary 
to bracket all factual considerations. Principles of  justice, Cohen famously says, need to 
be conceived as fundamentally fact-insensitive (2003, 214). The main argument that he 
proposes in favour of  a fact-insensitive interpretation of  principles of  justice is a strictly 
logical one. Recalling his own words, Cohen invites us to consider the case of  a principle 
P which might be grounded on a certain fact F, such as “we should keep our promises 
(call that P) because only when promises are kept can promises successfully pursue their 
projects (call that F)” (2003, 216). In this case, if  we were asked to explain why F 
grounds P, we would have to provide another general principled answer P1 which 
motivates the correlation, such as “we should help people to pursue their project”. But 
then, it would be legitimate to reiterate our perplexities asking what does explain this 
second correlation: this question, in fact, could be indefinitely reiterated. Thus, it should 
be concluded that, if  a sound ground for the principles that we advance must be found, 
this cannot lie on the recognition of  some facts which explain their validity. Unless we 
do not want to fall into an infinite regression, thereby failing to justify why some 
principles should be regarded as authoritative, there must necessarily be a fact-
insensitive principle P which explains why we hold some principles valid (Cohen 2003, 
218). For this reason, according to Cohen, the question “What is justice?” is essentially 
different from the one “What principles should we adopt to regulate our affairs?”; and 
yet, in order to have a clear grasp of  the second, we need to answer the first, which is 
unconstrained by factual considerations, hence by feasibility assessments too (Cohen 
2003, 244). 
 
Normative analysis of  feasibility constraints: I have labelled the second type of  
analysis as 'normative' because the argument here advanced is based on a reflection 
about how the reasoning about the requirements of  justice should proceed, not how it 
could proceed. Indeed, such an interpretation of  feasibility constraints for ideal theory is 
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typically inspired by a fundamental stance: NPT should not let us easily off  the hook, 
because it is supposed to provide a critical standpoint from which to assess our actual 
political world. According to the normative analysis, it would be conceptually 
inappropriate to let justice depend upon implementability (i.e. feasibility as interpreted 
by output realists: feasible here and now with reasonable expectancy of  success), 
because such a conceptual framing would neglect the fundamental function that 
conceptions of  justice are supposed to serve: the one of  providing a critical standpoint 
for assessing, and hopefully improving, our imperfect political world. Indeed, by 
endorsing a conception of  justice constrained by implementability requirements we 
would adopt an unduly permissive and adaptive attitude towards the status quo. We 
would fall into – what David Estlund (2008, 263) calls – “complacent realism”. The fact 
is that, the argument typically goes, the set of  states of  affairs that we have the potential 
ability to bring about is wider than the set of  states of  affairs which are feasible in the 
“here and now”. This is a point which output realists do not deny. For instance, there 
are several states of  affairs that we could reach through chains of  actions, which are 
nevertheless presently unrealisable12. So, even if  we agreed that a conception of  justice 
must be limited by some form of  feasibility constraint, thereby contesting somehow the 
logical analysis, we could still challenge the idea that the appropriate constraint for a 
conception of  justice is the narrow implementability constraint. 
In fact, if  we think about the function and value that we intuitively assign to 
claims of  justice, designing a conception of  justice on the proviso that its validity is 
conditional upon implementability would bring about unacceptable consequences. First 
and foremost, we would have to admit that a large part of  (what we perceive as) severe 
injustices and blameworthy behaviours are, actually, not to be seen as cases of  injustice 
at all. Pushing the output realist approach to its natural consequences, we could not – 
strictly speaking – condemn the occurrence of  deep-rooted reproachful events, given 
the fact that they are not presently remediable (Estlund 2014 and Gheaus 2013). As 
                                                 
12 Pablo Gilabert (2012) well discusses the importance of  conceiving political action in light of  what we 
could achieve over time, not just presently. Indeed, according to Gilabert, the extent and the border of  
what is achievable through practical agency is much wider than the set of  states of  affairs currently 
implementable, because we can progressively change current circumstances and act according to long-
term goals. For this reason, Gilabert (2012, 47-48) introduces the concept of  dynamic duties: we could 
have duties to act in order to create the necessary conditions for the future realisation of  just states of  
affairs. Similarly, Mark Jensen (2009) talks about the possibility of  realising states of  affairs taking 
advantage of  indirect diachronic abilities. 
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David Estlund remarks, excluding from the domain of  justice states of  affairs which are 
believed that will hardly be realised (that is, extremely improbable) would lead to 
legitimise inferences like the following: given the fact that humans are hardly prone to 
behave according to principles of  justice, behaving according to principles of  justice 
should not be legitimately required. Against such possible outcomes, he points out “I do 
not accept the […] perverse principle that if  it’s unlikely, however possible or easy, then 
it’s not required. It is not the case that ought implies reasonably likely” (Estlund 2014, 265, 
emphasis added). 
Because of  these counter-intuitive consequences, offering an appropriate 
conception of  the requirements of  justice, it is argued, solicit endorsing a perspective 
which brackets considerations of  implementability. Requirements of  justice must be 
freed from implementability constraints because, otherwise, we would be prone to 
legitimise all those practices which are presently unlikely to be changed. In other words, 
we would endorse the attitude opposite to the critical one requested: we would favour 
adaptive preference formation.  
 
At this point, recalling the main question that this paper deals with, we can 
summarize how methodological adequacy is interpreted among those who criticise the 
output realist approach and, accordingly, how the border of  possible worlds for NPT 
comes to be conceived within their framework of  analysis. 
We have seen that the critics of  output realism emphasise the complex structure 
of  NPT as a discipline. NPT must include different theoretical layers which mutually 
contribute to an appropriate definition of  our actual duties. Accordingly, the detractors 
of  output realism claim that it would make little sense to impose a single and uniform 
methodological requirement on NPT – as output realist did, assigning to effectiveness in 
this real world the value of  absolute standard of  assessment of  theories. The 
methodological adequacy of  theories should be assessed in light of  the specific function 
they play within NPT.  
In particular, as we have seen, methodological adequacy is structured each time 
around the widening or narrowing of  the feasibility constraints applied. So that, 
theoretical levels which are concerned with what should be done in ideal scenarios will 
be constrained by thin (or none) feasibility requirements, while theoretical levels 
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interested in providing prescriptions for the actual world ought to follow more stringent 
feasibility requirements. In other words, the methodological assessment of  theories is 
structured around a binary correspondence between function of  the theory we are 
engaged with and degree of  feasibility which is required of  it. 
What is, then, the border of  possible worlds for NPT the critics of  output realism 
would be willing to accept? In the output realist case, a uniform feasibility requirement 
justified a certain maximum distance that could be admitted between the envisioned 
world and the actual world: the set of  possible political worlds that NPT could refer to 
(in order to define what ought to be done here and now) had to be consistent with the 
states of  affairs presently accessible to actual agents. According to the alternative 
strategy that the detractors of  output realism defend, the maximum distance between 
the actual and the possible NPT can admit will be given by the less stringent feasibility 
constraints that applies to one of  the theoretical levels which are meant to play a role in 
NPT. Then, the methodological analysis proposed here is still a form of  output 
methodological strategy – the constraints discussed are, indeed, still constraints of  
applicability. However, the limits that ought to be imposed to NPT result here sensibly 
reinterpreted. In particular, two major interpretations of  the border of  possible worlds 
for NPT can be identified, and they usually come as consequences of  an endorsement 
of  logic or normative arguments respectively. Following a logical interpretation of  
feasibility constraints, there is one level of  analysis in which there are no feasibility 
constrains that do apply; following a normative interpretation, there is at least a minimal 
feasibility constraint that does apply to the whole of  NPT. This is due to the diverse 
rationale that moves the logical and normative interpretations respectively. According to 
Cohen, reasoning about justice should disregard any consideration about what can be 
done. Therefore, pure justice could require the realisation of  worlds which are 
inaccessible to human agency. On the contrary, normative arguments challenged output 
realism starting from a recognition that human action has enough power to access states 
of  affairs which go beyond what can be implemented given the current circumstances. 
So, granted that – according to normative arguments – a conception of  justice should 
be consistent with what can be feasible, NPT should be constrained by a more inclusive 
notion of  feasibility, comprising also states of  affairs that are not presently 
implementable. On this vein, for instance, Andrew Mason, distancing himself  from 
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both John Dunn and Gerald A. Cohen, claims that fundamental principles of  justice 
should be consistent with certain constraints given by human nature. Specifically, Mason 
says, “no principle of  justice could be adequate if  it would make unreasonable demands 
upon some” (2004, 260-62). 
Thus, according to this revised output strategy, in order to provide a definition of  
the appropriate border of  politically possible worlds for NPT, we would have to define 
what are the theoretical levels that can be admitted in NPT and what are, 
correspondingly, the thinnest feasibility constraints that do apply to the less empirically-
informed level. Moreover, in case we agreed with such a revised output strategy, there 
would be an additional theoretical challenge to face. We would have to show how the 
gap between levels of  analysis can be filled; that is, how, and to what extent, ideal levels 
of  analysis influence and inform less abstract ones. In other words, we would have to 
provide a sound account of  the transition between levels of  analysis13. 
 
4. The Input strategy 
At the beginning of  this paper, I said that are two fundamental ways to impose 
descriptive constraints on NPTs. We have just dealt with the output strategy, let me now 
turn to the second approach: the input strategy. The input strategy, which I am about to 
explain, remains largely neglected by those scholarly strands that mainly deal with the 
themes of  ideal theory and feasibility in political theory. Indeed, the literature discussed 
so far interprets the challenge of  realism in political theory as a challenge which 
essentially regards the adequacy of  theories' outputs – their ability to be useful for 
guiding actions in the actual world14. But, as I am going to show in a while, the main 
challenge political realism raises against ideal theory comes from another direction. 
Political realism fundamentally criticise the justificatory procedure ideal theories adopt, 
which relies heavily on idealised or severely abstract premises15. The reason at the basis 
                                                 
13 The problem of  transition remains a largely underexplored methodological issue. A valuable exception 
is offered in Valentini 2009. 
14 Examples of  analyses in which realism in political theory is interpreted as a plea for the effectiveness of  
theories can be found in Runciman 2012; Valentini 2012; and Zuolo 2012. 
15 William Galston (2010), for example, who offers a wide overview of  the realist tradition, seems often to 
conflate the two charges against ideal theorising. Anyway, the best way to qualify the realist tradition is 
to recall its origins. Political realists follow the steps of  classical political thinkers like Thucydides, 
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Weber. Among the most prominent contemporary theorists which can 
rightfully be inserted within the realist tradition (even if  they do not explicitly define themselves as 
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of  such a neglect may be attributed to the similar stance that moves both output realism 
and input realism: a shared uneasiness towards forms of  political theorising which 
ignore actual political reality16. However, systematising these two methodological 
interpretations of  realism in political theory looks fundamental as the two methods (and 
the two correspondent critiques realism moves against ideal theories) are independent 
from each other, and lead to substantively different ideas of  methodological adequacy in 
NPT, as well as to diverse procedures to define the border of  political possibilities that 
we are looking for. 
So, let us now turn to the input strategy – to the reasons that ground such a 
methodological approach and to its main characteristics. To begin with, let me clearly 
state what is the central claim defended by the proponents of  the input strategy: the 
main fallacy of  ideal theories is not their inapplicability to real-world circumstances – i.e. 
the practical impotence of  the principles they advance, as output 'realists' claimed. 
Rather, ideal theories are flawed precisely because they are intended to (although 
indirectly) apply to real-world circumstances. Yet, input theorists point out, the typical 
structure of  their justification makes the principles they derive invalid in the actual 
political context.  
What is the reason behind such a criticism against ideal theories, and how does it 
affect the construction of  NPTs? From a realist perspective, the main fallacy of  ideal 
theories is that they fail to take the autonomy of  politics seriously. They are, as Bernard 
Williams (2005, 1-3) says, paradigmatic examples of  political moralism – expression which 
Williams introduces in order to emphasise the peculiarity of  the opposite approach he 
favours: political realism, indeed. Picturing political realism as a form of  political thinking 
opposite to political moralism is probably the most appropriate and efficacious way of  
conveying the core of  political realism's thesis. At least, of  that version of  political 
realism that I define as input realism. According to Williams, political moralist 
approaches to politics can take two forms, the “enactment model” and the “structural 
                                                                                                                                          
realists), we can find John Dunn, Raymond Geuss, Stuart Hampshire, Bonnie Honig, Chantal Mouffe, 
Glenn Newey, Marc Philp, and Bernard Williams, but certainly this list is far from being exhaustive. 
16 Along similar lines, Rossi and Sleat (2014) emphasise that political realism must be distinguished from 
non-ideal theory. While non-ideal theory is meant to clarify how and when political prescriptions are 
feasible, political realism is more concerned with specifying which are the appropriate sources of  
normativity for political theories. Expressed in this way, the difference between non-ideal theory and 
realist theory largely resembles the divide I am pointing out between output and input realism. Here, 
my hope is to further explore and systematise the methodological divide that Rossi and Sleat outline. 
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model”; however, what matters for the present purposes is what they have in common: 
“Under the enactment model, politics is (very roughly) the instrument of  the moral; 
under the structural model, morality offers constraints […] on what politics can 
rightfully do. In both cases, political theory is something like applied morality” (2005, 1-2). In 
both cases, that is, morality takes priority over politics – what ought to be done in 
politics has to depend on some principles which are defined by political theory and then 
applied to the political realm. The circumstances of  application of  those principles do 
not affect the validity of  the principles themselves: they merely define the set of  the 
options available which the theory ranks. It is easy to realise why such a moralist 
approach to political theory resembles the methodology advocated by the supporters of  
ideal theory. We have seen that, according to the critics of  output realism, ideal theories 
were judged necessary to understand our political duties in concrete circumstances. 
Moreover, such ideal theories, in order to be adequate, had to disregard political reality 
in substantive respects, either for logical or for normative reasons. In order not to fall 
into “complacent realism”, ideal theories were elaborated bracketing the specificities of  
their circumstances of  application – objectivity was sought by applying a normative 
framework designed at a higher order of  generality to the particular circumstances. 
Williams, however, thinks that there is something inappropriate in such a way of  
proceeding. In fact, he declares “I shall try to contrast with [political moralism] an 
approach which gives a greater autonomy to distinctively political thought. This can be called 
[…] “political realism”” (2005, 3). Indeed, as we will see shortly, for Williams the 
peculiarities of  political practices encourage the endorsement of  a “bottom-up” 
methodology: the circumstances of  application ought to have a role in establishing 
which principles of  action to follow. Then, the key theme against political moralist 
theories is the autonomy of  the political: moralist theories do not understand the 
peculiarity of  politics, and thereby betray political thinking17.  
Why do political practices require a political normativity – i.e. a normativity 
sensible to concrete political circumstances? Political practices are structured by specific 
internal dynamics and arise for serving particular social needs – this specificity makes 
political practices somehow ontologically irreducible to other forms of  practical life. So 
that, in assessing principles for political conduct, we should evaluate those principles 
                                                 
17 On the irreducible character of  political normativity see also Newey 2010. 
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within political practices and its own driving forces, endorsing a systemic view in which 
the adequacy of  principles is judged in light of  the purposes of  those practices and the 
consequences they might bring about. Refraining to adopt such an inner perspective 
leads to political theories whose form may turn out to be internally fallacious, and/or 
whose normative content might prove to be unsatisfactory.   
The attitude that underlies political moralism – its attempt to interpret political 
practices through principles insensitive to political reality – has been defined as an 
irresponsible way of  understanding politics and political action. This classical charge of  
irresponsibility comes from Max Weber. Weber, in the Vocations Lectures (2004) 
introduces the distinction between “ethic of  responsibility” and “ethic of  conviction” 
precisely in order to underline the inappropriateness of  approaching political decisions 
by means of  an ethic of  conviction – that is, by determining what ought to be done 
applying fixed principles for action to the political sphere. This request for responsibility 
is what motivates also Williams's realist proposal. Williams recalls Weber's notion of  
responsibility several times, explaining that political decisions are “political” when they 
are “responsible” decisions (Williams 2005, 14); and that the political realist approach to 
politics is what best serves a responsible attitude towards politics18. So, to better 
understand the realist unease against political moralism, let me recall the Weber’s 
discussion of  the role of  responsibility in political judgment.  
According to Weber, those who act following an ethic of  conviction determine 
what ought to be done referring to a set of  principles which hold unconditionally – that 
is, which hold no matter what political reality is or happens to be – the same political 
moralist approach Williams talks about, as we will see. Those who act on the basis of  
principles approach political circumstances by merely applying the content of  their 
ethical views, i.e. selecting which course of  action, among the ones available, best serve 
their cause (Weber 2004, 83). Being so, the conclusions reached by ethics of  conviction 
are completely unaffected by the overall consequences that the actions prescribed might 
bring about. This blindness with respect to the side-effects of  the prescribed actions is 
indeed consistent with the spirit that animates the ethic of  conviction: if  principles hold 
unconditionally, what they prescribe as right to do in some circumstances cannot be 
                                                 
18 Williams (2005, 12) suggests that “thinking politically” means reasoning adopting the Weberian ethic of  
responsibility. Moreover, he emphasises that the ethic of  responsibility “is still very much an ethic. But 
many do not see this point” (2005, 72). 
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revised in light of  the circumstances themselves; rather, the circumstances merely define 
the options available to us (Weber 2004, 83-83). For Weber, such insensitivity towards 
the consequences that actions might bring about is the reason why the ethic of  
conviction proves to be a form of  normative reasoning inadequate for politics.  
In fact, if  we try to locate the ethic of  conviction within political circumstances, 
some perplexities regarding its consistency and appropriateness as a form of  political 
theory arise. To see the point, then, we must ask what are the circumstances of  politics 
in which those principles are meant to be applied. According to realists, there are some 
basic and unavoidable facts which characterise and explain the existence of  the practice 
of  politics. Above all, politics arises in circumstances of  disagreement and unbalance of  
powers. Politics, indeed, settles a social order where the lack of  consensus and the use 
of  force lead to conflictual relationships19. That is why Weber says that the crucial 
means for political action is violence: political goals can only be achieved through the 
use of  force and are steadily imposed by coercion. In similar circumstances, establishing 
what ought to be done on the basis of  the sole ethic of  conviction would justify an 
unmediated use of  force.  
Being an ethic of  conviction, the means to achieve a certain political goal are not 
taken into account when the validity of  the principles that ought to guide actions is 
assessed: the side-effects cannot push towards a revision of  the principles themselves. 
This means that, if  some action is consistent with what a certain principle prescribes, it 
is judged irrelevant whether that action exacerbates conflict among parties. More 
worrisomely, that principle, independently validated, could push us to favour the use of  
violence in order to achieve a worthwhile goal: if  we know what are the ethical 
prescriptions, we have a strong reason to try to force reality towards that achievement, 
in order not to collapse on a complacent acceptance of  the status quo. In other words, 
from the point of  view of  the ethic of  conviction, an unmediated use of  force becomes 
a legitimate means to the fulfilment of  some specific ends (Weber 2004, 89).  
Now, is this potential consequence acceptable from a political point of  view? As 
said, there are two reasons for being dissatisfied with a similar result. Firstly, there is 
something in the choice of  endorsing an ethic of  conviction that strikes as somehow 
inadequate for politics. In fact, we have seen that politics, according to political realists, 
                                                 
19 For a classical discussion of  the “circumstances of  politics” see Waldron 1999, 102-06. 
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arises as a response to situations of  deep disagreement, which may lead to an 
uncontrollable clash of  powers. Defending the achievement of  some ends in the 
political domain, and acting accordingly, means trying to settle a certain equilibrium 
whereby such end can be pursued in a fairly stable and ordered way. In other words, 
politics seems to serve a value and a purpose that the ethic of  conviction is unable to 
understand and respect. Hence, there seems to be a kind of  normative loss by merely 
applying normative principles to a certain practice, without letting those principles to 
depend on an understanding of  the practice itself20. 
Secondly, Weber suggests that there is a kind of  tension between what the 
supporters of  the ethic of  conviction want to achieve on the one hand, and the 
constraints posed by political reality on the other. Indeed, following the picture of  
political reality offered by realists, to enforce a principle in political circumstances means 
trying to impose a certain conduct of  action as the right one to follow, against contrary 
tendencies. Disagreement, indeed, entails that we will have to measure ourselves with 
those who do not have our same views regarding what is right or wrong to do in 
politics. Moreover, as our objective is not seeking conflict with the end of  fostering 
conflict per se, but in order to defend the establishment of  a certain political conduct, 
stability will be an implicit and fundamental interest of  ours. Given the objective just 
explained and the circumstances in which it is pursued, the main contention of  Weber is 
that, allowing room for an indiscriminate use of  force, i.e. judging what should be done 
by deducting it from a principled reasoning, defeats the purpose itself  of  suggesting 
what principles ought to govern collective life (Weber 2004, 89-90). Hence, drawing 
normative principles disregarding the peculiarity of  the practice they are meant to apply 
to leads also to a theoretical loss. For, if  we want to suggest what principles ought to 
govern political reality, we should better know what principles could be consistent with 
the existence of  political reality itself21. 
At this point, the reasons why political realists emphasise the importance of  the 
ethic of  responsibility in politics can be appreciated. Politics ought to be analysed and 
                                                 
20 In this vein talks also Bonnie Honig (1993) who emphasises the displacement of  politics of  current 
political theory. Contemporary normative analysis of  politics seems to be unable to understand what 
is most valuable within political practices. 
21 This is why Newey (2001) says that contemporary political philosophy construe post-political 
paradigms, proposals which cannot be consistent with the reality of  politics itself. The point of  view 
of  contemporary political philosophy is, in this sense, located “after politics”. 
47 
assessed through a prior, and mature, understanding of  politics itself  – of  its peculiarity, 
dynamics and sense. Avoiding this bottom-up approach leads to potentially dangerous 
prescriptions and weak political theories.  
There are other examples that can be recalled in which the inadequacy of  
discussing the normativity of  politics through principles drawn disregarding the 
specificity of  politics emerges quite strikingly. For reasons of  clarity, I am going to 
mention one more example: the case of  the duty of  truthfulness in politics. Williams 
discusses the case in “Truth, Politics, and Self-deception” (2005, 154-64). Here, Williams 
points out that from a (supposed) duty to tell the truth among individuals, we should 
not draw any conclusion with respect to the role of  truth in politics. The point, for 
Williams, is that whether truth has any role in politics or not, should be established 
through an appropriate political reasoning. The deduction from the private to the 
political realm would sound as follows: “if  it is a good thing (other things being equal) 
for people to be truthful, it is a good thing for people in government to be truthful” 
(2005, 157). Can we apply the same normative criteria both to individuals and to 
politics? Can individual morality adequately answer political questions? To this purpose, 
let us bear in mind that the relationship between rulers and ruled is a relation of  
subordination in which the ruling power, in order to rule successfully, must provide 
some effective reasons for acceptance. In other words, the benefits of  accepting the 
established order must overcome the possible disadvantages. For this reason, rulers have 
special responsibilities towards their subjects which private individuals do not have 
towards each other. In particular, as the minimal condition for accepting a ruling power 
is the perception of  being safer in – rather than out – politics, “any government is 
charged with the security of  its citizens, a responsibility which cannot be discharged 
without secrecy […]”22. So, for governments, the security of  the subjects is a 
fundamental function to absolve. The pursuit of  this function might require that 
truthfulness be left sometimes aside as a politically dangerous reason for action. 
However, this case cannot be contemplated by those who apply individual morality to 
                                                 
22 Recall that the problem with political moralism consists in the fact that it approaches politics through 
the lenses of  principles drawn from individual morality or, more generally, drawn disregarding the 
peculiarity of  politics. Political moralism does not indeed negate the value of  politics as a specific 
sphere of  practical agency – thesis which would require other, possibly anarchists, arguments to be 
supported. Despite such recognition, political moralists judge methodologically correct proceeding by 
deducing normative principles for politics from more general normative commitments about 
individual morality. 
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politics. Individual relationships are substantially different, they do not host relations of  
subordination similar to the political ones. Hence, they cannot furnish the necessary 
means to define the role of  truthfulness in politics as a specific political question. 
Political moralism, in other words, cannot see a reason for refraining from the truth, 
whereas politics, on the contrary, sees it. So, there are some circumstances which 
characterise governmental relationships, and which do not characterise individual ones, 
that make the superimposition of  individual morality to politics a fundamentally 
inadequate way of  discussing the role of  a duty of  truthfulness in politics. Certainly, this 
does not mean that truth in politics is not valuable. It merely means that, in order to 
assess the role of  truth in politics, we should proceed endorsing a realist point of  view – 
namely, from an appreciation of  the reality of  politics and its dynamics. 
To sum up, what does these examples show? To a realist's eye, they show the 
intrinsic peculiarity of  politics as a field of  practical agency and the inadequacy of  
designing normative proposals independently from an appraisal of  the practices that 
they are meant to guide. So – to recall our main question – how should political theories 
be adequately construed? What is the appropriate methodology to follow? 
I will follow the account proposed by Andrea Sangiovanni (2008), in order to 
show how a practice-dependent justification of  a NPT could proceed. The advantage of  
Sangiovanni's account, I think, is that it can be easily applied to the realist methodology 
more generally. The idea of  a Basic Legitimation Demand that Williams defends can be 
reconstructed in such practice-dependent terms. Moreover, the idea of  practice-
dependence has been recalled by other authors who can be inscribed within a realist 
literature, like Enzo Rossi (2012), or that underline the importance of  a bottom-up 
approach to the normative analysis of  politics, like Aaron James (2013). 
How is a practice-dependence justification supposed to work, then? According to 
Sangiovanni, in order to appropriately understand the normative principle that should 
guide a (political/social) practice we should proceed following two independent steps. 
We should start from an interpretation of  the practice itself; from its point and purpose as 
a social form of  interaction, and from the reasons participants show to abide by its 
rules. Then, this interpretation will need to be supplemented by a critical step aimed at 
assessing what principles could better serve the purpose of  the practice so understood. 
In Sangiovanni's own words: 
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The content, scope, and justification of  a conception of  justice depends of  
the structure and form of  the practices that conception is intended to 
govern. (2008, 138) 
Let us better analyse the methodology suggested by Sangiovanni. Through the 
first, interpretative, step, we try to uncover the purpose underlying the existence of  a 
certain practice. What are the dynamics and interaction that practice makes possible and 
protect? And, accordingly, what are the reasons that participants show for compliance? 
In this way, we attempt to endorse the point of  view of  the participants in order to 
understand, from an inner perspective, what is the ultimate sense of  a certain practice 
and what are the values or functions it aims at defending. This first step provides the 
basic structure for the justification. However, it is with the critical step that the shape of  
the normative conception is defined. To critically assess the content of  the normative 
principles a practice should be governed by, we need to focus on the relationships that 
practice generate – i.e. how it changes and affects social interaction, and, more 
importantly, we shall try to understand what role a normative conception is supposed to 
play within that practice. We assess, in other words, the content of  the normative 
principles that should guide that practice in light of  the purpose that practice aims at 
protecting, and the interactions that become involved in order to grant that purpose. In 
Sangiovanni's own words, our main question must be: “How does the demand for 
justice emerge within the contingent historical and political contexts constituted by the 
institutions?” (2008, 150). 
Only once that these two steps have unfolded, the political realist says, we will be 
able to draw a normative account for the practice in question. In fact, the normative 
principles that ought to guide a given practice will be the ones successfully supporting 
its purpose, given the constraints posed by the contextual relationships in which that 
practice happens to be located. The content of  the normative conception, in other 
words, will be entirely shaped by the function that conception needs to serve. 
Consequently, if  the content of  the normative principles endorsed depends on the 
function those principles are expected to fulfil within a given context, the content of  the 
principles themselves will be practice-dependent: indeed, different contexts will generate 
different normative principles. 
Therefore, the justification will be practice-dependent because the content of  the 
principles endorsed will be derived from an interpretation of  the practices themselves 
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within their contexts. So, following this realist account, we could appeal to values or 
principles in order to justify the normative framework that we are going to propose (a 
normative framework would not be possible without an appeal to values). However, 
crucially, the relevance or adequacy of  such values or principles is subordinated to an 
appreciation of  the role that the normative conception is supposed to play within that 
practice. Hence, it is not the case that some independent values or principles do apply 
uniformly to the different contexts, selecting what is the best course of  action among 
those available. Here, the context itself  shapes the content of  the normative principles 
that ought to apply to it. The direction of  the deduction follows the opposite course: 
the context establishes which are the principles or values we could choose among in 
order to define what ought to be done. 
Sangiovanni is very clear regarding this point: 
Sharing context Cn shapes the reasons we might have for endorsing specific 
principles of  justice Jn for which P [a given normative principle] is a premise 
(J1 for the context C1, J2 for the context C2, and so on), rather then the 
courses of  action we should adopt in implementing them. (2008, 147; emphasis 
in original) 
And Williams, similarly, labelling his method of  normative enquiry a “bottom-up” 
approach, writes: 
The approach of  the liberalism of  fear23 is bottom-up, not top-down. […] It 
does not try to determine in general what anyone has a right to under any 
circumstances and then apply it. It regards the discovery of  what rights 
people have as a political and historical one, not a philosophical one. (2005, 
61) 
Indeed, as I pointed out before, the argument in support of  the well-known Basic 
Legitimation Demand (BLD) that Williams defends could be interpreted as a special 
example of  the justificatory method proposed by Sangiovanni, where the practice 
analysed is the one of  politics itself. Thus, to clarify the point, I would like to sketch (very 
roughly) how the justification of  the BLD proceeds in Williams and what role does it 
play in defining a normative framework for politics. 
First of  all, what is the BLD for Williams? The BLD, as explained in “Realism and 
Moralism”, defines the basic conditions of  acceptability of  a given political power. This 
                                                 
23 Here Williams is referring to the rationale which grounds political realism itself. Political realism tries to 
take politics, hence fear, seriously. On this point, see Williams 2005, 3. 
51 
means that whether a form of  political power will be considered acceptable will depend 
on its ability to appropriately answer the BLD (Williams 2005, 4). Translating the case in 
the terms that we have been using so far, we can say that, for Williams, the BLD 
represents a critical test in order to establish whether a certain political rule (and, hence, 
the form of  collective life it purports to impose) is acceptable as a form of  political 
practice. 
How does Williams derive the BLD and what does it entail with respect to the 
normative frameworks that should guide politics? Williams, endorsing a practice-
dependent perspective, starts from an interpretation of  the practice of  politics itself. 
The point and purpose of  politics is defined as follows: “I identify the “first political 
question in Hobbesian terms as the securing of  order, protection, safety, trust, and the 
conditions of  cooperation” (2005, 3). Williams defines as legitimate those political 
systems which are able to answer the first political question so characterised. So, if  this 
is the point and purpose of  politics – namely, creating a system of  mutual safety and 
cooperation – what form should political practices take? At this point, Williams's 
analysis takes the critical step advocated by Sangiovanni. Williams explains that the basic 
principles of  conduct underlying a political system should have the role of  structuring 
legitimate power relations. Moreover, he specifies that a study of  legitimacy requires an 
analysis of  political relationships within their context, because “the solution should not 
become part of  the problem” (2005, 4). So that, for example, in contemporary 
democracies legitimacy will take the form of  liberalism, as, for historical reasons, a given 
political power will be perceived as granting the protection and safety of  participants 
only if  it abides to certain liberal standards (Williams 2005, 7). 
The BLD constitute such a critical test. Those political powers able to answer the 
first question will be considered legitimate, hence consistent with the point and purpose 
of  politics. The BLD will essentially be, therefore, a contextual test, as the perception of  
legitimacy will depend upon the history of  a particular context. Hence, different 
contexts will host different conceptions of  legitimacy. 
Here, I am not interested in assessing whether or not the justification proposed by 
political realists looks convincing. Of  course, the most controversial point regards the 
initial interpretative step: how can we assess practices themselves? How can we defend 
certain practices without referring to some principle validated independently from the 
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practice itself24? And, accordingly, how should a critique of  the practices themselves be 
conceived, if  the normative reasoning ought to be entirely internal to that practice? I 
believe there could be ways to think about internal critiques of  practices, but this is not 
my point here25. Instead, my point is to show that political realists do defend a bottom-
up, contextualist, justification for NPTs. The methodological approach realist adopt is 
moved by a concern towards feasibility; but rather by a concern towards the autonomy 
of  the political, and the necessity to construe normative frameworks able to respect and 
grasp such ontological peculiarity. So, their concern is entirely with the correctness of  
political theories and their appropriate method of  justification, not with their action-
guiding power26. 
So, we can now come again to our main concern, the one towards the 
methodological criteria of  adequacy. In fact, as I said at the beginning, the 
methodological criteria of  adequacy the two strategies adopt – the output and the input 
strategies – set constraints on the possible worlds NPT could be allowed to prescribe, 
thereby defining a certain border of  politically possibility for NPT. 
What kind of  methodological criteria of  adequacy input realists apply to theories? 
It should now be clear that political realism endorses criteria of  adequacy which concern 
the justification of  theories. In particular, these criteria concern the premises we should 
start from in order to construe a correct theory. As we have seen, for political realists, 
political theories should start from a particular descriptive appraisal of  the practice that 
they are meant to analyse from a normative point of  view. Political theories need to be 
construed starting from an interpretation of  the practice that they are supposed apply to. 
How does this methodological requirement affect the border of  possible worlds 
for NPT? We have seen that the interpretation of  a practice is intended to enlighten the 
point and purpose of  the practice itself; namely, by looking for a correct interpretation 
                                                 
24 For doubts on this specific point, see Erman and Möller 2015 and Larmore 2013. 
25 For two examples in this direction, though framed within two much different traditions, see James 2005 
and Roth 2012. 
26 As a further proof  – even if  minor – of  such a focus of  input realism on justification rather than 
application, consider the typical abstract way of  theorising realist theorists employ to develop their 
analysis. Some writers, like Simone Chambers (2002), have underlined the abstract way of  arguing of  
political realists as a sign of  their failure of  significantly distancing themselves from ideal theorists. 
Even if  they are concerned with criticising the impotence of  ideal theorising to address real world 
problems, it is said, they seem to reiterate the same error by recurring, as a necessity, to severe 
abstractions. However, it should be clear now that a similar accuse misses the point political realists 
intend to raise: the problem is not the detachment from, but the displacement of  politics. On this 
point see also Baderin 2013. 
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of  a practice, we try to sort out what the social significance of  that practice is. In other 
words, we come to see the implicit reasons that ground the existence of  the system of  
relationships that practice generates and sustains. Moreover, as Sangiovanni says, the 
interpretative step provides the structure of  the justification of  the normative principles that 
we will endorse via the critical step. Here, we begin to grasp how the interpretation of  
the practice we start from will affect the description of  the worlds we will be allowed to 
prescribe. We have indeed seen that the principles that are able to pass the second step – 
the critical one – are the ones which better serve the underlying point and purpose of  
the analysed practice. From a political realist perspective, then, the content of  the 
principles endorsed must be construed so as to reflect the underlying purpose of  the 
practice, given the contextual features of  its exercise. Hence, once we can count on a 
convincing interpretation of  a certain social practice, once its social meaning and value 
will be unfolded, the possible worlds adequate to prescribe will be those compatible 
with the conditions of  existence of  the practice itself. That is, as a practice is initially 
isolated by identifying which interactions it gives rise to and sustains, the political 
possible worlds which could appropriately guide our courses of  action will be those in 
which the conditions of  possibility of  such interactions will be respected. 
For this reason, I dub the realist method here presented an “input” 
methodological strategy. Indeed, as we have seen, political realism's main concern 
regards the form of  the justification of  political theories. Following a realist perspective, 
theories must be construed starting from a particular descriptive appraisal of  practices, 
and prescriptions will be substantively constrained by such descriptive starting point. 
 
5. Output strategy and Input strategy: A comparison 
Now that we have a sufficiently clear picture of  what I have called the output 
strategy and the input strategy, I would like to briefly sum up the aspects over which they 
differ. This is meant to highlight how these two different methodologies affect the 
relationships between political possibility and NPT. In fact, whether we are going to 
endorse an output or an input methodological strategy is going to substantively change 
the way in which the appropriate border of  possible worlds for political theory will be 
conceived. 
We have seen that the output strategy assesses the adequacy of  theories by placing 
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some criteria of  adequacy on the conclusions of  the theory themselves. As I explained, 
according to the output strategy, a theory is adequate in case the world(s) it prescribes 
are consistent with a set of  descriptive constraints which define the facts that the theory 
must not attempt to change. For example, a theory may need to be compatible with 
basic facts of  human psychology (i.e. the theory should not prescribe worlds humans 
could not lead themselves to bring about) or with basic facts regarding our present 
culture of  institutions (i.e. a theory should be feasible enough not to require basic 
changes in our institutional structure). Hence, the output strategy adopts criteria of  
adequacy that concern the required degree of  applicability of  a theory. According to the 
specific theoretical goal we set ourselves – namely, what field of  relevance the theory 
has – the outputs we should look for should be carefully consistent with the defined 
constraints. This requirement is precisely set in order to pursue our theoretical goals in 
the best possible way: if  we are interested in what ought to be done here and now, some 
specific constraints will be relevant in order not to fall in utopianism or practical 
irrelevance. On the contrary, if  we are mainly interested in understanding what justice 
per se requires, actual implementability will probably result an inappropriate constraint, 
unless we do not want to collapse on a form of  complacent acceptance of  the status 
quo – human nature, possibly, will qualify as a more adequate constraint. Thus, the 
criteria of  adequacy, so conceived by the output strategy, are construed to be external 
constraints. Once the theory is developed, if  it can be successfully adapted to the stated 
constraints, such theory is methodologically adequate, hence acceptable. According to 
this methodological approach, political theories can be relevant for the assessment of  
different levels of  abstraction as well as different contexts of  application, provided that 
they are able to successfully meet the applicability constraints required.  
However, we have seen that there is another, much different, way to interpret the 
methodological adequacy of  political theories. The input strategy assesses the 
methodological adequacy of  political theories placing constraints on their premises. 
Following the advocates of  the input approach, political theories are methodological 
adequate if  they start from some – suitably specified – descriptive premises. In this case, 
therefore, the descriptive constraints do apply to premises, not to conclusions. We have 
indeed seen that, for those who defend the introduction of  some descriptive constraints 
on the premises, political theories prove to be adequate only if  they start from an 
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appropriate descriptive appraisal of  the practice they are meant to theorise about. 
Following this methodological framework, answering the question “what ought to be 
done...?” always requires starting from an interpretative understanding of  the practice in 
which the question arises. Here, then, the criteria of  adequacy do regard the justification 
of  the theory, not its application. Indeed, the methodological criteria of  adequacy are 
introduced on the basis of  an analysis of  what a good construction of  a political theory 
should look like. For this reason, the descriptive constraints that do apply to political 
theories are here conceived as internal constraints. The descriptive constraints a theory 
starts from define the very content of  the theory, not merely its context of  application.  
What kind of  impact do these two methodological strategies have on the 
definition of  the set of  possible worlds political theory might be allowed to refer to? 
How do these diverse methodological criteria affect the notion of  political possibility 
that we should endorse in NPT? The crucial difference lies on which levels of  
abstraction the two approaches will be prone to judge useful in political theorising. 
According to the output strategy, the reference to ideal theories, understood as theories 
which make use of  severe abstractions, could usefully be a point of  departure to grasp 
what should be done here and now, provided that a good response to the problem of  
transition is offered (otherwise, in a non-ideal vein, we should find a way to construe 
feasible theories which do not need a reference to ideal ones). Therefore, the crucial 
point is the following: for the output strategy, provided that a transition from ideal to 
non-ideal is possible, ideal theories could be adequate starting points in order to 
understand actual practices. Hence, according to the output strategy, the border of  
possible political worlds for NPT would be given by the descriptive constraints which 
apply to the most abstract level of  analysis regarded as useful to analyse actual practices. 
However, this option is unavailable to the proponents of  the input methodological 
approach. Within an input methodological framework, what should be done here and 
now can be established only by theories that are construed starting from a careful 
interpretation of  actual practices. Therefore, an input approach makes unavailable 
precisely the transition from ideal to non-ideal that output theorists are so much 
concerned about: even if  – input theorists say – the transition were possible, it should 
not be pursued. Consequently, in case we agreed with input theorists, we would have to 
define the border of  political possible worlds for NPT in a much different way: the 
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border of  possible worlds for NPT would be given by the descriptive constraints placed 
on the premises of  theories, which would correspond to a description of  the 
relationships that characterise essentially a certain practice. 
Then, the choice of  placing constraints either on output or on input of  theories 
affects which levels of  abstraction would be licit to refer to in political theory. Input 
constraints make unavailable levels of  theorising which would be judged perfectly useful 
and legitimate according to the output strategy. Then, a crucial consequence of  such 
analysis is the recognition that the arguments usually provided in favour of  ideal 
theories must be regarded, from a methodological point of  view, as deeply 
unsatisfactory. For, even if  it is true that ideal theories do not mean to provide action-
guidance for present circumstances – hence, output charges result substantively 
weakened – their adequacy should still be entirely proven against the charges posed by 
input realism. Therefore, it is necessary to conclude that, in order to appropriately 
understand how to cope with the problem of  the border of  possible worlds for political 
possibility, we ought to take into consideration and assess both methodological 
strategies. 
In the next, and conclusive, section I draw a first outline of  how an appropriate 
procedure to tackle the problem of  the border of  political possibility for political theory 
could look like.  
 
6. Conclusion: How to trace the border of  political possibility for NPT 
So far, I said that the arguments in support for ideal theories appear 
unsatisfactory, because incomplete. The advocates of  ideal theories do not recognise 
that, when they refer to “political realism”, they are arguing against a specific form of  
realism in political theory: the realism of  outputs, the one concerned with the action-
guiding power of  theories. They fail to recognise the challenges posed by the realism of  
inputs – the one concerned with the adequacy of  justification. Certainly, the original 
fault of  this misunderstanding does not lie solely on ideal theorists. Realist writers are 
often not clear with respect to their methodological assumption and they seem to show 
unease with respect to both the (alleged) unfeasibility and moralism of  contemporary 
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political theory27. Hence, a better understanding and systematisation of  methodological 
assumptions would serve also the realist cause.  
Thus, given a similar lack of  methodological clarity, we must now ask: how should 
a research procedure able to take into consideration both methodological concerns look 
like? How, accordingly, should our research over the border of  possible worlds for 
political theory be set up? 
Now, to set up an appropriate analysis of  the constraints that do apply to political 
theory, we must understand what kind of  relationship occurs between these two 
methodological strategies. We must understand, in other words, what sorts of  steps are 
necessary to follow in order to come to a well-designed answer. Indeed, if  the two criteria 
of  adequacy were somehow related, analysing one method could give us some tools to 
assess also the other, thereby making our inquiry easier. And yet, a crucial step to set up 
a satisfactory methodological inquiry consists in recognising that the constraints 
required by the two criteria of  adequacy are independent. The two methodological 
strategies are not correlated: the presence or absence of  one of  the two kinds of  
constraint do not allow us to conclude anything with respect to the other. Therefore, we 
must assess them separately and, in addition, we might have to realise that both are 
required. 
The independence of  the methodological claims advanced by the two strategies 
emerges clearly if  we try to construe different models of  realist theories, based on the 
divergence between output and input realism advanced so far. Indeed, I contend, the 
independence of  the two methodological claims emerges particularly vividly if  we 
consider the case of  realist methodologies. 
Partly, the independence of  the two realist methodological claims has been already 
showed when input realism was discussed. Here, I would like to state the point as clearly 
as possible and to highlight its implications for the present purposes. Why must the two 
realist methods be regarded as fully independent? First of  all, because one 
methodological concern does not entail the other. In fact, we can construe consistent 
examples of  political theories which perfectly respect one type of  realist criterion of  
adequacy, while violating the other. We have seen, indeed, examples of  both in the 
analysis conducted so far. Let us think, first, to the case of  a political theory feasible 
                                                 
27 Miller 2008 and Geuss 2008, for example, clearly point out both stances. 
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according to output realist criteria, but not adequate from the point of  view of  input 
realism. Such a theory could be fruitfully represented by a theory which preaches 
truthfulness in politics. A similar theory looks, indeed, feasible and sufficient specific to 
be action-guiding. Nonetheless, it has to be judged inadequate for political realist 
standards, because it is in contradiction with the basic point and purpose of  political 
rule. Now, we could easily imagine an opposite case. We could imagine a political theory 
which, despite its practice-dependent justification, would prove to be unfeasible anyway. 
We could, for example, construe a realist theory of  legitimacy, starting from an appraisal 
of  the practice of  politics, of  its point and purpose – a theory which would judge 
legitimacy as a prerequisite for any political rule, such as the theory of  the BLD 
Williams suggests. However, it is by no means necessary that a similar theory could 
prove to be directly action guiding for current practices, given its high generality. 
Moreover, as Sleat (2014, 329) rightly points out, a fully legitimate political order looks 
hardly achievable, but it can work as a realist standard of  assessment of  current 
practices. This particular case aside, we have seen that input realism requires theories to 
start from an interpretation of  a given practice. Thus, within the border set by this 
interpretation, we could suggest more of  less severe changes of  our political reality. So 
that, as Enzo Rossi and Matt Sleat put it: “Utopianism may even be better served by a 
realistic take on which values can be genuinely transformative and which ones are 
merely ideological. [...] Conceptually nothing precludes realists from resurrecting the 
1968 slogan “Be realistic. Demand the impossible”” (2014, 690-91). 
Secondly, not only the two realist methodologies do not necessarily entail one 
another, they are not even mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is perfectly sensible to construe 
political theories which include both concerns. A similar political approach would echo, 
for example, kinds of  political decisionism which, typically, follow a Machiavellian reading 
of  politics and political action. According to (what I dub – recalling Mark Philp’s (2010) 
use of  the term) decisionist approaches, contingency governs politics. As a 
consequence, our appraisal of  “what ought to be done” cannot but follow both 
methodological concerns: political actions should be guided by a careful appraisal of  the 
sense and purpose of  the practices that we are acting into, and, within such borders, our 
decisions are irremediably constrained by the contingent possibilities at present 
available. Following similar frameworks, political action can hardly be inspired by an idea 
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of  progress or betterment: what should be done has to depend on the characteristics of  
the moment we happen to find ourselves in28. 
In conclusion, the two methodological criteria of  adequacy are strictly 
independent. And, being the two realist methodologies independent, in order to 
understand what kind of  constraints we ought to apply to a certain theory, we should 
address both concerns separately. Indeed, criteria of  adequacy could be put on either 
side for independent reasons. Accordingly, ideal theorists, in order to successfully 
defend their own approach to political theory, ought to inquiry and discuss both 
methodological requirements; a discussion of  output requirements will not suffice. For 
the purposes of  the present study, this means that descriptive constraints could be 
applied on both premises and conclusions of  a theory, starting from independent 
methodological concerns. The border of  possible worlds for political theory would then 
be defined by the sum of  the descriptive constraints applied both on premises and on 
conclusions of  theories.  
We now have a clearer idea of  what would be required by ideal theorists in order 
to defend the methodological adequacy of  the theories they advocate. Likewise, at this 
point, we can draw the outline of  a procedure for defining the border of  possible 
worlds for political theory – that is, the border of  those worlds that could appropriately 
constitute the content of  the prescriptions NPT advances.  
Three are the main steps that it is necessary to follow: 
 An initial assessment of  practice-dependence. We need to clarify whether 
political theories are, or not, allowed to refer to levels of  analysis which are 
construed bracketing the interpretative appraisal of  the practice they are going 
to be applied to. This first step would immediately state whether input 
constraints are necessary, thereby simplifying or restricting the analysis. 
 As a further step, and whatever the answer to point 1. might be, we would need 
to establish what feasibility threshold would be suitable to adopt. We have seen 
that feasibility variations could be admitted by both output or input approaches 
                                                 
28 For example, Stuart Hampshire goes in this direction. In Justice Is Conflicts, Hampshire (2000, x) declares 
“My political opinions and loyalties, when challenged, did not any longer include or entail any 
generalisable account of  a future ideal societies or of  essential human virtues. Rather, they pointed to 
the possible elimination of  particular evils found in particular societies at particular times, and not to 
universalizable principles of  social justice. It is necessary to turn toward the particular case and also 
toward the negative case, and only then one has sufficient grounds for political action.” 
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– it is by no means valid the correlation between input constraints and status 
quo bias, or cynism. 
 Finally, to establish the set of  the possible worlds for political theory, we would 
need to specify a criterion for the selections of  the relevant facts, according to 
the constraints so defined.  
The border we are looking for should be the result of  the methodological 
constraints introduced through 1. and 2., and the sum of  the descriptive facts selected 
through the criterion adopted in 3. 
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II. 
ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF POLITICAL REALISM 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: why political realism? 
Political realism has become a popular topic of discussion among political 
theorists. In particular, two lines of research have recently attracted the attention of 
many of them. On the one hand, much effort and time have been devoted in trying to 
clarify the methodological specificity of realist theorising (i.e. what are the essential 
features of a realist approach to political theorising? What is the relationship between 
facts and principles in realist thinking?)29; on the other hand, sustained defences have 
been proposed to demonstrate the consistency of realism as an approach to political 
reasoning (i.e. is it really possible for realism to avoid moralism? Can political realism 
qualify as an autonomous approach to political thinking?)30. And yet, the very question 
of the justification of the realist approach has not received the same attention. The studies 
into the meta-theoretical basis of realism are still few and, as I will argue, they seem 
unable to offer compelling reasons for the adoption of political realism to a non-realist 
audience (Hall 2014; Hall and Sleat 2017; Prinz 2016; Sagar 2016). 
Such neglect of the justificatory issue must not look as surprising as it sounds, 
though. Indeed, such refrain from justifications could be explained as a consequence of 
the anti-foundationalist tendencies of political realism. Notably, for political realists, 
theories ought to be assessed primarily by looking at political reality and what strike us 
as sensible to do, rather than by providing stable foundations and absolute systems of 
norms. And yet, it is of utmost importance to provide some compelling justification of 
political realism. Indeed, in case we failed to provide a persuasive justification of the 
realist method, political realism would result vulnerable against moralist critiques. 
                                                 
29 On the structure of  realist political thought see, most notably, Baderin 2013; Galston 2010; Hall 2017; 
Jubb 2017; Philp 2012; Rossi and Sleat 2014, Sleat 2016, Stears 2007. A different, but strictly 
connected, debate has focused on the relationship between realism and conservatism. For this specific 
line of  research see Finlayson 2017; McQueen 2016; Prinz and Rossi 2017; Raekstad 2016. 
30 For discussions about the ability of  political realism to propose itself  as an original and autonomous 
research method, see Erman and Möller 2015; Hall 2013; Horton 2010; Jubb and Rossi 2015; Larmore 
2013; Sleat 2014. 
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So, why should we choose political realism as a method for normative political 
thinking? Is it possible to provide a justification for the endorsement of the realist 
method? I will try to offer a more efficacious justification of realism, building upon the 
complexity of realist thought and taking advantage of all the argumentative strategies 
that realists have moved against moralist thinking. More specifically, I will propose a 
prudential argument in favour of political realism. I must emphasise that my primary aim 
is not interpretive: I do not mean to suggest that the argument that I will outline is the 
one that the realist thinkers that I will consider (namely, Raymond Geuss and Bernard 
Williams) had explicitly in mind – though I certainly do not exclude this possibility. 
Rather, I will try to bring to the surface a possible argument, more or less implicit in 
realist writings, which I take to be the most forceful strategy to employ against the 
detractors of political realism. 
To do so, I will proceed as follows. I will first introduce a characterisation of 
political realism as anti-moralism. I will then outline in detail three possible arguments in 
favour of the realist approach to political theorising, by availing myself of the recent 
studies into the meta-theoretical basis of realism: the meta-ethical, the ethical, and the 
prudential argument, respectively. I will explain that the prudential argument offers the 
most solid basis to construe a defence of political realism, because – compared to the 
other two arguments – it relies on less controversial premises. Even though I regard the 
prudential argument that I propose as the most persuasive, there are two reasons why I 
first delve into the meta-ethical and the ethical arguments: first of all, the prudential 
argument is essentially built taking advantage of the theses defended by the rival 
arguments and, secondly, unfolding the diverse justificatory strategies gives me the 
chance to comparatively show the strengths of the prudential argument. 
 
2. Political realism as anti-moralism 
Political realism as a tradition does not constitute a uniform and systematic 
corpus. Rather, we could say that those who define themselves – or that have been 
defined – as realists share some core research interests and theoretical sensibilities (see 
Galston 2010; McQuenn 2017; McQueen forth.). The interpretation of realism that I 
will offer is based on Geuss’ and Williams’ writings. This choice is motivated by the fact 
that Geuss and Williams are usually regarded to be the scholars who have played a 
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major role in shaping the contemporary understanding of political realism (Rossi and 
Sleat 2014). Hence, my starting point is ecumenical in character: by choosing Geuss and 
Williams as references, I try to propose a (as far as possible) uncontroversial justification 
of political realism, despite the differences that can be traced within this tradition. 
By drawing on Geuss’ and Williams’ reflections, I interpret political realism on the 
basis of what it aims to reject: political moralism (or, political theory conceived as applied 
ethics, as Geuss dubs it)31. Therefore, before proceeding with the outline of the 
justificatory arguments, we first need to understand what does it mean to develop an 
anti-moralist political thought. Let me introduce the idea of moralism in political theory 
(and, correlatively, of anti-moralism) by recalling Geuss’ and Williams’ own words. 
Geuss points out: 
“Politics is applied ethics” in the sense I find objectionable means that we 
start thinking about the human social world by trying to get what is 
sometimes called an “ideal theory” of ethics. […] The view I am rejecting 
assumes that one can complete the work of ethics first, attaining an ideal 
theory of how we should act, and then in a second step, one can apply that 
ideal theory to the action of political agents. (Geuss 2008, 6, 8) 
In a similar vein, Williams points out: 
I start with two rough models of political theory […] with respect to the 
relation of morality to political practice. One is an enactment model. The 
model is that political theory formulates principles, concepts, ideals, and 
values; and politics (so far as it does what the theory wants) seeks to express 
these in political action, through persuasion, the use of power, and so forth. 
[…] Contrast this with a structural model. Here theory lays down moral 
conditions of co-existence under power, conditions in which power can be 
justly exercised. […] My concern here is with what they have in common, 
that they both represent the priority of the moral over the political. Under 
the enactment model, politics is (very roughly) the instrument of the moral; 
under the structural model, morality offers constraints […] on what politics 
can rightfully do. In both cases, political theory is something like applied 
morality. (Williams 2005, 1-2, emphasis in original) 
These two passages depict a common understanding of political moralism. For 
Geuss and Williams, a political theory is moralist when its normative foundations lie 
outside politics; that is, when the principles it defends are elaborated abstracting from 
                                                 
31 Notably, political realism has been mainly developed as a critic, negative, standpoint in the literature, 
aimed at challenging mainstream political thought (Galston 2010, 408). For this reason, characterising 
political realism from the point of  view of  what it rejects is the best way to introduce it and explain it.  
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actual political practices. Indeed, what Geuss and Williams mean to emphasise in these 
well-known quotes is that in ethics-first models an understanding of political reality is 
superfluous to the elaboration of the normative principles suited to it. In this sense, 
political moralism is a top-down method: in moralist theories, political reality plays just a 
secondary role, and it starts to matter when the normative principles are to be applied to 
political circumstances. 
How would an anti-moralist theory look like, then? By definition, to qualify a 
political theory as anti-moralist, we need to look at the way it conceives the relationship 
between norms and reality. In an anti-moralist theory, political reality must play a crucial 
role in determining the content, not merely the application, of norms. Yet, this 
information is still insufficient to have a clear grasp on the substance of realist 
theorising. So, we have to examine in more detail how such relation of dependence 
between norms and reality comes eventually to be conceived. In Geuss and Williams, 
what ought to be done in a practical context is interpreted as a function of what would 
make sense to do in light of (a suitable interpretation of) the system of beliefs of its 
participants. Or, differently put, for Geuss and Williams, political practices ought to be 
reformed, or organised, in order to reflect what actual participants regard as valuable to 
achieve, or safeguard32. However, a good share of the final form that a realist theory will 
take depends on how this fundamental methodological requirement is interpreted. In 
fact, it is possible to develop different realist analyses of political normativity according 
to the criteria of acceptability of beliefs that will be adopted, and the general methods to 
elaborate norms that will be outlined. So, for instance, Geuss largely employs a 
“negative” methodology according to which we ought to orient political action by 
examining which beliefs must be rejected as ideological (and, correspondingly, by 
following those which pass the test of critical reflection) (Geuss 2016, Ch.1 and Ch.2; 
see also Prinz 2016; Rossi 2015). Williams, instead, adopts a less revisionist, and more 
constructive, approach: his method can be described as a practice-dependent method in 
which political practices ought to be reformed in order to fulfil their point and purpose 
and the value that their participants attribute to them (Williams 2005, 1-17; see also Jubb 
2016a; Rossi 2012). However, for the present purposes, it is unnecessary to delve 
further into the details of the realist methodology. Rather, what matters for the purposes 
                                                 
32 Hence, the realist methodology must not be confused with a search for consensus-based principles, see 
Horton 2010; Sleat 2014. 
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of construing a sound justification of realist political thought is to get a sense of the 
insight that moves the realist approach to political theorising. Realists intend to ground 
political normativity on an interpretation of what is valuable from the point of view of 
real political actors. Hence, unlike moralism, which defines political norms by 
disregarding the political circumstances of their application, political realism is a bottom-
up procedure which construes the normative analysis from an interpretation of 
contextual beliefs and practices. 
Notice, then, that “anti-moralism” does not mean “anti-moral” (Geuss 2008, 1-4). 
Political realism, if properly understood, claims that a political theory ought to start 
from an understanding of the significance of political practices. Therefore, when 
political realism is described as a claim about the autonomy of the political (Williams 2005, 
3), such claim must not be intended as a rejection of ethical thought, but rather as a 
rejection of top-down methodologies. Ethical thought can contribute to a realist 
understanding of political normativity precisely because realist political thought focuses 
on what actual agents find valuable (Geuss 2016, Ch.2). 
Then, why is moralism troublesome? Why should political theory favour a 
bottom-up approach for the construction of political normativity? I will outline a 
justification of political realism by taking into account the corpus of Williams’ and 
Geuss’ works as a whole. Admittedly, mine is going to be just one possible 
interpretation of the grounds of political realism, but I will argue that it might be 
considered as the most powerful against moralists. Indeed, Geuss and Williams are not 
entirely systematic writers, and for this reason multiple interpretations of the grounds of 
political realism can be consistently offered. Before explaining my interpretation, I will 
briefly introduce two alternative strategies for the justification of political realism which 
have been outlined, more or less explicitly, in the recent literature (Hall 2014; Hall and 
Sleat 2017; Prinz 2016; Sagar 2016). Why, though, do I need to spend time on 
justifications that I aim to overcome? A first crucial reason is that my argument partially 
builds upon these alternative routes to come to a justification of realism, hence they are 
essential to the construction of my proposal. Secondarily, because by pointing out the 
diverse strategies outlined I can defend the comparative strength of mine. 
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3. The metaethical argument: from the limits and sense of  ethics 
The first argument that can be reconstructed from Williams’ and Geuss’ writings 
as a basis for political realism revolves around a crucial thesis that they share about 
ethics. Geuss and Williams are sceptic about morality; still, they believe that some form 
of ethical discourse is both meaningful and necessary. According to the first possible 
argument, it is realists’ specific understanding of the scope and limits of ethics that 
ground their approach to political theory. In fact, this is the interpretation favoured by 
Ed Hall and Matt Sleat who have recently interpreted political realism as first and 
foremost an ethical thesis (see Hall 2014; Hall and Sleat 2017). So, let us see how this 
argument unfolds and what its limits might be.  
I have just said that this first justificatory strategy is based on the substitution of 
morality with another form of ethical reasoning that, as far as politics is concerned, 
takes the form of political realism. How is it possible that realists are moral sceptics and 
yet do defend a particular normative approach to politics? Here words must be read and 
chosen carefully. Following Williams, I am making a very specific use of the concept 
“morality” in this context33. As Williams points out, “morality should be understood as a 
particular development of the ethical, one that has a special significance in modern 
Western culture” (Williams 2011, 7). In Geuss’ and Williams’ works, morality must be 
intended as a form of normative reasoning which aims at defining a system of principles 
that establishes what ought (or ought not to) be done in a given context (Geuss 2016, 
28-33; Williams 2011, 80). The authority of such moral systems typically comes from an 
independent justification that proves their alleged objective validity, which is usually 
designed to demonstrate the universal validity of the system of norms. Morality, in this 
sense, resembles a scientific research: the philosophical endeavour is similarly devoted 
to the definition of a consistent system of objective laws whose justification requires 
universal recognition (Williams 2011, 193-201).  
It is easy to see how morality, so conceived, relates to the notion of political 
moralism that I introduced in the former section. If morality has the sufficient means to 
define what ought to be done in every circumstance and universally, politics will be just 
one field of application of a moral theory independently justified. According to this 
conception, there would be no point in conceiving political normativity autonomously. 
                                                 
33 I am making use of  the concept of  morality as it appears in Williams 2011, 193-201. 
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As Hall and Sleat (2017) explain, however, Geuss and Williams harshly reject morality: 
and with morality, political moralism must be abandoned too. 
But is it possible to overcome morality while saving some form of positive ethical 
thought? After all, if we reject the idea of an objective and universal normative 
knowledge, are not we doomed to fall into relativism or nihilism? Of course, Geuss and 
Williams attempt to positively construe an alternative proposal, and their answer is at 
the root of their defence of political realism – or, better, of a first possible defence of 
political realism. To understand how they come to defend realism – i.e. a bottom-up 
context-dependent normative thought – we first need to understand why, in their 
opinion, morality is untenable. 
Williams and Geuss reject morality for the same reason. They both argue that it is 
impossible to provide a philosophical justification of a moral system. In fact, according 
to them, the failure of contemporary moral outlooks is not merely accidental; rather, it is 
the whole project of morality that ought to be dismissed and rethought. According to 
Williams and Geuss, at the bottom of contemporary moral theory there is a failure to 
understand the very substance of ethical life. Indeed, it is no coincidence that one of the 
major theoretical influences they share is Nietzsche34. Following Nietzschean leanings, 
both Geuss and Williams believe that the project of providing a philosophical 
justification of morality is doomed to fail because there is no foundation to be 
discovered. There is no stable basis upon which to ground our moral knowledge: ethical 
life is a product of history for which an ultimate support – be it rational, transcendental, 
theological or teleological – cannot be found. So, there is no hope to find an objective 
point of view, external to our contingent and partial one, to justify our ethical life, 
thereby proving that what we do, or claim, is ultimately right. Williams’ Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy (2011) is the work in which this thesis is most fully discussed. There, 
Williams meticulously analyses what he takes to be the most developed attempts to 
provide a philosophical foundation of our ethical life. He examines in turn Aristotelian 
(2011, 34-59) and Kantian (60-78) foundations, and the attempt to provide an objective 
grounding of ethics by seeking a convergence on ethical truths in the way that science 
does (146-72) and convincingly argues that all of them fail. In this way, Williams aims to 
give substance to the thesis that it is impossible for philosophy to find the ultimate 
                                                 
34 Both Geuss and Williams have written extensively about Nietzsche’s thought. See especially Geuss 
1994; 1997; 2005, 40-66 and Williams 2002; 2007, Ch. 20, Ch. 21, Ch. 22 and Ch. 23; 2014, Ch. 60. 
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ground of our ethical life. That foundation does not exist, and the failure of all the 
major philosophical strategies to meet our need of objective moral answers proves his 
point (see Hall 2014, 548-51)35. Geuss, albeit in a less systematic fashion, defends the 
same idea by discussing ethical beliefs in their historical evolution and context. For 
Geuss, morality is grounded upon illusions which become manifest once we engage in a 
careful genealogical analysis: what we, here and now, believe to an ethical truth – eternal, 
coherent, and progressive – is actually the contextual products of specific historical 
circumstances (see esp. Geuss 2001a; 2001b). In Geuss’ view, there is no “view from 
nowhere” and we should deeply recognise this fact if we want to make proper sense of 
our ethical lives (2005, 4).  
What should our reaction be, then, if we agreed with Geuss and Williams? Should 
the realisation that an ultimate support for our ethical lives cannot be found leave us in 
nihilism and despair? Actually, this would be a serious mistake. Geuss and Williams 
believe that the realisation of the contingent nature of our ethical beliefs does not imply 
their immediate rejection, let alone the impossibility of making sense of our ethical lives. 
Who thinks so, they claim, makes the fundamental error of falling back into the illusory 
belief that foundationalism is the sole way to ascertain the validity of ethical 
propositions. In fact, they argue, those who claim that it is impossible to hold any 
ethical beliefs as truthful in reason of their contingent nature are trapped in the same 
deception Williams and Geuss are trying to unmask. Indeed, a similar worry only arises 
if we are convinced that foundationalism is the sole way to make ethical life meaningful. 
Those who react with despair are still “under the shadow of universalism” (Williams 
2005, 67). 
The point, rather, is that Geuss and Williams are inviting to radically change our 
conception of ethics and ethical life. We do not freely embrace a certain ethical life, we 
do not simply discover ethical truth and change them as soon as we get better 
information about it. Ethics is a necessary part of human identity and relationships – we 
cannot simply detach from it and consider it like a fully independent object of inquiry: it 
makes ourselves who we are, hence we could not get free of it or examine it from a 
completely impartial point of view. That is why we ought not to regard the contingent 
nature of our ethical beliefs as troublesome. Contingent does not mean arbitrary, and 
                                                 
35 On the relationship between political realism and moral scepticism, particularly in its Williamsian 
version, see also Sagar 2016. 
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once we understand what are the substance and role of ethics in our lives, contingency 
ought not to raise suspicions (Sagar 2016, 377). In Williams’ own words: 
 
Precisely because we are not unencumbered intelligences selecting in 
principle among all possible outlooks, we can accept that this outlook is 
ours just because of the history that has made it ours; or, more precisely, 
has both made us, and made the outlook as something that is ours. We are 
no less contingently formed than the outlook is, and the formation is 
significantly the same. We and our outlook are not simply in the same place 
at the same time. If we really understand this, deeply understand it, we can 
be free of what is indeed another scientistic illusion, that it is our job as 
rational agents to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a 
system of political and ethical ideas which would be the best from an 
absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of contingent historical 
perspective. (Williams 2006, 193-94) 
 
So, if this is how we should rethink ethics, our conception of the role of 
philosophy should change accordingly. Philosophy, as said, cannot help us is construing 
a moral theory. The role of philosophy cannot be the one of justifying ethics. Williams 
and Geuss conceive the activity of philosophising about ethics in a wholly different 
manner. Philosophy should help us to better understand, and possibly critically assess, 
the origin of our beliefs. The fundamental task of philosophy ought to be to enable 
critical reflection (Geuss 2016, Ch. 1 and Ch. 2). This might take different forms – such 
as genealogical and interpretive reconstructions, utopian reasoning, and artistic 
endeavours – and it must allow us to reach a truthful account of our beliefs, namely to 
allow us to have a better understanding about what our system of beliefs is, which of 
our beliefs are we ready to sincerely retain, and which ones to revise or reject36. 
Politics, as any other practical field, would have to be understood along these 
lines. Following this argumentative path, normative political theory needs to be realist 
because the whole field of ethics needs to be so conceived. There cannot be any 
moralism for the straightforward reason that ethics can never be merely applied ethics: 
ethical thinking must always start from the bottom, i.e. from actual practices (Hall and 
Sleat 2017, 281-82). Likewise, political philosophy needs to start from the contextual 
understandings of the ethical beliefs about politics, and needs to gain a normative 
                                                 
36 Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness (2002) is entirely devoted to exploring how we can make sense of  our 
lives – how we can retain some truthful belief  – despite the contingent nature of  what we hold 
valuable and take for granted. 
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appraisal of political practices from them – provided that the process is guided by 
critical reflection. Hence, according to this interpretation, political realism is motivated 
by a more general inquiry into the sense and limits of ethics. 
As I pointed out above, my interest in this paper is not mainly interpretive; hence, 
I do not intend to thoroughly address the justifications of political realism alternative to 
mine. So, I am going to take them as correct and consistent possible interpretations of 
what Williams and Geuss had in mind while defending political realism. However, I said 
that my justificatory strategy might prove stronger and more convincing than the rival 
ones. I will deal with this point more directly later, but by now let me just point out 
some of the reasons why this first argument might be regarded as a weak defence of 
political realism. There are two reasons that might weaken realism when backed via the 
justification just introduced.  
A first one regards the kind of justification pursued. This first argument is 
metaethical in content: as we have seen, it revolves around a fundamental thesis 
regarding the nature of ethics and the meaning that ethics might have for us. 
Convincing as this argument might be, it might nonetheless raise some perplexities that 
the ultimate justification for realism rests on a metaethical dispute, namely on an extremely 
abstract inquiry. This is by no means suggesting that such a defence naively falls into 
inconsistency. Rather, the point is that it seems to be an unfortunate choice, because 
realism typically requires starting from real politics, while such a defence remains purely 
theoretical37. There seems to be much more going on in political realism than a “mere” 
metaethical reflection: this justificatory strategy cuts off real politics and, with it, some 
of the themes dearest to the realist literature.  
A second reason that might weaken this first argument regards its very structure. 
Even if it is possible to offer a reconstruction of the path from (a form of) scepticism to 
realism by making use of Williams’ later writings and Geuss’ scattered suggestions, some 
doubts regarding the tenability of the project might arise. As Paul Sagar (2016, 378-79) 
also notes, the analysis proposed so far might not result completely convincing38: a more 
radical sceptic might object that, given the unavailability of a stable ground for our 
ethical beliefs, it is hard to retain some belief as truthful – that is, it is hard that some 
                                                 
37 On this point see also Philp 2012, 640. 
38 For a critical perspective on Williams’ approach to ethical life see Cottingham 2009. Hall (2014, 557-61) 
offers an elaborate response to Cottingham’s arguments. 
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belief will pass the test of reflection and we will not regard every conviction of ours as 
the fruit of a persistent self-deception. The radical sceptic will have to find some other 
solutions to defend realism39 or deny the validity of Williams’ and Geuss’ conclusions.  
As I said, however, my interest is merely to emphasise the potential weaknesses of 
this first justificatory strategy. As far as this first argument is concerned, the point is that 
this first justificatory strategy would require a complex defence to qualify as a good 
support of the realist case – and this defence would mainly consist in a metaethical 
discussion.  
 
4. Ethical Argument: From the dangers of  moralism 
As I said, setting aside the metaethical argument for the moment, there are two 
further strategies that it is possible to pursue to defend the adoption of political realism. 
The second argument could be defined as the “ethical” argument – where ethics must 
be intended in the realist sense that I briefly discussed above, i.e. as opposed to morality 
– because it is not centred around debating the methods of inquiry that normative 
political theories ought to follow (like the metaethical argument did). Rather, the ethical 
argument focuses on showing the undesirability of political moralism, namely the fact 
that some of its implications ends up being unacceptable. The ethical argument indeed 
revolves entirely around showing the practical dangers towards which political moralism 
leads; dangers that, the argument goes, ought to be eschewed and that realism is able to 
prevent. 
A major part of Geuss’ and Williams’ writings are indeed dedicated to reflections 
about the dangers posed by moralist thinking in political circumstances. This is a well-
known feature of realist writings which have often been described as overtly 
“destructive”, because mainly focused on highlighting the shortcomings of moralism, 
instead of construing a full-fledged alternative (see Galston 2010; Hurka 2009). It is not 
a case, then, that this line of interpretation dominates a recent article by Janosh Prinz, 
which – by providing the first careful analysis of Geuss’s political methodology – offers 
valuable insights on the justification of political realism (Prinz 2016). As Prinz correctly 
                                                 
39 Sagar (2016, 379) suggests that the sceptic might follow a “prudential” strategy to defend a bottom-up 
approach to political reasoning. This is indeed the idea that I will explore later on by outlining a 
prudential argument in favour of  political realism. 
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points out (2016, 4-9), Geuss’ crucial interest is not so much to engage in an abstract 
dispute aimed at establishing what is the best theoretical framework for guiding political 
action, but to denounce, and possibly contain, the perils of moralism. Even though 
Prinz does not deal with Williams’ writings in his article, an analogous case could be 
made for Williams’ political theory. A major part of Williams’ political writings is 
deconstructive too: Williams most of the times deals with denouncing the absurd, in his 
view, implications of moralism and he does so by making manifest the consequences of 
such theoretical approach, without providing counter-proposals (see, 2005, 62-74 and 
145-53). 
However, this crucial aspect of their thoughts remains mostly neglected if we 
interpret political realism as a primarily metaethical stance. The metaethical route, 
though consistent, seems to lose sight of some of the distinguishing features of the 
realist thought. Instead, if we focus on such deconstructive dimension of political 
realism, it is possible to build a “negative” justification in its favour entirely based on the 
shortcomings of moralism. 
So, how is this argument supposed to unfold? Why are moralist theories 
unacceptable in realists’ view? The reason for which realists regard moralism as an 
approach to political reasoning leading to unacceptable outcomes is due to its very 
theoretical structure. The problem with moralist thinking is not, in fact, circumscribed 
to a single (or some) specific kinds of moral theories; rather, the dangers fostered by 
moralism are due to the type of reasoning it supports. Indeed, the troublesome feature 
Geuss and Williams identify in moralism resides in its insensitivity to reality. As we have 
seen at the beginning of this paper, moralist theories are top-down systems, in the sense 
that they conceive practical reasoning as a form of deduction in which general principles 
independently justified are applied to specific circumstances. It follows that reality – 
once the general principles have been identified – cannot affect in any sense the 
conclusions of the theory. The circumstances of application can, at best, determine the 
feasibility of the general principle. Moralist theories are, in this sense, pure rational 
systems (Williams 2011, Ch. 10). Importantly, this means that realism must not be 
confused with a form of consequentialism. Consequential theories too must be regarded 
as moralist theories. The general principles which a consequential theory defends require 
checking and weighting the real-world consequences of actions, but this requirement, per 
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se, does not affect in any sense the validity of the principles – which are then insensitive 
to reality40. The problem Williams and Geuss see in moralism does not strictly consists 
in its inability to take into account the consequences of political actions. The trouble, 
more correctly, resides in the irrelevance to which reality is condemned in moralist 
paradigms – in the stark separation between theory and reality such paradigms trace. 
There are far too many examples, in Geuss’ and Williams’ writings, of cases in 
which moralism happens to lead to unacceptable consequences to provide an exhaustive 
account. However, without getting lost into the details of their discussions, it is possible 
to divide the theoretical shortcomings of moralism in three kinds of “blindness” 
towards reality, which – given my purposes – are enough for gaining a sense of the 
reasons that might justify the adoption of political realism. Moralism, given its structure, 
might neglect political reality along three dimensions: its complexity, its consequences, 
and its possibilities. In all the three cases, moralism appears to constitute an undesirable 
form of reasoning for politics, or so Geuss and Williams argue. 
With regard to the first kind of “blindness”, moralism is “blind” to the complexity 
of political reality because, as said, once the set of guiding principles is defined, reality 
cannot affect them. Such insensitivity has worrisome consequences. I will mention two 
examples which serve as schema for the several cases Williams and Geuss discuss. The 
first one concerns the application of a theory designed for interpersonal relationships to 
political circumstances. Williams discusses what would mean to apply to politics theories 
so abstractly designed by introducing the case of humanitarian interventions (Williams 
2005, Ch. 13). What would happen, he wonders, if we applied the everyday Principle of 
Rescue41 – according to which we ought to assist the ones we happen to find in peril 
                                                 
40 Williams, indeed, harshly criticises utilitarianism for its inability to make sense of  some essential features 
of  ethical life, which disappear once practical choices are taken exclusively on the basis of  
consequentialist considerations. On this, see the well-known example Williams proposes about Jim 
and the Indians. Williams imagines the case of  a person, Jim, who finds himself  in the following 
situation: he bumps into a group of  Indian prisoners who are about to be killed by the captain in 
charge. The captain, who is pleased by having met Jim, decide to honour his presence by offering him 
the opportunity to kill one of  the prisoners himself  – and, if  Jim accepts, the other prisoners will be 
let off. What would be Jim supposed to do? A utilitarian would have no doubt. However, Williams 
points out that the utilitarian view is too simplistic: utilitarianism reduces to a simple calculus a 
situation which is deeply tragic for Jim. There is, then, something in personal experiences that 
utilitarianism is unable to consider. Utilitarianism obscures the moral life of  persons (Williams 1973, 
97-99). 
41 Specifically, Williams defines the Principle of  Rescue as follows:  
(1) If X is in peril and 
(2) Y is saliently related to X’s peril and 
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and which we have the means to assist – to international relationships? The 
international case involves several complexities that make the Principle of Rescue 
inapplicable, unless we accepted its destabilising consequences. In international 
relations, in order to decide to intervene in another country to the aid of its population, 
several additional questions come into the picture: is the intervention welcomed by the 
government which would receive the aid? Would the intervention affect the political 
influences and alliances in the area? Which State is supposed to intervene? Is the 
intervention approved by the population of the country which is providing help? If the 
realities of politics are considered carefully, it looks manifest that the Principle of 
Rescue, if strictly followed, would severely undermine stability, and trigger collateral 
conflicts. Hence, it looks dangerous, therefore inappropriate, to apply principles 
designed for interpersonal relations to political circumstances. Once the principle is 
revised or rejected, and political theory is conducted by taking into consideration real 
politics, we are already accessing the territory of political realism. However – it might be 
objected – there are some political theories that have a moralist structure, but are 
specifically designed for political circumstances; therefore, moralism is not troublesome 
per se, rather it is the kind of abstractions the theory employs. The second example, 
taken this time from Geuss, tackles this sort of cases. A moralist political theory might 
well start from a conception of political reality, but if such conception is mistaken or 
insufficiently elaborated, the theory proves to be no less damaging than the first case 
illustrated. Geuss takes as an example A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (1999), which he 
harshly criticises by pointing out: “one is immediately struck by the complete absence in 
it of any discussion of what I have described above as the basic issues of politics. The 
topic of “power”, in particular, is simply one he never explicitly discusses at all” (Geuss 
2008, 90). The trouble with this mischaracterisation of politics, at least according to 
Geuss, is that the lack of a discussion about power, and power dynamics, makes Rawls 
unable to “see” some of the gravest problems which affect politics. Consequently, his 
theory not only offers no guides to counteract these problems, it actually reinforces 
them42. According to Geuss, Rawls is above all unable to recognise the fact of 
ideological power, namely the idea that the interests of some people might be 
                                                                                                                                          
(3) Y can hope to offer effective aid to X 
(4) at a cost to Y, which is not unreasonably high, Y ought to help X (Williams 2005, 146-47). 
42 On the relationship between political theory and ideology in Geuss, see also Prinz 2016, 6-7. 
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systematically manipulated and oppressed, because the dominant systems of thoughts 
does not contain the conceptual elements necessary to make the oppressed realise their 
disadvantage43. As a proof of such shortcoming, Geuss mentions Rawls’ choice of 
construing his theory around the device of the veil of ignorance: the idea that principles of 
justice ought to be identified by agents unaware of any information about their concrete 
conditions of life in society, such as gender, class, or job. In this way, Rawls’ crystallises 
ideologies because, by completely taking out of sight the concrete power dynamics, his 
theory does not contemplate any device able to tackle them (Geuss 2008, 86-89)44. As 
these examples are aimed to show, moralist theories might have dangerous practical 
consequences by ignoring some crucial aspects of political reality. The shortcoming of 
moralism consists in its inability to consider political reality in the elaboration of 
normative judgments: the theory is logically unable to “see” it as normatively relevant.  
However, the dangers of such insensitivity to facts become even more striking 
when the “blindness” of moralism towards consequences is considered. Indeed, given 
their structure, moralist theories exhibit insensitivity to the collateral implications of 
their application. At this point, it should be pretty easy to understand why this is the 
case. In moralist theories, once the set of principles is defined, the collateral implications 
of their implementation are consequences which the theory regards as acceptable to the 
fulfilment of the principles45. Geuss happens to clearly explain what might be the 
damages of this insensitivity to side-effects when he says: “the moralizing approach 
                                                 
43 Guess specifically talks about a normative form of  oppression, which is given whenever “the agents are 
prevented from pursuing their interests by a set of  beliefs they accept” (Geuss 1981, 34-35).  
44 Similar criticism against Rawls’ Theory have been advanced by McCharty 2001 and Okin 1989 who 
regard Rawls’ proposal unable to tackle racial and gender injustice.  
45 Once again, this should not misguide the reader: consequentialist theories are not exempt from this sort 
of  “blindness”. Since consequentialist theories define a rigid set of  principles to follow, they define, 
also, a rigid set of  implications which the theory regards as acceptable: consequentialist theories regard 
as normatively irrelevant all those considerations that lie outside the consequentialist calculus. What 
Williams says about utilitarianism and integrity is revelatory: “The point is that [the agent] is identified 
with his actions as flowing from projects or attitudes which… he takes seriously at the deepest level, 
as what his life is about… It is absurd to demand of  such a man, when the sums come in from the 
utility network which the projects of  others have in part determined, that he should just step aside 
from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. 
It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of  his action in his own 
convictions. It is to make him into a channel between the input of  everyone's projects, including his 
own, and an output of  optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which his projects and his 
decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with 
which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity” 
(1973, 116-17). As in the case of  Jim and the Indians (see n. 40), Williams explains that utilitarianism 
loose something by systematising: utilitarianism may represent a threat to one’s own integrity, because 
utilitarianism asks to follow a consequentialist calculus, leaving aside personal projects and identities. 
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tends to assign potentially infinite value to the struggle against certain […] visible forms 
of evil. If the task at hand is of infinite importance, some fabrication of evidence, 
suborning of or intimidation of civil servants, infliction of ‘collateral damage’ on 
innocent populations, etc. are forgivable offences” (2010, 33; see also 2016, 35-38). Here 
Geuss is pointing out that, in some of its forms, moralism becomes structurally unable 
to attribute relevance to a fundamental feature of political practices, namely the use of 
force, which is essentially required to the enactment and maintenance of any political 
reform. In similar cases moralism shows its most worrisome implications. If the theory 
demands the realisation of a certain good or, as in the present case, the prevention of 
some supposed “evil”, the theory might become insensitive to the consequences of use 
of force. Similar considerations emerge also in Williams’ discussion of human rights as 
political institutions. As Williams is keen to emphasise, the charge of violating human 
rights (hence, to recall Geuss’ quote, to be in presence of some form of “evil”) is “the 
most serious of political accusations” (Williams 2005, 72). The accuse of violating 
human rights has the force to justify the enactment of severe measure to eradicate the 
source of the violation. For this reason, Williams argues, defining some right as a 
“human right” is a choice that ought to be taken very carefully, it ought to be a matter 
of political good sense (Williams 2005, 72-74)46.  
Finally, there is another reason for concern that is vividly discussed by Geuss. By 
providing a vision of how the world is supposed to be, moralism does not require us to 
turn our sight towards, and therefore consider, the alternative political possibilities that 
are open to us (see Prinz 2016, 2-4). By doing so, in Geuss’ view, moralism might even 
dangerously foster conservative tendencies. This happens when the circumstances in 
which we find ourselves are somehow coherent with the normative conclusions of the 
moral paradigms we embrace. In similar cases, moralism is a comforting (and Geuss 
would rather add oppressive) structure: “the fascination with evil […] is usually a cheap 
way to assume that one’s own moral intuitions are basically in order. Almost obsessive 
discourse about “evil” can be […] a way to evade the necessity of using one’s 
                                                 
46 As Williams acutely points out, an unwise enlargement of  the set of  human rights might end up in 
another, opposite, danger; namely, the one of  ceasing to consider violations of  human rights as radical 
forms of  “evil”, declassing them to mere rhetorical attributions. In this case, moralist theories would 
show another kind of  blindness, similar to the ones above-mentioned: the inability to recognise the 
distinctiveness of  some real political facts, like the seriousness of  some forms of  cruelty and 
oppression (Williams 2005, 64). 
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imagination to face reality”, with the result that moralism might become a way of 
“reinforcing the status quo than as any kind of contribution to radical change” (Geuss 
2010, 182-83). The clear structure of moralist thought gives us a clear picture of how the 
world should be and, once such understanding is gained, there is no point to seek 
alternative possibilities, as this would represent merely a useless and costly effort. When 
this structure of thought is consistent with the dominant normative ideology the result is 
a lack of critical reflection, a blindness towards political possibilities. 
Those that I have been exposing so far must not be taken as features that every 
moralist theory presents. In fact, some of the alleged shortcomings introduced push in 
opposite directions: at times moralist theories can justify disruptive political actions (as 
for the case of humanitarian interventions), at others they can foster an uncritical 
conservation of the status quo (as for the case of moralist theories which are consistent 
with the dominant normative ideology). The examples discussed were meant to give a 
sense of the possible shortcomings that Geuss and Williams envisage in moralism as a 
form of political thinking. 
However, despite being the most diverse, there is a common trait that unites all 
the criticism Williams and Geuss move against moralism. At the beginning of this paper, 
I defined it as a structural blindness towards reality, and now we can see why such 
structural blindness is regarded as unacceptable to a realist eye. Since moralism isolates 
theory from reality it is unable to clearly see what happens in this real world, and the 
results are the ones portrayed. Those results look manifestly unacceptable to Geuss and 
Williams, and should also suffice to convince us that moralism cannot be the 
appropriate guide in political circumstances. 
 Political realism, then, proposes itself as the remedy to the distortions of 
moralism. Being essentially a bottom-up type of political reflection, realism makes reality 
its source of normativity and, by being so characterised, it is constantly open to changes 
and revisions in light of the political circumstances at hand. Contrary to moralism, 
realism keeps an attitude of respect towards reality: the theory is not imposed upon 
circumstances, rather political reality becomes the most relevant part of political 
reasoning. In this way, realism manages to recompose the dangerous divide between 
theory and reality traced by moralism. 
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Is this line of defence of political realism convincing? A first doubt might be 
pointed out by arguing that such realist considerations commit a fundamental error 
since they collapse theory and reality, while these are two separate domains: theoretical 
inquiries are merely concerned with understanding normativity, they do not really have 
the concrete consequences on the real world feared by realists. This is a point which 
Geuss and Williams would harshly object. For Geuss and Williams, there is a 
fundamental connection between theory and reality: political theories are forms of 
political actions because they are able to generate effects in the real world (Geuss 2016, 
20; Williams 2005, 72). Therefore, it makes perfectly sense to reflect on their 
consequences. 
However, the major objection that might be raised against this second line of 
defence is that there seems to be something missing. Criticism by itself – as it has been 
commonly pointed out against realism – cannot work (Hurka 2009). If moralists are 
getting it right about political reasoning, realists might well find the implications of their 
theories hardly acceptable, but they should nonetheless respect those implications as 
true accounts of what ought to be done. Moralists, in other words, could remain 
unmoved by this sort of realist critiques. If realists want their reflections to be 
convincing, they must advance some alternative positive idea of how political thinking 
ought to be conducted. Someone, in fact, went as far as to suggest that there are implicit 
assumptions in realist arguments that motivate their unease against moralism (see 
Erman and Möller 2015; Larmore 2013).  
Maybe, then, this second line of defence could be saved from the accuse of being 
inconclusive by making explicit the covert assumptions that allegedly ground their 
rejection of moralism. Following this route, there seem to be two sorts of implicit 
assumptions that might support the realist case: a meta-theoretical and a principled one. 
The trouble is that neither of them seem convincing. In the first case, the dissatisfaction 
with moralism could be grounded on an implicit prior understanding of the nature of 
ethical knowledge. As we have seen, this is the route followed by Hall and Sleat. In this 
case, the reason for which moralism ends up by looking unacceptable in the cases 
considered is that it contravenes what makes sense from the point of view of the agents 
involved, which is the only valid source of ethical knowledge47. However, if this was the 
                                                 
47 This would hold also for the case of  unreflective conservatism seen above, precisely because the 
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case, the second argument would collapse on the first one, and I have already pointed 
out some of its potential weaknesses. Alternatively, instead of a prior metaethical 
background, there could be some principled reason why Geuss and Williams judge 
unacceptable the implications of moralist theories: for instance, they could believe that 
the first task of politics is the avoidance of oppression in all its forms (both on a 
normative and on a practical level) and realise that moralism fails to meet this 
fundamental principle, given the implications mentioned48. If this was the case, though, 
realism would seem to fall into a form of tacit moralism, since it could be charged of 
assuming a principle prior to politics, a fact-insensitive assumption. Overall, this second 
argument in favour of realism would seem to be doomed to fail, since either it results 
inconclusive, or it relies on implicit theoretical assumptions that weaken it.  
But is this a necessary result? Actually, the realist has another way out, which I 
believe is the most interpretively accurate. The realist could reject the very initial claim 
and deny that every critique must be accompanied by a constructive alternative. Indeed, 
the whole point of Geuss’ and Williams’ reflections is to argue for the priority of reality 
over theory in ethical reasoning. It is then entirely consistent that they get to their point 
by “simply” showing political reality: by making manifest why moralism does not make 
sense to us as a guide for practical life49. They do not need an alternative account of 
what a valid ethical reasoning would consist in to do that, exactly because this is the 
“scientistic” way of thinking they are arguing against. Hence, there is a way to make the 
second argument in defence of political realism viable. However, this line of defence 
comes at a price: such argument is unable to convince the moralist of the preferability of 
political realism. Exactly because the realist defends his position by embracing criteria of 
validity which the moralist does not share, the realist argument cannot strike a chord 
with the moralist. The moralist and the realist would be like preachers of different faiths: 
                                                                                                                                          
acceptance of  the status quo is unreflective: moralism in that case prevents from understanding what 
really makes sense to agents involved. 
48 Geuss explains that there are two kinds of  oppression: manifest or normative. He explains the two 
follows: “Macht is the ability to prevent others from pursuing their interests. The exercise of  Macht is 
repression. This exercise is either 'manifest' - open use of  force or direct threat to use force - or 
'normative.' Repression is 'normative' if  the agents are prevented from pursuing their interests by a set 
of  normative beliefs they accept” (1981, 34-35). Thus, given what as been said so far, the realist 
rejection of  moralism could be explained as a rejection of  oppression. 
49 In fact, Geuss explicitly argues against the idea that criticism must be constructive in ethical thinking. 
He firmly believes that we could make sense of  a critique without having a clear idea of  what could 
“substitute” what is being criticised (see Geuss 2014, Ch. 4). 
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convincing the moralist would be more like a matter of conversion than of rational 
persuasion. 
This is why I believe that the third argument in defence of political realism that I 
am about to introduce has to be regarded as a better defence. As I will shortly explain, 
the third argument has tools to convince the moralist of the preferability of political 
realism, and it is also able to overcome the weaknesses of the first (metaethical) defence.  
 
5. Prudential argument: From responsibility in political action 
As I briefly pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the third argument is 
meant to overcome the weaknesses of the former two; however, to achieve this goal it 
makes use of both of them. This means also that, in order to get to the justification of 
realism, the third argument takes into account a wider set of realist topics, because it 
refers both to its metaethical and ethical dimensions, while the former two (as I showed) 
can be construed independently. For this reason, I take the third argument to be 
stronger also from an interpretive point of view.  
I define this final argument as the prudential argument because it is centred around 
the idea that to endorse political realism as a practical guide for political action would be 
a prudent choice. Prudent, however, it is not meant to mean “convenient” in a 
derogatory sense; rather, it should be intended as “responsible”, namely as a justification 
which follows from taking politics seriously. 
The prudential argument is divided in three steps. The former two steps are taken 
from the arguments previously introduced and run as follows. To begin with, from the 
meta-ethical argument we can deduce that there is deep uncertainty about the conditions 
of validity of our ethical judgments and, accordingly, about how normative thinking 
ought to be conducted. In fact, we can loosen the conclusions of the first argument and 
make a safe use of it without having to deal with its metaethical core. To claim, as I am 
doing, that there is epistemic uncertainty around ethical claims will suffice to recognise 
that realists raise good arguments against the structure of ethical thought defended by 
moralists. The doubts raised against foundationalism in ethics are certainly worth to be 
taken into consideration – so much so that the disagreement around these issues is still 
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wide and far from coming to a resolution50. Hence, my first step consists in emphasising 
the fact that Geuss and Williams put some meaningful doubts about the capacity of 
moralism to provide us with the truth around ethical thinking, and consequently around 
political thinking too. 
The second step takes advantage of the ethical argument. From the second 
argument, namely from the realist “negative” literature, we learn that normative theories 
are performative (i.e. they might have some impact on the real political world), and that 
the structure of moralist thought is in some specific sense worrisome. In fact, as we 
have just seen, moralist theories can lead to a series of concrete damages, to a greater or 
lesser degree manifest. In the previous discussion of the ethical argument, we have seen 
a few examples of such damages: moralist theories might foster an inconsiderate use of 
force, incite disruptive actions, or frustrate our capacity to critically question our 
practices and choices (thereby hiding or perpetuating concrete injustices). As explained, 
all these shortcomings that are imputable to moralism are due to its very logical 
structure: since moralism does not attribute normative relevance to the real political 
world, it makes political reasoning insensitive to it. By pointing this out, as stated above, 
I do not mean to suggest that all moralist theories will end up by fostering the sort of 
consequences mentioned. Rather, I more modestly mean to emphasise that these 
shortcomings are potential consequences inherent to their very structure. So, my second 
step merely consists in recalling Geuss’ and Williams’ suggestions about the potential 
practical dangers of moralism. Still, am I endorsing some sort of pre-political value-
judgment at this stage, by defining such consequences as dangerous? This is a doubt I 
formerly considered as one possible objections against the ethical argument. Yet, my 
answer is negative: for the purposes of the argument I merely need to assume that the 
consequences of moralism that realists portray commonly strike us as grave. Hence, 
mine is a contingent interpretive claim, not an evaluative judgment. Some of the 
implications of moralism, in fact, appear to threaten what we hold dearest in politics, 
such as the “securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of 
cooperation” (Williams 2005, 3). I consider such interests as a common-sensical 
                                                 
50 For an introduction about the controversies on the foundations of  ethics, see Shafer-Landau and 
Cuneo 2016. 
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“platitude” about politics – to use Williams’ words – and, therefore, I take moralism to 
be regarded as dangerous from the point of view of actual political agents51. 
We can come now to third and final step of the argument. Given the previous 
two steps, we can argue for a rejection of moralism as a guide for political action, and 
the adoption of realism instead, for prudential reasons. This means that realism can be 
defended as the less risky form of practical reasoning to adopt in political circumstances. 
The choice of political realism as our guide for political practices safeguards at best our 
political interests, because it ensures the attainment of the best cost and benefit balance 
among them. The sense of this general prudential claim emerges vividly when we 
consider moralist reforms which engender the sort of political consequences discussed 
in the second step of the present argument and, more extensively, in the ethical 
argument previously considered. In similar cases, by choosing whether to favour 
moralist conclusions or a bottom-up normative guidance, we face a choice about what 
kind of interests to prioritise in the political domain: we might either defend moralism, 
because we believe (or hope) to have found the truth about how politics ought to be 
conducted, and we are disposed to promote (and accept the consequences of) its 
attainment; or we endorse realism, because we believe that the preservation of our political 
interests, and – with it – the protection from the dangers of moralism, ought to take 
precedence. Now, in similar cases, given the former two steps of the argument, it looks 
sensible to conclude that political realism is the most prudent approach to choose. In 
fact, on balance, given the persistent disagreement around the ability of moralism (and, 
                                                 
51 The judgment of  moralism as dangerous on the basis on common-sense political interests is a theme 
that largely recurs in Williams’ essay “The liberalism of  fear”, in which he draws from Judith Shklar’s 
political thought to explain why liberalism in the appropriate doctrine to adopt in our political 
circumstances (Williams 2005, 52-61). According to both Shklar and Williams, a serious problem for 
political thought is that theorists tend to forget about the characteristics of  political reality and the 
interests of  real political actors. Realism is a “party of  memory”, not a “party of  hope”: it focuses on 
reminding us what are the fundamental political need upon which political coexistence has been 
construed and which ought to form the grounding pillars of  any normative understanding of  politics 
(Shklar 1989, 26). Fundamental political goals, such as the protection from cruelty and abuse of  power 
– which are at the core, for instance, of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (and which, 
therefore, belong to our shared political culture) – usually vividly emerge as basic political interests in 
post-conflictual historical phases, and are somehow neglected afterwards. A passage of  Shklar, recalled 
by Williams, is emblematic in this respect: “To those American political theorists who long for either 
more communal or more expansively individual personalities, I now offer a reminder that these are the 
concerns of  an exceptionally privileged liberal society, and that until the institutions of  primary freedom are 
in place these longings cannot even arise. Indeed the extent to which both the communitarian and the 
romantic take free public institutions for granted is a tribute to the United States, but not to their 
sense of  history. Too great a part of  past and present political experience is neglected” (Shklar 1989, 35-36, 
emphasis added). As it will become clear, the fact that moralism can be regarded as dangerous from a 
human point of  view is crucial in order to develop a prudential argument in favour of  realism. 
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relatedly, of the diverse theories it gives rise to) to deliver the truth about political 
normativity, and given its perceived potential shortcomings, to select moralism as a 
practical guide for political circumstances appears as an excessively risky choice: 
moralism generates a severe negative impact, while the gain it promises is uncertain. So, 
in this sort of cases, following moralism as a practical guide looks unwise, since the 
benefits it promises are overridden by the serious costs incurred. Moralism, according to 
this line of argument, is a gamble which is hardly worthwhile to take. Realism, on the 
contrary, offers a way to protect the fundamental political interests of actual agents, 
because it grounds normativity on a contextual interpretation and reflection about what 
political actors find valuable52. On balance, a prudential reasoning would conclude that, 
in this kind of circumstances, it would be politically wise to follow a bottom-up 
methodology. However, it might be replied, certainly not every moralist theory needs to 
engender the sort of practical implications portrayed above. So, is the prudential 
argument able to generalise its conclusion? After all, a possible objection might go, we 
could simply contrast the implications of moralist paradigms with the real world, and 
assess whether it is wise to follow their prescriptions. Yet – a realist would reply –  this 
is precisely the sort of reasoning that makes the prudential argument a forceful general 
justification of the realist approach. Indeed, the prudential argument is precisely 
construed around the idea that moralist prescriptions could, and should, be weighed 
against what actual agents find valuable. But the prudential argument also suggests that, 
whenever the conclusions of moralist and realist analyses conflict, we have a reason to 
safeguard the interests of actual political actors, given the fragile status of moralist 
theories. Therefore, once it is accepted the idea that normative prescriptions ought to be 
subjected to a prudential analysis, moralism either becomes redundant (because it 
                                                 
52 In fact, Williams points out that political theorists favour the creation of  normative political “systems” 
when they forget about the real political audience and its actual political interests. For Williams, to abide 
by the fundamental political interests of  actual agents it is necessary to build context-sensitive, bottom-up, 
proposals – not political ideals abstractly justified. While arguing in support for the doctrine of  the 
liberalism of  fear, he points out: “the approach of  the liberalism of  fear is bottom-up, not top-down. Just 
as it takes the condition of  life without terror as its first requirement and considers what other goods can 
be furthered in more favourable circumstances, it treats each proposal for the extension of  the notions of  
fear and freedom in the light of  what locally has been secured. It does not try to determine in general 
what anyone has a right to under any circumstances and then apply it. It regards the discovery of  what 
rights people have as a political and historical one, not a philosophical one” (Williams 2005, 61).  
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reaches the same conclusions of realism), or it becomes an unwise strategy (because it 
conflicts with what realism would counsel)53. 
Can this third justificatory strategy convince the moralist? Given its prudential 
nature, I believe that this third argument possesses the tools to persuade the moralist 
about the superiority of realism as a practical guide in political circumstances. In fact, 
even if the moralist regarded the pursuit of truth has a highly valuable goal, its uncertain 
status, and the risks entailed, could give her a reason to recognise that realism is a wiser 
strategy – at least for the time being, and on a practical level. 
Still, a similar argument might look puzzling and fragile for a number of reasons. 
So, let me unfold it in greater detail by addressing some of the doubts that might be 
raised against it. A first group of objections can be directed against the very idea of a 
prudential justification. For these critiques, the very project of justifying prudentially 
political realism is troublesome. A similar doubt can take three different forms. A first 
one would consist in claiming that a prudential justification is by definition unsound. 
Since the task of the theorist is to seek a better understanding of normative political 
theory, an evaluation of the practical costs of the theories is irrelevant or, more 
correctly, a focus on the costs of theories might undermine the theorist’s research. In 
other words, a prudential justification commits a category error: it focuses on practical 
advantages, while the aim of the justification should be that of uncovering what method 
delivers the best normative understanding of politics. However, a realist would not 
accept a similar objection. In order to appropriately understand the prudential argument, 
a fundamental point about realism must be understood. The reason Geuss and Williams 
would not regard a prudential justification as a category error resides in the fact that, in 
their view, theorising qualifies as a political action and, crucially, every political action 
must be conducted responsibly. In fact, I have already mentioned the fact that Geuss 
and Williams regard theories as performative constructs, namely as products that are 
able to have an impact in the real world. By being so characterised, however, they must 
be subjected to the sort of evaluations that every political action must go through. 
Among those evaluations, judgments of responsibility are a fundamental component of 
                                                 
53 Notice that this does not imply that moralism cannot have any role in political thinking. The argument 
claims only that moralism is an inappropriate source of  prescription, i.e. an inappropriate guide for 
political action. Moralism, though, might play other roles in political reasoning. It might, for example, 
constitute a source of  criticism of  our own beliefs, by encouraging us to examine and assess our own 
interests and moral views. 
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realist thought, which has remained largely underappreciated, though. With 
responsibility in political action, Geuss and Williams refer explicitly to the traditional 
Weberian notion according to which political actions ought to be analysed and assessed 
in light of their expected consequences (Geuss 2010, 30; Williams 2005, 12 and 72). To 
act responsibly means, in this sense, to pass through a careful examination of the 
concrete impact of the intended action, and to attentively weight the costs that a course 
of action might confront. In this vein, Geuss’ and Williams’ appeal for responsibility in 
political action serves as a reminder that we act in a real world and that political choices 
might have a severe impact on it: it is a call to take politics seriously, and be prepared to 
be accountable for one’s own choices. Hence, political theorising, which constitutes an 
active intervention in this real world, ought to be evaluated along similar standards. It is, 
then, perfectly legitimate to assess theories in light of the costs that their realisation 
would entail. Their analyses, as we have seen, are a warning against the concrete dangers 
of moralism which, if attentively considered, might dissuade us from backing a moralist 
approach. In a realist vein, we could even go as far as saying that the category error is 
rather committed by those who artificially, and unrealistically, separate reality and theory 
when the question of which guidance to pursue in political circumstances is at stake. 
Let us now turn to the second possible objection against the employment of 
prudential reasons of justification. According to a second line of objection, the 
prudential argument would encourage the development of self-deceptive beliefs, 
because it would justify acting as if realism were the approach which truly reflected what 
ethical life demanded of us, where instead this behaviour is just the most convenient. 
The prudential justification, in other words, would go against the very foundation of the 
realist project, which demands a truthful understanding of our political world. However, 
the argument that I am proposing here merely claims that we should attain to the realist 
approach as a practical guide; namely, that the norms we endorse ought to be conceived 
following a realist methodology. The prudential argument explicitly declares that the 
adoption of political realism is dictated by an assessment of the risks of moralism, and it 
does not exclude the pursuit of parallel researches – metaethical and ethical – about 
what political practices would truly demand of us. 
A final objection against the prudential justification could be made against its 
contingent nature. As every prudential argument, this kind of justification of political 
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realism is merely contingent: that is to say, it does not prove that realism is the form of 
practical reasoning that ought to govern our political life, but it merely shows us that, 
given the present circumstances, it is accidentally convenient. This is a very fragile 
achievement, which could be rejected as soon as circumstances change. A realist would 
reply that this is certainly true, a prudential justification is necessarily contingent. 
However, the realist would deny that this weaken in any sense the argument. First of all, 
the justification is less contingent than it might appear: the facts mentioned in its 
support are contingent but persistent. The facts upon which the prudential justification 
is built are: the deep disagreement around the conditions of validity of metaethical and 
ethical theories, the practical consequences that moralism might give rise to, and a 
shared interest in the preservation of some fundamental political values (like protection, 
order, trust, stability, and the conditions of cooperation). All these facts are stubborn 
political facts, which will hardly change in the foreseeable future. Secondarily, it is not 
even clear why arguments that are grounded on contingent facts ought to be regarded 
with suspicion. In fact, this is exactly the point that realist aim to challenge by arguing 
that between theory and reality a sharp line of separation ought not to be traced. 
Leaving aside the possible objections against the idea of prudential justification, 
let us consider a final doubt regarding the argument, this time concerning the prudential 
calculus itself. Indeed, someone might object that the prudential assessment is wrongly 
conducted, because the pursuit of truth is infinitely more valuable than any other goal. 
Therefore – the objection would go – the prudential analysis would not allow us to 
exclude moralism, since taking the risk of moralism would always constitute the best 
choice, given the infinite value of the potential gain. There are two answers a realist 
might point out in this case. As a first point she might, once again, recall that the 
prudential argument does not prevent us to search for the truth about metaethical, or 
ethical, issues: political realism is just the best practical approach to follow. As a second 
point, the realist would emphasise that the prudential calculus aims to take into account 
the interests of the participants; hence, it does not matter whether the theorist would 
conceive the calculus in a different manner. The relevant point of view is the enlarged 
one of those who take part in political practices. This is done because, as explained, the 
prudential argument originates from the necessity of responsibly taking into account 
what happens in the real world when moralism is enacted, and this requires abandoning 
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the restricted point of view of the theorist, in order to endorse the enlarged human one. 
As Williams effectively emphasises, political realism “speaks to humanity” (Williams 
2005, 59). 
 
6. Conclusion: Going realist in order to take politics seriously 
I want to close my paper by saying a few more words on what I tried to argue for, 
and its relevance. As I specified in the introductory section, the central goal of this 
paper was to outline a prudential justification for the adoption of the realist method in 
normative political theory. As I specified and explained all along the paper, though, the 
prudential justification is taken to be just one possible justification of the realist method. 
In fact, I argued that there are at least two other arguments – what I dubbed the meta-
ethical and the ethical arguments, respectively – which might back the realist case for 
the adoption of a bottom-up methodology. However, I claimed that the prudential 
argument is the only justificatory strategy which might result compelling for a moralist. 
As I tried to show, the prudential argument has such potential because it employs means 
unfamiliar to the moralist: whereas attempted theoretical justifications – the ones pursued 
by the meta-ethical and the ethical arguments – prove unpersuasive, a prudential 
justification has some chances to appear convincing, because it maintains that the realist 
method is the wisest practical choice to follow. 
Is this the sole advantage of the prudential argument? I do not believe so. By way 
of conclusion, I care to emphasise that I regard the prudential argument also the most 
loyal to the spirit of realist political thinking. Indeed, I take the prudential argument to 
be a fruit of the fundamental insight of political realism: namely, that politics ought to 
be taken seriously, where to “take politics seriously” means to place at the core of 
normative reflection an attentive comprehension of the reality of politics (Geuss 2008, 
9-18; Williams 2005, 12-14). But it is important to emphasise that to such a requirement 
can be given two different – though deeply connected – readings, according to the 
importance we assign to “politics” and “reality” respectively. On the one hand, this 
requirement can be read as to mean that political thinking ought to be structured around 
a deep understanding of political phenomena. But, on the other hand, this same 
requirement can be read as to suggest that political theorists ought to be aware of the 
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fact that what they are reflecting about is, indeed, a part of reality54. On this second 
reading, political theory ought to be conducted in light of the fact that politics is not 
merely a theoretical object of study, it is the world we inhabit, in flesh and blood. For 
political realism, once we come to a serious understanding of the reality of politics, we 
come to recognise that normative theorising and judgment ought to be conducted by 
seriously inquiring the concrete implications that theories would have, and assessing 
which consequences we would be ready to accept. Political theories cannot merely 
satisfy a requirement of theoretical consistency, they need to be evaluated by paying 
attention to their expected functioning within real political practices, and to the 
comparative cost and gains obtained by assuming them as practical guides. The 
prudential argument, being structured around a call for responsibility in political action, 
precisely follows such need to take politics seriously: the prudential argument urges us 
to turn our sight from the theoretical machinery to reflect on what would be the wisest 
practical strategy to pursue. Hence, even though all the three arguments are built 
starting from attentive analyses of political practices, it is with the prudential argument 
that the realist invite (and the challenge) to take politics seriously becomes pivotal. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Williams, for examples, explains that his defence of  the liberalism of  fear is inspired by a “constant 
reminder of  the reality of  politics, that there is a political reality out there” (Williams 2005, 61). 
Similarly, Geuss points out that judging politically does not merely consists in pronouncing judgments 
about politics, but rather to judge the implications of  actions within their concrete political contexts 
(Geuss 2010, 10). 
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III. 
POLITICAL REALISM AS REFORMIST CONSERVATISM 
THE REALIST (LONG) JOURNEY FROM THE STATUS QUO TO UTOPIA 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Political realism and the status quo 
Since its recent resurgence, political realism has remained a largely critical voice in 
political theory. While it is disputable whether embracing a ‘mere’ critical attitude should 
be regarded as a flawed approach to political theorising, the fact that political realism 
has been for a long time so characterised is certainly revelatory of theoretical lacuna. 
Indeed, how realist political theory ought to be conceived, or what the proper role of a 
realist thinker should be, remain largely underexplored issues. In light of this gap, the 
debate has recently begun to offer the first contributions to the project of providing a 
constructive understanding of political realism. For those who are engaged in such 
endeavour, the challenge is clear: since political realism fundamentally criticises 
‘mainstream’ political theory for failing to recognise the normative autonomy of the 
political, realists must explain how political thinking ought to be affected and 
constrained by political reality. 
In the context of this broad theoretical enterprise, my paper aims at contributing 
to the discussion by addressing a specific issue: I intend to clarify what is the 
relationship between a realist political theory and its context of application. Notably, 
indeed, political realism is considered a ‘contextualist’ approach to political theorising, 
meaning by that that, in political realism, the contest of application of the theory 
represents its source of normativity. My goal is to explain how, and to what extent, 
realist political theories are dependent on the particular context they are conceived for. 
Ultimately, I will argue that political realism must be interpreted as a form of reformist 
conservatism which demands the political order for a certain context to reflect its subjects’ 
beliefs about politics, but which also encourages a revision of those same beliefs. Hence, 
I will explain, political realism is both conservative, since it tends to preserve and justify 
the status quo, and – at the same time – reformist, since it allows to gradually modify 
90 
the status quo by soliciting a critical reflection on the beliefs that ground the normative 
theory. 
By defending a similar interpretation, I mean also to take a distance from the 
positive reconstructions of realism that the literature has offered so far. The most recent 
contributions appear neatly polarised, indeed. On the one hand, some contributors 
interpret political realism as an approach to politics which – more or less explicitly – 
leads to an affirmation of the status quo (Hall 2017; Jubb 2017; McQueen 2016). On the 
other hand, it has been suggested that political realism, if correctly understood, might 
(and perhaps ought to) lead to radical transformations of the status quo (Finlayson 
2015; Rossi 2015; Rossi and Prinz 2017). To a certain extent, a similar scenario is 
understandable and wholly expected. As I will explain, the fundamental theoretical 
tenets of political realism, when considered together, appear to be hardly reconcilable. 
Those who defend the conservative tendencies of political realism usually attribute 
crucial importance to the realist emphasis on the need of order and stability. On the 
contrary, those who interpret political realism as a progressive approach to politics tend 
to develop their interpretation starting from the realist warnings against the power of 
political institutions to oppress, often in subtle and unrecognised ways. However, as I 
will discuss, struggling to preserve order comes at the price of undermining the attempts 
of analysing and revealing the structures of power that sustain political institutions, and 
vice-versa. 
Nevertheless, though understandable, I believe that forcing us into a choice 
between said alternatives is a mistake, both for interpretive and for theoretical reasons55. 
I will show that it is possible to reconcile all the basic tenets of political realism in a 
unique theoretical framework. To do so, I will propose an interpretation of political 
realist theories as tripartite theoretical structures composed by a prescriptive theory, an 
internal critical theory and an external critical theory. My strategy will be that of 
explaining political realist theories as structures in which the critical momentum does 
not entirely overlap to the prescriptive one. I will defend the idea that there are two 
different ways of criticising reality for political realists: an internal critique (which 
                                                 
55 In a similar direction goes Thaler 2012, which maintains that political realism ought to include both 
radical and conservative reflections. However, while he believes that it is not possible to provide 
general guidelines to choose between these approaches, since in his view only the particular political 
judgments can establish what is the appropriate approach to adopt, I attempt to reconcile these 
tendencies in a single theoretical framework. 
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criticises existing political arrangements in light of what the prescriptive theory 
prescribes) and an external critique (which challenges subjects’ beliefs about politics and 
that does not have a direct impact on what ought to be done). I shall argue that such a 
partial overlap between political normativity and critique allows to consistently abide by 
the fundamental tenets that inspire political realism, and to overcome the tension 
between preserving order and unmasking oppression I mentioned above. 
I will proceed as follows. I will begin by introducing the basic tenets of political 
realism and I will show the potential inconsistencies they raise. I will then propose my 
own interpretation of political realism as a tripartite structure able to overcome said 
inconsistencies. All along the paper, I will defend such interpretation showing its 
advantages, both interpretive and theoretical, over the rival ones. Overall, then, my aim 
is to picture what I take to be the most convincing reading of political realism in a 
constructive sense, which will result in an account of political realism as a form of 
reformist conservatism.  
 
2. The five methodological tenets of  political realism 
As anticipated, I am going to devote the second section of the paper to the 
introduction of the basic tenets that animate realist political thought. The analysis will be 
conducted making use of the works of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. There 
are two reasons that motivated my choice. Firstly, Williams and Geuss are usually 
regarded as the two most prominent voices in contemporary political realism56. 
Secondly, and more importantly, I chose to base my analysis on both Williams’ and 
Geuss’ readings of political realism because my goal is showing that – despite their 
differences – it is possible to reconcile their diverse theoretical sensibilities in a single 
interpretive account of political realism. However, since – as I formerly recalled – 
theorists have so far refrained from providing positive interpretations of political 
realism, my own understanding of political realism qualifies as a reconstructive 
endeavour: I start from Geuss’ and Williams’ analyses of political realism and draw 
further conclusions from them, partly overcoming their accounts. Specifically, from 
Geuss and Williams, besides taking – as said – my understanding of the basic theoretical 
                                                 
56 See, among others, Hall and Sleat 2017; Honig and Stears 2011; Philp 2012; Rossi and Sleat 2014; 
Scheuerman 2013. 
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tenets that animate political realism, I gain also some first scattered suggestions about 
how political realism ought to be construed. The conclusions I will defend regarding the 
relationship between realist political theory and the context will be reached exclusively 
seeking an overall consistent picture of the fundamental tenets that ground political 
realism. So, it is necessary to clarify what I take to be the fundamental tenets of realism 
as a first step. 
I take the methodological tenets of political realism to be the fundamental 
theoretical commitments that guide Geuss’ and Williams’ normative analyses of political 
arrangements and actions. Though scattered, I identified five recurrent tenets that affect 
Geuss’ and Williams’ normative political theorising, without which we could hardly 
make sense of some of the conclusions they draw. Let me spend a few words on each. 
i. Reject moralism. Often defined as the thesis for the autonomy of the political, 
“anti-moralism” is certainly the most distinguishing and discussed theoretical 
commitment of political realism. When Geuss and Williams refer to moralism in 
political theory they indicate a specific methodological approach to political theorising 
which they take to be dominant in contemporary political philosophy. In their accounts, 
a political theory is moralist when it understands the political sphere as a mere field of 
application of normative theories independently justified. That is to say, a political 
theory is methodologically moralist when it judges the empirical knowledge of political 
practices and political circumstances as irrelevant to a proper understanding of the 
principles that ought to govern political life. For moralist thinkers, normative principles 
are prior to politics and are valid cross-contextually, even if possibly adjusted in light of 
feasibility constraints. Political moralism means, in other words, methodological 
insensitivity to political reality (Geuss 2008, 6-9; Williams 2005, 1-3). In Geuss’ and 
Williams’ view, moralism constitutes a fundamental methodological error in political 
theory. According to them, politics must be considered normatively autonomous – which 
does not mean that interactions between ethics and politics will not be possible, but 
rather that what is appropriate to do in political circumstances must proceed from a 
prior understanding of those circumstances themselves. In fact, politics poses unique 
problematics that moral theories – which first and foremost deal with interactions 
between individuals – do not have the means to properly address57, and involves a 
                                                 
57 See, for example, Williams’ (2005, Ch. 12) discussion about humanitarian interventions, or Geuss’ 
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particular understanding of values and their priorities58. Geuss and Williams, therefore, 
maintain that every political theory construed bracketing politics is doomed to achieve a 
distorted comprehension of the sense, and the proper conduct, of political action. 
Hence, for them, the first task of a political theory is to start from a deep understanding 
of political reality in all its forms, without allowing external principles to distort the 
analysis. 
ii. Focus on order. Politics is both for Geuss and Williams a delicate activity aimed at 
imposing order over disorder. They indeed start their analyses from a common 
understanding of political practices. The first task of politics, they both point out in a 
classical Hobbesian fashion, consists in making possible a system of coexistence out of 
disorder, by generating a hegemony able to exercise coercive power and limit conflict 
(Geuss 2008, 22-23; Williams 2005, 3). Aligning themselves with classical realism, Geuss 
and Williams see in stability the first requirement of political practices, which in turn 
enables all the other political achievements. Accordingly, one of the primary focuses of 
political theory must be to study the mechanisms through which political powers 
generate and maintain through time, and to reflect about their implications, both 
theoretical and practical. 
iii. Accept coercion. Despite necessary, the pursuit of order is never free of costs. As 
it is well-known, together with anti-moralism, one of the harshest critiques Geuss and 
Williams move against mainstream political theory is that of being irrelevant and 
dangerous by posing the consensual acceptance of the governing power as a 
requirement for its legitimacy (Geuss 2005, Ch. 1; Williams 2005, 2-3). Indeed, Geuss 
and Williams strongly argue against the utility of employing the notion of consensus in 
politics. As they explain, disagreement and conflict are ineliminable features of political 
life. Being so, every political order will never be attainable without a “remainder”: there 
will always be a certain amount of disagreement about the legitimacy of the authority 
and, consequently, a certain amount of compulsion. Political realists, then, see the (at 
least partially) coercive affirmation of power as an ineliminable trait of politics (Geuss 
2008, 23-30; Williams 2005, Ch. 1 and 5).  
                                                                                                                                          
(2005, Ch. 1) comments against the liberal way of  dealing with political disagreement. 
58 As Williams (2005, Ch.7) tries to show by explaining the political value of  liberty, or as Geuss (2008, 70-
76) argues while problematising the pre-eminence usually assigned to the value of  justice in political 
circumstances by moralist literature. 
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iv. Exercise critical thinking. The tradition of Critical Theory is another fundamental 
influence in Geuss’ and Williams’ political thought. Despite differences, one of the basic 
theoretical commitments that animates both their political philosophies is the suspicion 
against unreflective thinking, namely the act of holding some beliefs without inquiring 
their origin, their basis, and validity. The problem with unreflective thinking consists in 
that it might prevent us from abandoning beliefs that we would rather reject (as invalid 
or unacceptable) if we just had the means to appropriately examine them (Geuss 2008, 
90-94; Williams 2002, 225-32). In this sense, unreflective thinking must be intended as a 
form of epistemic blindness. However, it is not immediately clear why analysing the 
conditions for reflection ought to have any special role in shaping the thought of 
political thinkers. The reason the phenomenon of unreflective thinking gains a special 
weight in political theory becomes manifest once the conditions for reflection are 
analysed in light of the fundamental instrument politics employs to create order, namely 
– as said – power. Crucially, as political practices build stable hegemonies through 
power-relations, they might actively foster the formation of unreflective beliefs. In fact, 
as Geuss and Williams remind us, political actors and institutions have the capacity to 
produce the acceptance of certain beliefs, by obstructing individuals from seeing reality 
from a different perspective (whether this be by actively hiding pieces of information, or 
by unintentionally disseminating a positive perception the status quo) (Geuss 2008, 50-
55; Williams 2005, 6). Geuss, which often refers to the fruit of unreflective thinking in 
politics as to ‘ideology’ or ‘illusion’, explains the phenomenon by saying that “an 
ideology (…) is a set of beliefs, attitudes, preferences that are distorted as a result of the 
operation of specific relations of power” (2008, 52). So defined, ideologies are shields 
that hinder individuals from seeing clearly political reality, and therefore from acting in 
the political world in full conscience of the sense and the purpose of their choices. In 
fact, beliefs that are induced by power-relations, by hiding reality to a certain extent, 
might prevent individuals from adequately judging the status quo, and consequently to 
reform, or radical transform, their political context. It is for this reason – Geuss and 
Williams believe – that unreflective beliefs are a particularly dangerous phenomenon in 
political life, and that political thinkers ought to beware of them by promoting critical 
thinking (Williams 2005, 161-63). 
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v. Act (and therefore theorise) responsibly. If the Hobbesian root of realist thinking is 
rightly recalled as one of its grounding pillars, the same emphasis has not been given to 
another crucial influence that has shaped political realism: the Weberian political 
thought. Still, Weber’s Vocation Lectures (2004) play a major part in informing the 
political theory of Geuss and Williams. Weber’s influence is manifest in several respects, 
but to the present analysis one theme is of central interest: his considerations about the 
role responsibility ought to play in political action. A responsible political action, according 
to Weber, is that action which is pursued carefully taking into consideration its possible 
consequences and side-effects, and evaluating its merit in light of such analysis. Being a 
responsible political actor, for Weber, means to be attentive to the empirical features of 
the political circumstances in which the action takes place – i.e. to understand the causal 
chains involved – and to ultimately decide what ought to be done in light of the 
expected consequences of the actions (Weber 2004, 90-91). Behind Weber’s emphasis 
on the role that responsibility must play in political circumstances there is, notably, an 
invite to take politics seriously: political actors must realise that politics is made possible 
through the use of force, and that every political action takes place in a web of causal 
chains which is impossible to fully control. Hence, political actions are always potentially 
harmful and to take politics seriously means to be conscious that taking political 
decisions light-heartedly might be a disruptive behaviour. Following Weber, Geuss and 
Williams place a particular emphasis on the role of responsibility in politics. They often 
point out that a good political actor is the one who is able to exercise some sort of 
practical wisdom (Geuss 2010, 41). Indeed, what has to be done politically can never be 
decided by merely applying a rule in a given context; rather the political actor needs to 
be capable of evaluating and weighting the multiple factors at play in the circumstances 
at hand analysing the available alternatives and the risks involved in pursuing some 
course of action (Geuss 2010, Ch. 1; Williams 2005, 12-14). How are these 
considerations related to the shape that normative political theory ought to take, 
though? So far, I dealt with Weber’s understanding of responsibility of political actors 
and this may rightly seem an issue unrelated to the realist conception of political 
normativity: realists could define some guidelines, principles, for political action, but the 
onus of establishing which course of action is the responsible one would bear on the 
actor. However, a similar understanding of the role of responsibility in realist thought 
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would represent a severe misinterpretation. The role of responsibility is realist political 
theory is much wider and directly bears on the content of realist normative theories. 
Indeed, for Geuss and Williams, one aspect of endorsing a realist attitude in political 
theory consists in recognising that the theorist himself has to be regarded as a political 
actor. Despite perhaps disposing of means of action less effective than other kinds of 
actor, the theorist, since promotes political imaginaries and is able to encourage or 
discourage political actions, can have a direct impact on the real world (Geuss 2008, 29-
30; Williams 2005, 72-74). Theorising, therefore, fully qualifies as a political action. 
Normative theorising, in other words, must be conducted in a responsible way and can 
be constrained or invalidated if it is carried out without taking into account its possible 
consequences and contextual circumstances of application (Geuss 2010, 30; Williams 
2005, 148-51). 
 
3. A puzzle for realists 
Even at a first sight, the list of realist tenets I just introduced might leave us 
perplexed. As a matter of fact, it is not at all clear how, from these theoretical 
commitments, political realism could build a stable theoretical proposal. Indeed, a 
tension between the Hobbesian and Weberian lineages of political realist thinking and 
its Critical Theoretical root seems to emerge. Political realism, as characterised according 
to the above-mentioned five tenets, shows an uncertain disposition towards power. On 
the one hand, following the Hobbesian and Weberian traditions, Geuss and Williams 
recognise that is necessary to establish a centralized power structure in order to make 
political life possible at all. Hence, power structures are necessary for political life and 
every change to the system that would undermine them ought to be evaluated with 
caution, given the responsibility constrain.  
Yet, on the other hand, the realists’ invite to exercise critical thinking, and have a 
clear grasp on the origin of our beliefs, points exactly in the opposite direction. By 
recalling the Critical Theory tradition, Geuss and Williams encourage us to reflect on 
our beliefs about politics and to be conscious that they might be generated by the 
structures of power in which we live. However, such critical exercise is potentially 
detrimental of political power. Indeed, reflection might push us to revise our beliefs in 
light of this newly-acquired awareness, and such reflective attitude can foment hostility 
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against existing power-structures. In fact, to exercise critical thinking means to 
continually stress the basis of our acceptance of the status quo, and to possibly come to 
know that we have reason to oppose the political arrangements in which we find 
ourselves. As Williams himself admits, reflection often brings with it “unsettling 
effects”, because we might discover that we feel deeply uncomfortable to live the life we 
accepted before the reflection, and we might want to actively resist it (Williams 2006, 
Ch. 17; see also Williams 2002, 230-32). Hence, how such invite to welcome the 
unsettling effects of reflection can be balanced with the parallel admission that we need 
stable power structures and we ought to deal with them responsibly is certainly a 
reasonable question to ask. 
To solve the puzzle, those who have dealt so far with the problem of construing a 
positive interpretation of political realism have preserved consistency by giving up one 
of the two commitments. On the one hand, building upon Williams’ analysis of 
legitimate political orders, Edward Hall and Robert Jubb have recently defended the 
anti-moralist goal of political realism by providing guidelines about how to provide a 
context-dependent justification of political orders (Hall 2017; Jubb 2015a and 2017). 
Despite the emphasis Williams put on the role of critical thinking for the elaboration of 
a theory of legitimate order, in Hall’s and Jubb’s reconstructions the Critical Theory 
tradition cease to exercise any influence in the normative analysis. Hall and Jubb have 
both argued for an approach to political normativity that draws the normative 
commitment for politics from an interpretation of the purpose of political practices. 
Since the purpose of political orders is to make possible a rule able to overcome conflict 
without collapsing into sheer domination, the first requirement of political orders is to 
be locally recognised as legitimate forms of authority. Hence, according to Hall and 
Jubb realist political theory defines what ought to be done politically by understanding 
the contextual beliefs about legitimacy and defending those arrangements that best 
reflect such contextual beliefs. Therefore, in Hall’s and Jubb’s readings, political realism 
appears ultimately as a conservative approach to political reality: we have reason to 
overturn the political orders just when their subjects cannot recognise them as legitimate 
authorities, in most of the cases, however, such interpretation of political realism 
encourages partial adjustments of existing political arrangements in light of the beliefs 
about legitimacy actual subjects hold. 
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On the other hand, Janosh Prinz and Enzo Rossi have rejected the idea of 
providing a positive normative interpretation of political orders (Prinz and Rossi 2017). 
In their view, the strategy to fulfil the anti-moralist commitment of political realism is to 
engage in a process of “negative criticism” which they take to be, albeit in an 
underdeveloped way, the idea of political realism that Geuss has introduced (Prinz 
2016). Instead of positively suggesting how we should evaluate and organise political 
arrangements, their fundamental idea is to define what ought to be done politically by 
examining – through a process of ideological unmasking – which beliefs about politics 
are tenable against reflection and can therefore have a role in governing our collective 
life. According to Prinz and Rossi, building a “positive” conception of political order 
would push us back towards some form of moralist political theorising, because the 
starting point from which we would build our conception of legitimate authority – the 
“Archimedean point” at the basis of the theoretical construction, to use a Williamsian 
phrase – would necessarily be pre-political and ideological in content: establishing some 
starting points to build up a normative proposal would mean to hold as fixed some 
(normative or interpretive) assumptions about politics, where political reality is 
constantly changing and cannot be defined once and for all (Prinz and Rossi 2017, 355). 
Hence, for Prinz and Rossi, political normativity as negative criticism is the only 
interpretation of political realism that allows us to avoid moralism in political theory. 
Contrary to the reconstruction offered by Hall and Jubb, such interpretation of political 
realism explicitly embraces radicalism in political theory; that is to say, Prinz and Rossi 
believe that a correct interpretation of political realism could foster radical changes of 
political reality (355-62). Since the ultimate aim of a realist political theory is to test 
through ideological analysis our political beliefs, political realism as negative criticism 
actually has a deeper critical potential. Here, the search for an ordered cooperation 
appears subordinate to the process of ideological unmasking, in fact negative criticism 
could encourage radical changes despite (and against) the actual beliefs held by the 
subjects and the accepted authority. 
Contrary to these interpretations, I believe that the five tenets above-outlined can 
coexists in a unique theoretical framework without generating contradictions, i.e. 
without the need to radically weaken some of them. The reconstruction that I am about 
to introduce is manifestly just one possible interpretation of the realist political thought; 
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however, throughout the paper I will defend my interpretation by engaging with the 
rival accounts of political realism just sketchily presented. Ultimately, my aim is to argue 
for the comparative advantages of my account by showing its interpretive and 
theoretical superiority over the alternatives.  
 
4. And its solution: The tripartite structure 
Before beginning my reconstruction, let me put forward the basic idea behind my 
interpretive endeavour. I abide by the five tenets listed and disentangle the theoretical 
puzzle just outlined by conceiving realist political theories as tripartite structures. 
According to my interpretation, realist political theories are composed by a prescriptive 
theory, an internal critical theory, and an external critical theory. Since, as it will shortly 
become manifest, just the first two parts regard what ought (or ought not) to be done, 
while the third concerns the free exercise of reflection, it is possible to fully preserve a 
role for critical thinking substantively limiting its power of undermining the stability of 
political institutions. This is obtained by denying that there is a direct link between the 
outcomes of reflection and the reasons we might have for rejecting, or fighting, the 
political authority; these two dimensions ought to be kept distinct. The account of 
political realism that will emerge from this picture will result in a conservative reformist form 
of political theory, but I shall say more on this point later on. So, let me start with the 
prescriptive theory and give a sense to the sketch just drafted. 
 
4.1. Prescriptive Theory 
In a conventional fashion, I take the first part of realist political theory to be its 
prescriptive theory, namely an analytic reflection about how politics ought to be 
evaluated and what ought to be done in political circumstances59. The best way to give a 
                                                 
59 Someone might object that Geuss would never accept the idea of  a realist normative theory, and so argue 
that I should not introduce the idea of  a prescriptive role of  political realism so easily. Rob Jubb, for 
example, has claimed that Geuss is one of  those realists “hostile to idea of  normativity as such” 
because, as Geuss affirms repeatedly, he is suspicious “about the normative standpoint as a whole” 
(Jubb 2015b, 922; Geuss 2005, 21-28). Jubb takes Geuss’ position as a motive to dismiss his 
philosophy because useless to the purpose of  construing a normative version of  political realism. In 
any case, if  a similar interpretation of  Geuss’ thought were true, the very possibility of  a realist 
normative theory could be troublesome and ought to be defended. However, I take the objection to 
be the fruit of  a misunderstanding. In fact, Geuss never claims that normative reasoning is irrelevant 
or impossible in the political realm; rather, Geuss harshly criticizes the idea of  a political normativity 
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sense of realist political theory in its prescriptive role is to follow Williams’ discussion of 
the notion of legitimacy as a political value. Indeed, the analysis of legitimacy that 
Williams proposes in “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory” (Williams 2005, 1-17; 
hereinafter RMPT) is the first attempt to develop the realist paradigm in a positive form, 
and I will build on his basis. 
As it will shortly become clear, the empirical and the normative dimensions of 
politics are deeply intertwined in realist political thinking. I recall, in fact, that the anti-
moralism tenet requires political theory to be somehow sensitive to the specificities of 
political reality. Williams is accordingly interested in making possible a political 
understanding of the key evaluative notions that are usually employed in political 
circumstances, such as – as said – the notion of legitimacy. His strategy to develop a 
political understanding of legitimacy can be explained as a three-steps procedure which 
generates a contextually-valid conception of legitimacy starting from a descriptive 
appraisal of political reality60. So, in order to gain a first grasp on the relationship 
between political context and theory in political realism we need to delve into each of 
the three steps that compose the procedure. 
As a first step, Williams isolates the practice that is the focus of his interest and 
provides a description of its essential features. Since Williams’ argument in RMPT is 
entirely meant to explain what does it mean to give greater autonomy to political 
thought, the practice under scrutiny is politics itself. In Williams’ view, a situation can be 
described as political every time there is a structure of power able to coercively enforce a 
set of rules over its subjects and, crucially, which claims to have the authority for doing 
so. In Williams’ own words: 
 
A coerces B and claims that B would be wrong to fight back […] By doing 
this, A claims that his actions transcend the condition of warfare, and this 
                                                                                                                                          
as a universal system of  principles that could tell us what is right or wrong in a given situation 
deductively. Specifically, Geuss defends the idea of  normative reasoning for politics as the art of  
producing context-sensitive judgments that can never appeal to universal principles (Geuss 2010, Ch. 
1). The reading I am proposing of  political realism is precisely conducted in the attempt to account 
for a context-sensitive normativity for politics. 
60 In fact, as Jubb has pointed out, Williams’ procedure has strong similarities with the practice-dependent 
methodology for normative political theory elaborated by Sangiovanni (see Jubb 2016a and 
Sangiovanni 2008). Williams does not explicitly introduce his realist account of  legitimacy as a three-
steps procedure; however, I discuss them as separate steps in order to clearly present his 
argumentative strategy. This will allow me, in the final section of  the paper, to better counteract some 
of  the criticism that have been raised against Williams’ method. 
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gives rise to a demand for justification of what A does. When A is the state, 
these claims constitute its claim of authority over B. (2005, 6) 
 
According to Williams, then, politics as a practice must be carefully distinguished 
from warfare, namely from a condition of sheer domination. The political is given when 
a justification for the use of coercive power is offered by those who dictate the rules of 
cooperation (A, in the previous quote) to those who are subjected to those rules (B). 
Correspondingly, a political relationship is established whenever the justification offered 
by the governing power is accepted (i.e. it is not the consequence of mere imposition). 
In a second step, Williams analyses the practice so identified in light of its sense 
and purpose from the point of view of its participants. Crucially, here is where the shift 
from description to normativity is made possible. Williams famously declares that the 
reason we have politics is because of the first question it is meant to answer, namely 
“the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation” 
(2005, 3). In Williams’ opinion, Hobbes got it basically right when he defended the idea 
that politics exists to prevent the terror we would experience in a state of nature. Hence, 
politics, in Williams’ interpretation, is a complex phenomenon which has both an 
empirical and an evaluative dimension: it is an identifiable practice (securing order 
without resorting to sheer domination) that has a value to its participants (defying 
terror). Somehow, the prescriptive theory will have to be sensitive to such conception of 
politics if it must be able to give autonomy to political thought, which – as formerly 
pointed out – is Williams’ central goal in RMPT.  
It is in the third momentum of the argument that the possibility of a properly 
realist political theory is finally outlined. For Williams, thinking politically means 
conceiving the prescriptive theory for politics in light of its point and purpose: what 
ought to be done politically needs to reflect the purpose of politics itself, and no other 
external considerations. Hence, the normative turn is reached by Williams by reflecting 
on what would be required of politics to fulfil its core purpose, namely answering the 
first political question (FPQ). So, in Williams’ view, the task of a realist political theory is 
to unfold how politics ought to be organized to appropriately answer the FPQ.  
To solve this normative issue, Williams introduces another fundamental idea: the 
basic legitimation demand (BLD). As Williams explains, answering the FPQ equals 
meeting the BLD. In fact, the BLD – argues Williams – is inherent in there being a 
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FPQ, namely in there being something called politics. In Williams’ definition, “meeting 
the BLD implies a sense in which the state has to offer a justification of its power to 
each subject” (2005, 4). This is essentially required because, since the aim of politics is to 
avoid the basic evils we would encounter in the state of nature, the construction of 
order cannot be pursued through violence and domination. Answering the FPQ 
through sheer domination would simply replicate the problem politics is meant to solve. 
In order to make politics possible, the governing power needs to provide an 
“acceptable” answer to the FPQ; namely, it has to offer a legitimation story that can 
serve as a justification for its authority to its subjects. In other words, the governing 
power has to be legitimate in the sense its existence needs to have some sort of 
justification for those who are subjected to its rules. So, legitimacy comes to be regarded 
as the first value of political institutions, that is, as the first requirement the satisfaction 
of which every other political achievement must be subordinated. 
However, we need to unfold a bit more the functioning of the BLD to adequately 
understand what is the relationship between a conception of legitimacy and its context 
of application. Recall, indeed, that my main task is to clarify the relationship between 
theory and reality in realist thinking, so we need to understand how the substantive 
content of the conception of legitimacy is ultimately derived. Williams explains what 
might qualify an acceptable answer to the FPQ through the notion of making sense, 
which is a “category of historical understanding […] a hermeneutical category” (2005, 
11). An answer to the FPQ is acceptable – and therefore makes a regime legitimate – if 
the regime that provides the legitimation story makes sense as a form of political 
authority to the addressee of that story. “To make sense” means to be recognisable as a 
thing of a certain kind: a regime that makes sense as an authoritative order to its subjects 
is recognised as an example of that thing by them. In this sense, Williams deliberately 
departs from consensual forms of political legitimations: to make sense is a much less 
ambitious goal. To make sense as a form of authoritative order means that, given some 
historical and cultural circumstances, and so given the subjects’ “political, moral, social, 
interpretive” beliefs (2005, 11), a certain regime consistently fits as legitimate with the 
set of beliefs held, and it will be probably perceived as such. The answer to the BLD, 
then, will always be contextual, since what is perceived as fundamentally harmful or as 
brute domination is relative to a certain time and place.  
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Having unfolded the main lines of Williams’ prescriptive method, let me sum up 
some conclusions regarding the relationship between norms and reality in realist 
political thinking. According to Williams’ account, normativity is conceived in light of 
the practice it is meant to regulate. Specifically, normative political theory is founded on 
a certain conception of the meaning and sense of politics. In this sense, realist 
normative theory is practice-dependent. In fact, legitimacy comes to be thought as the 
first value of politics because this follows from an interpretation of the purpose of 
politics. More specifically, from such a practice-dependent approach some other 
normative consequences with respect to legitimacy follows. Firstly, Williams’ account 
entails that regimes must seek legitimacy as their first essential task, meaning that they 
must make sense as legitimate political authorities to their subjects. Secondly, it follows 
that judgments about the legitimacy of a certain regime will have to be political too: 
complaints about legitimacy will be justified only insofar as they are consistent with the 
possibility of a political order, namely if they are grounded on reasons that most of the 
subjects would recognise as conditions of legitimacy. Complaints about legitimacy that 
do not fit this requirement ought to be judged impolitical, hence irrelevant. 
Similar conclusions allow us to gain a first picture of the kind of conservatism 
political realism brings us to. Political realism in its prescriptive version is an approach 
to political theory that starts from already existing practices and aims to reform them in 
light of the beliefs that are already hold by their participants. Indeed, as we have seen, the 
process is entirely hermeneutical: we gain a sense of how practices ought to be (and 
correspondingly ought to be reformed) by referring both to their general meaning as 
practices of a certain kind and to their particular interpretation in a given context. No 
other external argument can be considered a form of normative theorising adequate to 
politics. Therefore, it looks like realist normativity shows eminently conservative 
tendencies towards the status quo. Still, this is just one part of realist thinking. Things 
are more complex than this, as I am about to explain. 
However, before proceeding, I need to deal with a criticism that has been raised 
by Prinz and Rossi and which I touched upon formerly. The Williamsian approach to 
political theory has been accused of being covertly moralist by Prinz and Rossi61. 
                                                 
61 Williams’ BLD has been accused of  being a moralist political proposal by many commentators (see, for 
instance, Erman and Möller 2015 and Larmore 2013). However, here I cannot deal with the extensive 
debate that has grown around the Williamsian idea of  the BLD. Since my intent in this paper is to 
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Specifically, they have argued that to derive a normative political theory starting from a 
conceptual appraisal of politics represents a form of moralism because: 
 
We have no usable concept of politics until we decontest it, i.e. we flesh out 
its meaning by reference to a wider set of normative commitments. […] 
And so the question re-emerges as to whether the contentious normative 
connotations used by Williams in his decontestation of the concept of 
politics do not themselves originate in pre-political moral commitments. 
(2017, 355) 
 
In other words, as I formerly explained, according to Prinz and Rossi every 
definition of politics is doomed to be moralist because it must provide a fixed 
representation of a constantly changing phenomenon, and, being so, such definition 
cannot be but determined by pre-political commitments.  
I chose to explain the Williamsian procedure as a three-steps practice-dependent 
procedure to counteract this possible objection. As the three-steps procedure shows, 
Williams – who often openly declares that he does not intend to offer any “definition” 
of politics (2005, 12) – does not start from a definition of politics which asserts to be 
universally true and immutable. The starting definition of politics is, like the subsequent 
steps of the procedure, an interpretive step. The initial definition of politics is a 
definition which is taken to be a credible description of a phenomenon given an 
empirical appraisal of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Moreover, the 
initial interpretation is supposed to gain strength in light of the subsequent steps of the 
procedure: for the initial description of the practice to be plausible, it has to be possible 
to actually identify a shared understanding of its purpose and at least one possible 
instantiation of said practice in the context under exam. Hence, the starting point of 
Williams’ procedure is taken to be strongly plausible given the available empirical and 
interpretive data, but is always taken to be provisional and potentially subject to 
revision, given its interpretive nature. In this way, the Williamsian approach is able to 
offer an anti-moralist grounding, yet with a sufficient theoretical strength to constitute 
the basis of a positive normative interpretation of political reality. In fact, some sort of 
starting point seems to be necessary to construe a normative appraisal of politics, and it 
                                                                                                                                          
argue for the comparative advantages of  my interpretation of  political realism, I am here interested in 
dealing with criticisms that come from points of  view sympathetic to the realist project. Hence, my 
defence will exclusively address Prinz and Rossi’s point of  view. 
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is meaningful to wonder how Prinz and Rossi can provide such an appraisal without 
offering a positive grounding – I will address this further issue shortly. 
 
4.2. Internal Critical Theory 
So far, following Williams’ work on political realism, I outlined the basic features 
of a prescriptive theory intended in a realist sense. But there is certainly more to say. If 
we delve further into Williams’ account we discover that it leaves open large spaces for 
criticising the status quo – namely for showing where political conduct is wrongful or 
political institutions ought to be reformed. When political realism is engaged is such 
effort of actively criticising the status quo, I take it to be engaged in an operation of 
“internal” critique. I dub it “internal” critique because such active scrutiny of political 
circumstances descends from the prescriptive theory itself. Then, internal critical theory 
is the counterpart of the prescriptive theory: everything that departs from what the 
prescriptive theory prescribes can be an object of such (internal) criticism62. However, if 
this is the case, it might be questioned the opportunity to divide prescriptive theory 
from internal critical theory. There is a reason for such a choice, though: by keeping the 
two parts separated I aim to emphasise the possibility of another kind of realist 
criticism, the external critical theory (with which I am going to deal shortly), and to 
carefully distinguish it from the internal one. 
Sticking to Williams’ account of realist prescriptive theory, four different ways of 
arguing for a change of the status quo can be identified. Let me spend a few words on 
each. 
First of all, as it has already been suggested, the purpose of the practice we are 
concerned with might be not entirely fulfilled; namely, the BLD might have been just 
partially met. However – precisely because in Williams’ framework politics entails 
meeting the BLD – if a regime is just partially legitimate, because it does not make sense 
to every subject as an authoritative order (scope of legitimacy), or because it still inflicts 
fundamental harms to its subjects (degree of legitimacy), there are good reasons to 
                                                 
62 The correlativity between normative theory and active critique of  the status quo might be challenged by 
denying that we need a prior understanding of  how the world should be in order to advance 
complaints against the status quo; namely, by arguing that criticism need not be constructive. I will deal 
with this specific issue later on, when I will address the latest constructive interpretations of  political 
realism. By now, it will suffice to say that I take political realism incompatible with criticisms that are 
not constructive. For an extensive analysis of  this problem, see Geuss 2014, Ch. 4. 
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advance complaints against the status quo and to seek reforms. This does not entail that 
a regime that partially meets the BLD is to be considered wholly illegitimate (and that 
therefore ought to be overcome); this judgment cannot be but contingent and relative to 
the circumstances considered. A regime will be recognised, in most of the cases, at the 
same time legitimate, partially legitimate, and totally illegitimate by some of its subjects: 
in the latter cases subjects will have a political reason to advance complaints and seek a 
change, but the response of the governing power will have to be subjected to contextual 
considerations of political opportunity. 
Secondly, Williams’ account leaves open the possibility that more than one 
political arrangement be compatible with the requirements of legitimacy. When this 
happens, reasons other than political (e.g. moral or prudential) must be invoked to 
choose between options. Therefore, the realist approach so far outlined admits the 
possibility of challenging the status quo by invoking criteria other than the political 
ones. Specifically, similar circumstances occur when two conditions apply: a) the 
political arrangements set up, or pursued, are broadly recognised as legitimate, b) general 
disagreement over particular policy issues is given. In such cases, the realist prescriptive 
theory is unhelpful since legitimacy is not at stake (given condition (a)) nor could be 
increased because there is no further reform that makes sense collectively (given 
condition (b)). To clarify with an example, a circumstance of the sort just portrayed 
often presents itself when issues about public health are to be discussed. In Italy, there is 
a broad agreement over the necessity of a public health system able to provide 
affordable (or free) healthcare for every citizen63 and such system is operative and well-
functioning64 (hence (a) is satisfied), however disagreements might generate over the 
particular services that the system ought to provide (hence (b) is satisfied too) – e.g. 
should abortion, sex reassignment surgery, or aesthetic surgery, be provided by the 
public healthcare system? In similar cases, it is admissible to invoke moral (or other) 
reasons to back one of the options, because the role of the moral theory is entirely 
subordinate to the political theory, which preventively sets the boundaries of what is 
politically demanded and which is unable to provide further guidance.  
                                                 
63 Source: 48° Censis Report (2014). 
64 Source: Bloomberg Global Health Index (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-
20/italy-s-struggling-economy-has-world-s-healthiest-people). 
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Thirdly, I formerly explained that the prescriptive theory for realist thinking is 
practice-dependent, meaning that is entirely tailored to the sense and purpose of the 
practice of politics. Yet, we live in a world of overlapping practices, and it might be not 
immediately clear what practice has normative priority in a certain context, or how to 
mediate between the different claims they raise65. A clear example is given by the EU 
and the nation-states that compose them. Are we in a political relationship with the EU, 
or with the nation-states which we belong to? How should we judge EU policies that go 
against the requirements of legitimacy that single states are expected to fulfil? These 
questions call for complex historically-sensitive answers. However, we might 
consistently think of cases in which supra-national policies ought to partially decrease 
national legitimacy, to the aim of preserving the correct functioning of the supra-
national institution66. Indeed, given the practice-dependent framework, where supra-
national institutions come to have a value for its participants, it might be the case to 
argue for a decrease of internal legitimacy67. 
Finally, Williams adds a further condition to evaluate whether the BLD has been 
met or not. Williams explicitly claims that the recognition of an authoritative order as 
legitimate must pass the Critical Theory Principle, according to which “the acceptance 
of a justification does not count if the acceptance itself is produced by the coercive 
power which is supposedly being justified” (2005, 6). The reason why Williams adopts 
this principle is strictly related with his own interpretation of the practice of politics and 
could be effectively summarized in his motto: “might does not imply right” (2005, 5). 
Indeed, as we have seen, the whole point of having political institutions is that they 
                                                 
65 For an extensive analysis of  the challenges raised by overlapping practices see Banai et al. 2011. 
66 I take the relationship between the EU and Greece in 2015 to be an example of  overlapping political 
practices which poses conflicting demands upon political institutions. In 2015 Greece was forced to 
enact a series of  austerity measures deeply fought by the citizenry, but nonetheless necessary to 
preserve its status as a member of  the EU. The policies enacted were, unfortunately, at the same time 
a source of  conflict within the State, but sole means to avoid disruption outside the State. Of  course, it 
can be disputed whether the EU could have enacted more legitimate policies, but the point of  the 
example remains: what is legitimate to do within certain political practices can conflict with the 
requirements posed by others and in such cases a balance or a choice is required. 
67 In fact, I am convinced that a fully developed Williamsian theory of  politics ought to deal with 
international politics. Given the extent of  the interconnection and overlap that contemporary political 
institutions present, the practice of  politics seems to be fragmented in multiple sites. Consequently, it 
is hard to think that the purpose of  politics is fulfilled by a single authority. Such a perspective would 
raise many interesting and challenging questions: above all, how are we supposed to identify the 
relevant constituencies, and to rank practices? But also, how is the hermeneutical work to be 
conducted if  relevant constituencies are sensibly enlarged? So far, however, realist political theory in a 
global perspective remains an (almost) entirely unexplored field. 
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must not qualify as brute domination, that is, they must be recognised as legitimate 
authoritative orders by their subjects. So, crucially, the simple fact of being successful 
does not qualify a regime as right – might does not imply right, precisely. However, if 
the acceptance of the justification offered by the regime is produced by the regime itself, 
there would not be any form of recognition to justify the regime, because the point of 
view of the subjects would be absent (it would in fact coincide with the point of view of 
the regime itself). When the acceptance is produced by the coercive power, “might” and 
“right” cannot be distinguished, therefore it cannot be said that the coercive power has 
been justified. For this reason, realist political thinkers must be engaged in an attentive 
work of critical analysis aimed to identify when the acceptance has been produced by 
the regime itself. In such cases, the order cannot be said to be justified and we have a 
reason to reject its authority. But how far should this criticism go? As Williams himself 
notices, the trouble with the CTP is to establish what does count as “produced by”. For 
reasons that I will discuss more extensively later, I take these cases to be exceptional. 
Specifically, I consider cases of failure of the CTP that must lead to a sever revision, or 
rejection, of the status quo all those cases in which the governing power demonstrably 
hides factual truths to manipulate consent or exercises a subtle, though significant, 
control over its subjects’ belief-formation. 
By defending a similar position, I am taking a distance from both Hall’s and 
Jubb’s readings of political realism and Prinz and Rossi’s one. On the one hand, as I 
formerly said, Hall and Jubb do not deal with the CTP Williams discusses in their 
reconstructions of political realism. However, following what has been said so far, this is 
a serious shortcoming of their proposals. The CTP is not an accessory part of the 
Williamsian project, it is a necessary complement for a theory which is based on the 
notion of “making sense”. Besides, without the CTP, those interpretations sensibly 
curtail the normative capacity of realism by leaning towards a justification of whichever 
power is sufficiently able to manipulate its acceptance (see Sleat 2014, 330-31). 
On the other hand, as I formerly recalled, Prinz and Rossi go in the exact 
opposite direction by conceiving political realism entirely as a process of critique of 
beliefs. As it can be understood from the previous discussion about the alleged 
moralism of the Williamsian procedure, Prinz and Rossi guard with suspicion every 
attempt to positively set criteria for selecting the political beliefs that ought to ground a 
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conception of legitimacy: in their view, every positive criterion of selection may incur 
the risk of being affected by pre-political judgments, i.e. by a moralist bias (2017, 355). 
Yet, it seems that we cannot avoid introducing some mechanism of selection (as Hall 
and Jubb appear to do) as such a choice would – as emphasised – severely curtail the 
normative power of the theory. To overcome the difficulty, their proposed solution 
consists in adopting a wholly internal criterion of selection, employing tools typical of the 
critique of ideology. Here, the tenability of beliefs is assessed by testing their 
correspondence with political reality: “there is a difference, on this approach, between 
the ‘manifest’ and the ‘operative’ concept, i.e. between the concept as it appears to 
ordinary speakers as opposed to the concept revealed by an empirical investigation into 
the causal history of how the concept come to play the role it plays within the relevant 
social practice” (2017, 358). When a discrepancy emerges between the manifest and the 
operative use of concepts the political beliefs related to those concepts ought to be 
revised or abandoned. Therefore, their approach is intentionally wholly “negative”, 
meaning by that that the normative standpoint is obtained as a remainder of the process 
of criticism: what is left untouched by the critique can be retained normatively valid. In 
this framework, no positive grounding can be offered for construing the prescriptive 
theory.  
I regard a similar proposal unacceptable for two reasons. First of all, it is at least 
implausible to regard every political belief that we hold as potentially ideological until it 
has been proved to be otherwise through to a process of critical analysis. Indeed, as 
Jubb has emphasised, it is more credible to hold our long-lasting and well-established 
beliefs about politics as provisionally authentic, not as the fruit of some sort of illusion 
or manipulation, for the sake of a realism itself: it would require an extensive effort by 
the dominant group, or a systematic and collective self-deception, to generate illusions 
of such a magnitude (Jubb 2017, 120-21). A realistic attitude towards politics would 
counsel caution in accusing political beliefs of being ideological. 
However, there is another reason for rejecting Prinz and Rossi’s interpretation of 
political realism. In fact, their approach is an irresponsible form of political theorising. 
Indeed, as said, Prinz and Rossi intentionally avoid providing a positive definition of 
what requirements a belief ought to possess to be regarded as non-ideological. Yet, in 
absence of a similar positive outlook, there are reasons to worry that the process of 
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criticism suggested by Prinz and Rossi could proceed indefinitely, without reaching any 
stable and solid base to defend some normative understanding of political arrangements. 
This suspicion is motivated by the fact that every political belief is, as they do argue, 
historically situated and determined by the specific context in which it arises; hence, 
there is always potentially a discrepancy between the manifest concepts held – which are 
taken to be truthful convictions autonomously chosen – and the operative ones – which 
can always be explained as contingent product induced by forces external to the subject. 
By this, I do not mean to say that a criterion of validity of beliefs cannot be argued for 
in such circumstances; rather, the problem is that Prinz and Rossi explicitly do not 
intend to define such a criterion. Being so, Prinz and Rossi’s proposal is potentially 
deeply destructive, without at the same time providing any indication of what ought to 
be done or what ought to be saved of our political world. As a consequence, their 
interpretation of political realism is unacceptably irresponsible (given the tenets formerly 
outlined) because a similar theoretical outlook can have disruptive consequences, but 
this fact is not noticed nor considered a matter relevant to the elaboration of the 
theory68. 
Against these features of Prinz and Rossi outlook, my interpretation always 
considers the subjects’ beliefs about legitimacy a provisionally valid ground for a realist 
prescriptive theory; namely, it considers the subjects’ beliefs the ground for the political 
theory unless the exceptional circumstances above-mentioned demonstrably hold.  
Now that the main features of the realist internal critical theory have been 
unfolded, the diverse theoretical tools that a Williamsian political theory provide to 
criticise the status quo should be clearer. Ultimately, what does emerge from the 
previous analysis is a form of conservatism able to gradually reform the status quo. 
Indeed, a Williamsian approach to politics does not merely lead to a passive acceptance 
of the status quo: Williams’ realism encourages active reforms of the status quo in all the 
four circumstances above-mentioned. However, has we have seen, these reforms 
(excluding some rare applications of the CTP) are mostly conservative, since they 
fundamentally attempt to fulfil the purpose of already existing practices. Still, if political 
realism consisted solely of these first two parts – namely, the prescriptive and the 
                                                 
68 In fact, Geuss himself  happens to underline that deconstructions ought to be conducted carefully in 
political contexts and ought to be accompanied by some – at least vague – constructive idea of  what 
ought to substitute the circumstances criticised (Geuss 2014, 85).  
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internal critical theory – it would appear far too conservative even to a realist eye. It is 
for this reason that political realism necessitates also an external critical theory. 
 
4.3. External Critical Theory 
The realist prescriptive theory so far depicted, even though allows us to depart 
from the status quo in several ways, it does so by interpreting and systematising our pre-
existent beliefs. This is why realists cannot be satisfied with such a theory. Indeed, a 
similar normative approach not only does not offer tools to positively reflect on our 
beliefs (since the whole method presupposes them without scrutinising them), but also 
it strengthens them, and so it actively discourages reflective thinking. Such side-effect is 
naturally due to the fact that the conclusion of a realist normative analysis, in most of 
the cases, confirms the fundamental traits of our pre-existing beliefs: through a realist 
prescriptive theory we often discover that the political world ought to be governed 
almost as we already thought it ought to be. In fact, remember that the whole point of 
political realism is that we ought to recognise the regime as a form of authoritative order. 
If politics must be distinguished from sheer domination, the governing power must not 
be perceived as an enemy, hence it must at least partially reflect its subjects’ beliefs 
about the requirements and sense of coexistence. 
This is why political realism – as far as it is conceived as exclusively formed by the 
prescriptive and the internal critical theory – discourages reflective thinking: because 
besides avoiding providing tools to assess our beliefs, it tends to corroborate them. But 
a similar unreflective tendency is deeply troublesome for political realism, at least as far 
as Geuss and Williams are concerned. The reason is twofold. 
First of all, it would be a blatant form of unrealism to regard as valid, without any 
form of scrutiny, our political beliefs. A realist attitude would demand an inquiry into 
the origin and justification of our convictions, in order to ascertain whether they might 
be wrong and whether there could be alternative political possibilities open to us and 
preferable (Williams 2002, 220). The prescriptive theory outlined, instead, makes agents 
blind towards the existence of alternative political possibilities, and diverts them from an 
active assessment of their convictions, by simply assuming as valid the existing beliefs69. 
                                                 
69 Geuss often warns against the ideological power of  normative thinking and the necessity of  constantly 
reflect on our intuitions (see Geuss 2008, 84-94). 
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Secondly, because we have seen that in Williams’ prescriptive framework it is 
crucial to understand when the recognition of the authority is produced by the same 
power that has to be justified. Without a similar test, we would not dispose of a 
normative criterion able to evaluate regimes: every power that happens to effectively 
impose order would result satisfactory. Nevertheless, as Williams himself acknowledges, 
to identify when power produces acceptance is not an easy task. In most of the cases the 
conditioning does not take the form I introduced discussing the CTP, rather is subtler, 
and might include situations in which the political relationships are so entangled and 
steady that both the coerced and the coercive parties hold some beliefs in a prejudicial 
manner, namely because they are induced to do so (Williams 2002, 219-24). Yet, every 
time the acceptance of the status quo is due to some form of political conditioning, it 
cannot be said that the regime has been justified. It is then essential, in a Williamsian 
perspective, to subject our political beliefs to a constant critical reflection aimed at 
identifying their origin and tenability.  
Therefore, for both these reasons, a reflective scrutiny of our political beliefs 
cannot be a mere ancillary part of realist political theory; it must be one of its essential 
tasks. The external critical theory is supposed to remedy this lacuna. External criticism is 
that part of realist political theory aimed at testing our political beliefs by allowing us to 
take new perspectives on our habitual worldviews. I name it “external” precisely because 
it provides a critique not of politics itself, but of our beliefs about politics; namely, it 
provides an assessment of the source of political normativity. Specifically, there are 
three tools that serve the purpose of external critical theory: the evaluative theory, the 
critique of ideology, and art. Let me spend a few words on each of these to give a sense 
of the functioning and purpose of this last part of realist political theory. 
First of all, what I dub “evaluative theory” indicates a systematic study into the 
idea of desirable society. This is the theoretical space where it is possible to actively 
argue in favour of some visions of the political world, providing reasons for their 
preferability against rival accounts. This part of realist normative thought, then, can host 
the typical tools employed for inquiring the idea of good society: metaethical and ethical 
reflections can find a space in realist thought as external forms of critical theorising. 
Indeed, as said, the possibility of preserving a similar dimension of reflection around the 
idea of good society descends from the fact that the evaluative theory is not meant to 
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have any prescriptive role: since the evaluative theory is a mere theoretical exercise, it is 
not required to follow the practice-dependent procedure formerly outlined. Hence, the 
methods of inquiry that the theorist will be allowed to employ in the ECT will be much 
more varied than the ones outlined so far. However, despite being a space of 
philosophical reflection unconstrained by the procedures belonging to a prescriptive 
inquiry, the research methods allowed in the evaluative theory will have to be restricted 
at least in a sense: for reasons of consistency, the arguments advanced by the evaluative 
theories will not be allowed to contain assumptions or conclusions which defy the realist 
project, i.e. which make impossible to endorse the realist approach to normative 
political theory depicted so far70. 
Secondarily, I mentioned the critical theory tests. As I recalled, indeed, for 
Williams many forms of subtle conditioning of our beliefs do exist, and Geuss has 
certainly harsher opinions in this respect71. They both make use of critical-theoretic 
tools to counteract this phenomenon which, as we have seen, constitutes a danger for a 
realist approach to politics. For both, the technique that ought to be employed to 
unmask beliefs that have been induced by some external agent is, following the critical-
theoretic tradition, to employ a genealogical reconstruction. Genealogy would allow us 
to become aware of the reasons that led us to hold a certain set of beliefs. Such 
reconstructive endeavour is supposed to give us the chance of rejecting, or confirming, 
our beliefs in light of an understanding of their origin72. 
Finally, art constitutes a third fundamental tool of external critical theory. 
Differently from the previous two tools, artistic expressions are unsystematic forms of 
                                                 
70 This necessary requirement merely states that the evaluative theories must not imply a rejection of  the 
realist approach. Notice, then, that the set of  possible evaluative theories that can find a place in the 
ECT is wide: if  an evaluative theory is compatible at least with a prudential endorsement of  political 
realism, it can have a role as an external critical reflection. Some of  Williams’ reflections around 
liberalism can be interpreted in this vein: Williams is convinced that, given the conditions of  
modernity, liberalism constitutes the best conception of  legitimacy under present circumstances; 
however, he is also aware that judgments of  legitimacy must be political since “there can be practical 
consequences of  applying or withholding “LEG” in the contemporary world” (2005, 14). Hence, 
judgments of  desirability and political judgments forms two partly independent sets in Williams. 
71 Geuss, in fact, believes that Williams has been unable to seriously engage with criticism of  ideology. In 
a harsh passage, he criticises Williams for “paddling about in the tepid and slimy puddle created by 
Locke, J. S. Mill and Isaiah Berlin” (Geuss 2014, 184).  
72 The works in which Guess develops a genealogical type of  analysis are countless, but see especially 
Geuss 2001a, 2001b and 2005: Ch. 9 as clear examples. As regard Williams, his most systematic and 
developed use of  the genealogical method can be found in Truth and Truthfulness where he employs 
genealogy in a vindicatory sense, to defend the value of  truth and the virtues of  truthfulness (2002, esp. 
20-40). 
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reflection, and precisely this feature constitutes their strength. Artistic expressions, of 
any form, do not necessarily have to be realistic nor they need to have a specific 
purpose. The value of art resides in its being a source of unusual and unexpected 
reflection. Art works as a gadfly and urge us to abandon our habitual ways of thinking 
by inviting us to perceive the world from a different perspective73. Geuss, particularly, 
strongly emphasises the role that imagination and utopian thinking have in politics – as 
unsystematic, hence emancipating, forms of reflection. By imagining utopias, we get the 
chance to bracket the ideologies we hold and, by so doing, to adopt a wholly new point 
of view74.    
Once again, it must be clear that these three tools for reflection do not have 
prescriptive purposes; they are not meant to suggest what we should do politically, nor 
how politics ought to be organised. They are more modestly, but crucially, supposed to 
allow us to have a better grasp on the convictions we hold about what would be 
desirable to do politically. External critical theory makes this possible by developing our 
knowledge about the values we refer to in political circumstances (evaluative theory), 
unmasking sources of ideological belief (genealogical analysis), and pushing us to 
assume a different perspective on our political world (art). So constituted, the ECT 
represents as essential part of a realist approach to political theory for the above-
mentioned reasons. 
Still, albeit necessary, the ECT so conceived might sound troublesome for two 
separate motives. At first glance, the ECT might give the impression of covertly 
reintroduce moralism in realist political thought. Moreover, such exhortation to actively 
reflect on our political beliefs might be regarded as an irresponsible action in political 
circumstances. If one of these charges were sound, the idea of ECT would result 
untenable, so let me address both these worries. 
For one thing, the ECT seems to clash with what has been said so far, while 
discussing political realism in a prescriptive form. Indeed, if politics ought to be 
governed as the Williamsian procedure indicates, are not we supposed to gain our 
understanding about what is desirable for politics from that procedure alone? Yet, the 
ECT allows us to test our beliefs about politics drawing from resources external to the 
                                                 
73 Geuss particularly emphasises the political role of  art; see Geuss 2005, Ch. 11; 2010, 78-80; and 2014, 
Ch. 13. 
74 See Geuss 2010; vii-xiii; and 2016: 42-48. 
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realist prescriptive theory. Hence, it must be the case that the ECT refers to normative 
criteria of evaluation independent from the Williamsian practice-dependent procedure. 
Then, the ECT is a form of moralism and it cannot play any role in realist political 
theory without undermining its consistency – or so the criticism would go. However, a 
similar charge would be grounded on a misinterpretation of the theoretical account I am 
outlining. Notice, indeed, that in the realist theoretical framework here discussed the 
notions of being politically prescribed and being politically desirable are not coextensive, 
but just partially overlapped; or better, it must be kept in mind that there is a crucial 
difference between what is desirable for us to do politically (i.e. what politics demands 
us to do) and what we believe desirable for politics to become. In the first case, political 
desirability signifies what we ought to do politically, given a collective assessment of our 
beliefs (as defined by the practice-dependent procedure outlined). In the second case, 
political desirability indicates what we individually would like politics to become, 
bracketing the political circumstances in which we find ourselves in. Hence, what is 
politically desirable is partly independent from what is politically prescribed: not every 
belief about political desirability informs the prescriptive conclusions about what we are 
politically required to do. For this reason, the ECT does not generate inconsistency in 
the realist theoretical account I am proposing, because testing our beliefs about politics 
does not mean to invalidate the prescriptive conclusions reached by the Williamsian 
procedure75. Clearly, though, the two dimensions are importantly related: in case enough 
people changed the set of beliefs held about politics, the prescriptive conclusions would 
have to change accordingly. 
Coming now to the second possible objection against the idea of an ECT for 
political realism, it might be feared that the act of exercising an external critique on 
realist theories constitutes an irresponsible political action and, if this were the case, the 
very idea of an ECT would result inconsistent in a realist framework. Indeed, to 
“externally” criticise realist theories certainly constitutes a political action. As I 
explained, external critiques are aimed at testing our political beliefs and this practice 
might have a concrete political impact, since it might lead to a change in the 
requirements of legitimacy, thereby pushing towards a modification of the rules of 
                                                 
75 In fact, Williams explicitly talks of  the necessity of  being “double-minded” in political circumstances. 
Regardless of  the beliefs we happen to hold, the political requires autonomous decisions which take 
into account its specificity (Williams 2005, 125-26).  
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coordination adopted by the governing power. But there is something more: as the 
above discussion has shown, such activity cannot be regulated – it must consist in a free 
reflection – because it needs to test beliefs against the possibility that they have been 
produced by the ruling power itself. Hence, the ECT encourages political actions which 
are potentially destabilising and whose consequences are unpredictable. Being so, the 
objection would go, the ECT foments the recourse to irresponsible political actions, and 
this is not acceptable in political realism. On the contrary, I believe the exact opposite is 
true: the ECT represents a responsible way of dealing with reflection in politics. Indeed, 
the activity of reflecting on our beliefs about politics is an ineliminable component of 
political life. Imaginative thinking and moral reasoning are recognised by realists to be 
among the fundamental factors that explain the political identities we assume and the 
institutions we create (Geuss 2008, 10-11). The ECT manages these crucial elements of 
political life by assigning them a specific, and limited, role and by clarifying their use in 
political circumstances. The ECT transforms imagination and moral reasoning in three 
activities belonging to an external critique of politics. By doing so, the ECT allow us to 
directly face – not to blindly ignore – these political phenomena and to limit their 
politically unwanted effects, such as the recourse to moralist actions. So, the ECT must 
be regarded as a way to responsibly engage with the activity of reflecting on our beliefs 
about politics, because it gives us tools to manage these elements of political life and to 
prevent their undesirable effects. 
 
5. Conclusion: Political realism as reformist conservatism 
I began my paper asking myself how the relationship between status quo and 
realist political theory ought to be conceived. Contrary to the current debate, I believe 
that political realism ought not be considered strictly conservative nor radical. In fact, I 
labelled my interpretation of political realism as a form of conservative reformism, and 
the reason for a similar choice should now be clearer. On the one hand, political realism 
defends political arrangements that make sense as legitimate authorities: by doing so it 
construes normative proposals in light of the beliefs subjects already hold and, 
therefore, it can rightfully be conceived as a conservative approach to political theory. 
However, on the other hand, political realism can sensibly foster political change by 
providing tools to reflect on the very beliefs that justify the prescriptive theories. In this 
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sense, political realism is also reformist: it stimulates a gradual change of the set of beliefs 
of the subjects, encouraging, accordingly, a gradual change in the prescriptive theory. 
Therefore, in my view, political realism invites radical reflection, but it takes cautiously 
real political change. 
How I ended up here? My conclusion, as argued, follows from an attempt to 
provide a solution, and give a sense, to an apparent paradox contained in realist 
literature. As I tried to explain, in realist literature both the conservation of a stable 
order through power and the invite to critically examine the reasons behind our 
allegiance to power structures have a prominent role, but these two methodological 
commitments seem to push in opposite directions. If we must attempt to offer a 
constructive understanding of political realism, we have to cope with this problem – 
whether by trying to dismiss one of the two commitments, or by finding a way to solve 
the puzzle. 
I chose the second route and argued that the puzzle can be overcome by splitting 
the critical momentum of realist normative political theories, i.e. by conceiving realist 
theories as tripartite structures in which the critical theory is not always directly relevant 
for a prescriptive understanding of political reality. As I tried to explain, once critique is 
not regarded as coextensive with prescription, political realism can conserve its vocation 
to reflective thinking while, at the same time, assigning a priority to the preservation of 
order. 
 
Realist Normative Political Theory 
(1, 2, and 3) 
Prescriptive Theory 
(1 and 2) 
 
 Critical Theory 
(2 and 3) 
1 
(Positive) Prescriptive 
Theory 
 
Practice-dependent method 
 
2 
Internal Critical Theory 
 
i. Failures of the PD method 
ii. Overlapping practices 
iii. Multiple implementations 
of the PD method 
iv. Critical theory principle 
3 
External Critical Theory 
 
i. Evaluative theory 
ii. Critique of  ideology 
iii. Art 
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Yet, my decision to follow the second route is not so obvious – as we have seen, 
the interpretive endeavours attempted so far have pursued a different direction – so 
something must be said to explain the strengths of my interpretation against rivals. All 
along the paper I have presented what appear to be the shortcomings of the two major 
approaches that have been recently put forward (Hall’s and Jubb’s, and Prinz and 
Rossi’s), but let me add a brief synthesis to clarify my analysis. I believe that the reasons 
for favouring the outlook I provided are both interpretive and theoretical. In this paper, 
I dealt with the interpretive reasons. The tripartite structure offers a way to make sense 
of the realist alleged paradox, and to abide by all the five realist tenets above-listed. On 
the one hand, as I showed, if we conceived political realism as solely composed by the 
first two parts we would curtail the possibility to actively reflect on political reality, 
leaning towards a blind acceptance of the status quo. On the other hand, if we thought 
of political realism as a mere endeavour of negative criticism, we would build an 
irresponsible theoretical proposal. Hence, the tripartite structure is able to give a better, 
and more charitable, sense of Geuss’ and Williams’ unsystematic political writings. 
Certainly, a mere interpretive justification is not sufficient to provide a defence of 
the approach here outlined. My interest, though, was modestly the one of showing its 
interpretive superiority over the rivals. However, there are also theoretical reasons to 
prefer my account, reasons with which I cannot properly deal here, since it would take a 
whole justification of political realism as a method to offer a satisfactory explanation. 
But let me just provide a conclusive hint to the theoretical reasons that could back my 
case, and which I put forward as a final motive to favour the outlook here provided. 
Why should we care about both reflection and responsibility in politics? Differently put, 
why ought political theory to enable a critical assessment of political reality and, at the 
same time, slow down political change? The explanation resides in the guiding insight 
behind political realism: namely, that political reality ought to be taken seriously. For 
realists, to take seriously political reality means to constantly make an effort to 
understand what are the specific features, both empirical and evaluative, in which a 
political action takes place, and what is the potential impact of acting politically. In fact, 
politics is not a mere object of theoretical interest, it is both a fundamental dimension of 
human life, but also a complex and potentially dangerous site of interaction. Therefore, 
for the realist theorist, serious political theorising must involve a constant critical 
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appraisal of political reality and a prudent attitude towards political action. The tripartite 
structure here outlined tries to respect this fundamental vocation and to safeguard the 
richness of realist thought. 
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IV. 
CAN YOU BE A REALIST AND DEMAND THE IMPOSSIBLE? 
FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS ON REALIST IDEALS 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
What is the relationship between political realism and feasibility? Should the 
political proposals defended by realists abide by any feasibility constraint? The question 
might puzzle some because, for a long time, political realism has been interpreted as a 
theoretical endeavour primarily interested in concrete action guidance. For those who 
endorse this interpretation, there would not be much of a mystery in the relationship 
between realism and feasibility: a realist theory would coincide with a concretely 
implementable theory (Freeden 2012; Valentini 2012; Zuolo 2012). Yet, more recently, 
such thesis has been challenged from multiple fronts. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that the essential feature of political realism consists in the sources of 
normativity that it chooses to endorse, not in the action-guiding character of its 
proposals (Rossi and Sleat 2014). On the other hand, it has been claimed that political 
realism can be compatible with utopianism (Geuss 2016, 42-50; Raekstad 2016) or, in a 
similar fashion, that it might demand the impossible (Rossi 2015).  
However, as soon as the original association between action-guidance and realism 
comes to be rejected, a number of methodological problems for political realism arise, 
which make an analysis into its relationship with feasibility urgent. For one thing, as I 
will argue, if we admit, as much contemporary literature does, that political realism is an 
independent approach to political theory which might prescribe unfeasible ideals, 
realism begins to face all the methodological problems that have haunted the ideal/non-
ideal debate. Indeed, if realism can defend unfeasible normative proposals, how are they 
supposed to guide action in concrete circumstances? This is a particularly troublesome 
issue for realists, since they claim to be concerned primarily with the study of concrete 
political action (Geuss 2008, 11). Moreover, in case it was possible to provide a solution 
to this first problem, what sort of practicability constraints ought to apply to realist 
normative theories? In what sense, if at all, realism can prescribe the impossible? To 
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clarify this second issue is fundamental to achieve a complete understanding of political 
realism itself – of its theoretical structure and methodology. 
However, there is something more. As I will explain all along the paper, another 
reason for aiming at an analysis of feasibility constraints according to specific realist 
standards is the following: given the fundamental features of realist political thought, the 
role of unfeasible realist proposals cannot be appropriately framed into any of the 
methodological accounts of the structure of normative political thought developed so 
far. That is to say, the recent literature about the methods of normative political thought 
is unable to provide us with any model able to explain how unfeasible proposals can 
inform concrete political action in realist political theories. So, if it is maintained that 
realism can defend political proposals that are not directly implementable, a specifically 
realist analysis of feasibility constraints needs to be developed. 
In this paper, I will pursue a first inquiry into the problem of the relationship 
between feasibility and realism, and I shall do so by availing myself of the 
methodological literature that has investigated the relationship between ideal and non-
ideal theory. In fact, even if this literature cannot offer satisfactory solutions to the 
question that I raise, it nonetheless proves to be a valuable source for disentangling the 
problem of the relationship between feasibility and realism. This is done in a spirit of 
mutual gain. On one side, the choice of combining these two debates will help to clearly 
systematise the issues at stake and to define the proper place of political realism within 
the methodological literature. Political realism, in other words, has much to gain from a 
dialogue with the discussion around the methods of political theory. On the other side, 
given that, as I said, the realist case is unable to fit any of the methodological 
interpretations of the relationship between and ideal and non-ideal theory, in order to 
explain the structure of realist political thought it will be necessary to introduce a new 
interpretation of that relationship. Therefore, I take the present analysis to be fruitful 
also outside the realm of realist theorising, since – by delving into the realist case – it is 
possible to introduce a new perspective in a debate which, so far, has not reached 
completely satisfying results (as argued, for instance, by Wiens 2015a).  
My paper will be divided in three sections. First of all, by borrowing a terminology 
employed in the analysis of ideal theories, I will introduce the concept of “realist 
political ideal”, to clarify the object of the present analysis and to explain in which sense 
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a realist theory can be “unfeasible”. Secondly, I will discuss several possible solutions to 
explain if and how, despite their possible unfeasibility, realist ideals can be relevant in 
concrete circumstances. Here, I will conduct my analysis by dealing with the three major 
interpretations of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory provided – those 
which interpret ideals as targets, as benchmark, and as useless theoretical constructs, 
respectively – and I will show that none of these can be acceptable from a realist point 
of view. I will then introduce a fourth category, the model interpretation, which better 
explains how political realism interprets the relationship between theory and reality, and 
which is able to overcome the shortcomings of the alternative interpretations. Finally, in 
the last section, I will be able to clarify which feasibility constraints apply to the realist 
normative thought in light of the discussion outlined in the course of the paper. In the 
end, I will explain that realist ideals ought to be construed by taking into consideration 
the limit of practical possibilities; hence, they ought to be construed by disregarding their 
relative probability of realisation.  
 
2. Political realism as ideal theorising 
When, some decades ago, the methodological debate in political theory started to 
gain attention, there were not so many stable pillars grounding the research, the field of 
methodological studies in political theory was – and somehow still is – pretty messy 
(Valentini 2017). However, the classification of political realism as a form of non-ideal 
theory represented one of the few solid assumptions underlying the debate. The reason 
behind such conceptual association was intuitive. Since the core interests animating 
political realism were taken to be understanding the functioning of real politics and 
assessing the limits of political action, and since non-ideal theory was commonly defined 
as that part of political theories interested in defining what ought to be done in real 
contexts (as opposed to what ought to be done in ideal scenarios), interpreting political 
realism as a form of non-ideal theory was an immediate conclusion (Freeden 2012, 
Valentini 2012, Zuolo 2012). Hence, according to such a common view, political realism 
and non-ideal theory were pursuing one and the same endeavour: they were 
investigating what ought to be done given the constraints and specificities of actual 
political circumstances. Realist analyses fundamentally sought action-guidance, 
whenever abstract normative theorising failed to provide concrete advice for actual 
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circumstances. When the methodological debate started to gain interest, then, there 
were few doubts regarding the substance of the link between political realism and 
feasibility. Feasibility, specifically understood as the possibility of implementation (i.e. 
concretely achievability in actual contexts), was the core interest of realist theories. A 
realist theory was fundamentally an implementable theory.  
Yet, as I explained in the introductory section, this paper aims to propose a 
general inquiry into the relationship between realism and feasibility. So, what happened 
since then? Why is it necessary to delve further into the relationship between feasibility 
and political realism? 
For those who supported the realist project, the methodological assimilation of 
political realism with non-ideal theory amounted to a grave misunderstanding of its aims 
and motivations. In fact, it would not be unfair to say that, since the resurgence of 
interest in realist political theory, a major part of realist efforts has been dedicated to 
dismantling that fundamental error. In particular, two argumentative strategies have 
been pursued to defend realism against such non-ideal interpretation: on the one hand, 
it has been argued that realism is not primarily interested in action-guidance; on the 
other, it has been pointed out that realism might demand the achievement of unfeasible 
arrangements. Let me spend a few words on both these theses, because they will allow 
us to understand why it is possible to define political realism as an ideal form of political 
theorising. 
For one thing, it has been forcefully argued that the specificity of realist theorising 
does not lie in proposing action-guiding prescriptions, rather in the sources of 
normativity it chooses to endorse (Rossi and Sleat 2014). A realist theory is so defined 
not because it proves to be realistically implementable, rather because it is built starting from 
an appraisal of political reality. Realists are not so much, or primarily, interested in 
effectiveness, but rather in understanding the standards of adequacy of action in 
political contexts. Indeed, as it has been often recalled, the appeal and originality of 
realism lie in its attempt to construe a normativity wholly internal to politics (Jubb and 
Rossi 2015, Sleat 2014, Williams 2005)76. Methodologically, such approach has taken the 
                                                 
76 Or so it is argued. Indeed, it is currently debated whether realism effectively manages to construe a 
political normativity without relying on standards external, and prior, to the reality of politics (Erman and 
Möller 2015, Larmore 2013). However, my goal in this paper is not that of proposing a defence of 
political realism. Rather, my intention is to clarify how political realism should relate to feasibility 
assessments, assuming political realism as a tenable theoretical position. 
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form of a bottom-up normative construction. Realists construe normative proposals as 
a function of (a suitable interpretation of) the value that real practices have from the 
point of view of their participants. In a realist perspective, what ought to be done is 
given by what it would be required to do to fulfil the purpose of existing practices, as 
understood by those who participate in them. Williams’ discussion of legitimacy in 
political thought is possibly the most cited example of the realist method so conceived. 
Indeed, Williams’ conception of political normativity is conducted starting from an 
understanding of the value of politics itself, according to those who take part in political 
practices. Since, Williams claims, the ultimate purpose of politics is “the securing of 
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation” (Williams 2005, 3), 
we ought to regard legitimacy as the primary value to safeguard in political practices. 
Such normative conclusion, according to Williams, follows precisely because it is only 
under legitimate institutions – namely, institutions whose authority is somehow 
recognised by its subjects – that it is possible fulfil the ultimate purpose of politics as 
defined above (Williams 2005, 4-6). For Williams, therefore, the priority that 
contemporary theorists are used to assign to justice in political thought reveals a 
profound misunderstanding of political reality and its dynamics, and leads to a flawed 
conception of political normativity (Williams 2005, 1-3; see also Horton 2012; Rossi 
2012). The core insight of realist thought is to bring political reality back at the centre of 
normative political theorising. Therefore, realists explain, describing political realism as a 
form of non-ideal theory severely impoverish the significance of its methodological 
approach – if, by non-ideal theory it is meant a mere exercise of providing action-
guiding prescriptions. Realism is a more ambitious project: it proposes an independent 
vision of the grounds and structure of normative political theory (Sleat 2013, 9-12; and 
2014). 
However, as I anticipated, the analogy between political realism and non-ideal 
theory has been essentially criticised from another direction too. Besides describing 
political realism as not primarily concerned with action-guidance, it has been argued that 
realism can defend proposals which are not easily implementable, or that might even 
prove to be radically unfeasible. If we look carefully, indeed, such a thesis is entirely 
consistent with what has been pointed out so far. In fact, according to the sketchy 
account provided, political realism fundamentally defines where the normative political 
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inquiry should start – not where it is supposed to end. Indeed, the mere fact that, for 
realists, the normative starting point is an interpretation of the point and purpose of 
actual practices is not, by itself, sufficient to grant that realist normative proposals will 
be easily implementable (Finlayson 2017, Prinz and Rossi 2017). In fact, by engaging in 
an interpretive appraisal of participants’ beliefs we could come to discover that existing 
practices substantively depart from, or violate, the values that they would be supposed 
to safeguard and promote (Jubb 2016a). To take the former example, following 
Williams’ reasoning we could come to realise that actual institutions are not legitimate 
for a vast part of the population, or that certain authorities are recognised as more 
legitimate than others, or even that the present structures of power are forms of sheer 
domination. Relying on what Williams says about the priorities of political practices, 
realism could demand a complex departure from the existing arrangements when 
legitimacy is violated77. Of course, a realist analysis of similar cases would require an 
attentive and extensive discussion, but my intent here is merely to suggest that, as far as 
the bottom-up approach realists endorse is considered, realism might lead to a severe 
revision, a radical change, or even a suppression, of the existing state of affairs78. As a 
further proof of the unnecessary correlation between realism and non-ideal theory, it 
will suffice to say that Raymond Geuss and Enzo Rossi have come as far as to claim 
that political realism might be compatible with some form of utopianism (Geuss 2016, 
42-48), or can demand the impossible (Rossi 2015). 
So, the debate has managed to challenge the equivalence between realism and 
non-ideal theory by showing both that the core goal of political realism is to reconceive 
the sources of normative political thinking (i.e. it is not primarily interested in action-
guidance) and that it might even defend normative proposals which are not immediately 
achievable. Therefore, to borrow a terminology belonging to the methodological debate 
on ideal and non-ideal theory, we can say that it is possible talk about a realist ideal theory 
                                                 
77 It is important to get this point correctly: I am not claiming that realist ideals can be unfeasible because 
they can be radical. Feasibility and unfeasibility are not coextensive to conservatism and radicalism. In 
fact, it is possible to think about cases in which a radical reform is more feasible that the conservation 
of  the status quo (for instance when a dominant power comes to be openly rejected by the majority 
of  its subjects). The present discussion is only meant to show that political realism might advance 
political proposals which require possibly hardly implementable reforms of  the status quo – a point 
which is easier to argue for and understand when radical reforms are considered. 
78 For extensive discussions along these lines see Jubb 2016a. See also, Banai et al. 2011, and Sangiovanni 
2008 which prove to be extremely useful to understand the practice-dependent approach, even if  
developed outside the realist tradition. 
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in the specific and restricted sense so far outlined: political realism proposes itself as a 
method to define what would be desirable to do politically, but its normative 
conclusions might well be unachievable79. Then, since the methodological debate 
started, a lot has changed with respect to the understanding and elaboration of realist 
political theory.  
Such change of perspective, however, is not free of costs. Once political realism is 
saved from being interpreted merely as a form of non-ideal theory and, consequently, 
the possibility of talking about realist ideal theorising is introduced, a number of new 
troubles – well-known to those familiar with the methodological debates around ideal 
theory – arises. Realists, on their part, seem still not enough conscious of those 
methodological implications. 
The first methodological issue realists must face concern the relationship between 
ideal and non-ideal theorising. As ideal theorists are well aware of, as soon as realism 
comes to be read as a form of theorising which might defend unfeasible ideals, it 
becomes urgent to explain how realist ideals are supposed to relate to concrete action, 
and how realism would provide guidance in actual circumstances. This problem is 
generally recognised as a crucial issue in political theory; however, it strikes even more 
forcefully when political realism is considered. This is so for the fundamental reason 
that realists claim to be interested in keeping the focus of their analyses on real politics. 
The dimension of action is possibly the most crucial and distinctive aspect of political 
reality80 and a realist theory which would not be able to say anything about, or to, 
political agents would betray its guiding aspiration (Prinz and Rossi 2017). As said, this 
                                                 
79 Someone might think that to talk about ideal and non-ideal theory in this context overtly muddles the 
analysis, since there is no consensus on the appropriate use of  these categories. Moreover, as it is well 
known, realists fiercely reject mainstream ideal theory; therefore, it might result particularly 
controversial to employ this category in a discussion about political realism. Some clarifications are 
due, then. As I suggested, I use these two categories in a very specific, and limited, sense. Drawing 
from Robert Jubb’s “Tragedies of  Non-Ideal Theory” (2012) I use ideal theory to indicate that part of  
political theorising aimed at identifying what is desirable or perfect, which might lead to unachievable 
prescriptions (but not necessarily so); whereas I take non-ideal theory to be that part of  political 
thinking concerned with actual action-guidance. Hence, I make no reference to the much more 
contested concept of  idealization, which have dominated the discussions around ideal theory and which 
is the actual target of  realists’ critiques against ideal theory. Employed in this restricted sense, the use 
of  this terminology helps the discussion, since it allows to systematise the issues at stake and to make 
use of  the arguments developed within that methodological literature. So, despite counterintuitive at 
first sight, if  employed correctly, the categories of  ideal and non-ideal theory allow to establish a 
dialogue between two debates that have remained for the most part separated. By doing so, it is 
possible to make some progress in both fields, as I shall show.      
80 Geuss goes as far as to say that to study politics means first and foremost to study political action and 
its context (Geuss 2010, 1-16). 
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is far from saying that realism ought to be primarily concerned with guiding action. 
Nevertheless, a realist theory structurally unable to provide a normative analysis of 
concrete political action would represent a failed project.  
Secondarily, it is still largely obscure what claiming that realist ideals can be 
unfeasible amounts to. Even more controversially, it is hard to make sense of the idea 
that political realism is compatible with utopian thinking or with defending the 
impossible, as Geuss and Rossi claim. Are there any feasibility constraints that do apply 
to realist ideals? That is, must realist ideals prove to be practically possible in some 
sense? Notice that this is not merely a theoretical curiosity. As those who take part in 
the debate around ideal and non-ideal theory well know, the feasibility constraints that 
apply to ideals directly affect the content of normative proposals (as they set boundaries 
to what is regarded practically demanded) (Cowen 2007, Jensen 2009). Moreover, 
clarifying which feasibility constraints do apply to ideals is connected to a more general 
understanding of the entire structure of political theories. Is the role of ideals, for 
instance, that of conceptual exploration, evaluation, orientation, or prescription? In all 
these case, as it is extensively argued in the methodological literature, ideals will be 
subjected to different feasibility requirements, in accordance to their role81. In other 
words, feasibility constraints over ideals affect both the content and the conduct of 
political theorising; hence, this is not an issue that can be superseded. 
However, the contemporary literature on political realism has so far neglected the 
importance of discussing similar topics. The rejection, on the one hand, of mainstream 
ideal theorising and, on the other hand, of the equivalence between realism and non-
ideal theory have set a dramatic distance between the two debates82. 
In the following, I will address both issues starting from the first mentioned. This 
argumentative strategy looks necessary in virtue of the questions at stake: as I said, in 
order to understand which feasibility constraints apply to political theories, it is 
necessary to understand their overall structure first. If we were unable to explain what is 
the normative role of ideal theorising in realist thinking, it would be pointless to inquiry 
the feasibility constraints that apply to realist ideals. I will, then, first try to clarify the 
nature of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theorising in realist thought. 
                                                 
81 For different takes on this issue see Gheaus 2013, Jubb 2012, Simmons 2010, Stemplowska 2008, and 
Swift 2008. 
82 There are a few exceptions, see Baderin 2013 and Sleat 2016. 
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Section 3 will be entirely devoted to this problem. As we will see, clarifying the 
relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory in realist theorising will be a pretty 
challenging task and it will require an extensive analysis. Given the structure of the 
discussion conducted in Section 3, the answer to the second of the methodological 
problem mentioned – namely, clarifying the feasibility requirements that realism ought 
to abide by – will somehow already emerge from the ongoing analysis; however, I will 
point out an explicit answer in Section 4.  
 
3. Realism and the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory 
Let us begin, then, with the first of the two tasks ahead. As I said, the core 
objective of the present section is to explain the nature of the relationship between ideal 
and non-ideal theorising in realist thought. To disentangle the problem, I will make use 
of the interpretations of the relationships between ideal and non-ideal theory already 
available in the methodological literature. I will indeed proceed by checking whether any 
of the interpretations provided could suit the realist case. In fact, addressing this 
problem by making use of the diverse solutions proposed in the literature will facilitate 
the task ahead to a great extent: the methodological literature provides a first 
systematisation of the issues at stake, and allows to clarify the comparative weaknesses 
and strengths of the diverse models outlined. Specifically, I will address the three major 
interpretations of the role of ideals in normative political thought: the interpretation of 
ideals as targets, of ideals as benchmarks, and of ideals as useless theoretical constructs, 
respectively83. I will explain, crucially, that none of these models is compatible with the 
realist approach to political theory. Realism, I shall argue, requires the adoption of a new 
interpretation of the role of ideals, if it aims at distancing itself from non-ideal 
theorising, while preserving an action-guiding role. Hence, at the end of this Section, I 
will propose an alternative interpretation of the role of ideals, compatible with political 
                                                 
83 This classification recalls both substantively (Stemplowska and Swift 2012) and terminologically (Wiens 
2015a) the surveys of  the literature that have been recently proposed. The reasons for this choice are 
twofold. Firstly, I would like to enable a fruitful dialogue between the methodological literature and 
political realism, and a proliferation of  diverse classifications would make this task harder. Secondly, 
keeping the categorisation of  the methodological panorama relatively simple allows me to maintain 
the discussion at a sufficient level of  generality to enable a constructive discussion of  the problem at 
stake. Hence, while I am aware that the methodological debate is more complex that the one I here 
portray, I believe that the overview proposed is accurate and functional enough to conduct a clear and 
profitable analysis.   
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realism: the interpretation of ideals as models. The discussion that will bring me there 
will also provide all the necessary tools to answer the main question this paper aims to 
answer; namely: what sort of feasibility constraints do apply to political realism? 
 
3.1. Ideals are targets 
The Target View is one of the most defended interpretations of the relationship 
between ideal and non-ideal theory. As the name suggests, according to this reading, the 
role of ideal theory is to define the target towards which politics should ultimately aim, 
and the subordinate task of non-ideal theory is to trace the best route to that target. 
Following this interpretation, the relationship between ideal theory and non-ideal theory 
can be expressed as a means-ends relationship, in which the ends are set by the ideal 
part of the theory and the means are provided by the non-ideal one. In this picture, 
then, the state of affairs the ideal theory defines as desirable is the one we are required 
to implement (Robeyns 2008, Simmons 2010, Valentini 2009).  
Therefore, according to such approach, the relationship between ideal and non-
ideal theory looks straightforward: in concrete circumstances, we ought to reproduce the 
ideal. Of course, things are not so simple. In fact, it might be the case that the ideal 
cannot be readily instantiated. Here is where the methodological literature starts to 
problematise the relationship between the ideal and the non-ideal. In cases in which the 
ideal is not implementable, how is the ideal supposed to relate to actual circumstances? 
Target theorists dissolve the problem of the unfeasibility of ideals in concrete 
circumstances by emphasising that the relevance of ideals is supposed to be only indirect 
(Robeyns 2008, 345). Indeed, the unfeasibility of ideals ceases to constitute a problem as 
soon as their function is correctly understood. Since ideals play the limited, and very 
specific, role of endpoints of political agency, they are not supposed to be directly 
applicable; rather, it is sufficient that a route towards their realisation can be identified in 
principle. This last role is precisely the one pertaining to non-ideal theory. Non-ideal 
theory has the fundamental function of identifying which steps are required to reach 
that mostly desirable political arrangements as defined by the ideal theory. So, contrary 
to ideal theory, non-ideal theory is concerned with understanding what ought to be 
done taking into account what can be concretely pursued here and now. Indeed, those 
who defend the target approach often define non-ideal theory as a “transitional theory”, 
130 
precisely because non-ideal theory traces the route to the ideal: it guides political agency 
into the transition from the present (in many ways wrongful) state of affairs to a better 
(possibly ideal) one (Gilabert 2009, 678; Robeyns 2008, 346; Simmons 2010, 22). In this 
context, Gilabert (2009, 676) usefully introduces the idea of “dynamic duties” to explain 
that, given the relationship that it is supposed to hold between the ideal and the non-
ideal, non-ideal theory might be required to define intermediate duties; i.e., duties which 
hold under imperfect circumstances, and which are justified only as instruments to help 
us to reach our final goal. 
There is a specific consequence of such conception that must be underlined, and 
which will become relevant in the discussion to follow. Given the structure of the 
relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory that the target view defends, non-ideal 
theory might demand the pursuit of reforms which might be judged suboptimal with 
respect to the states of affairs that are presently feasible, but that are nonetheless justified 
because necessary to the achievement of a future superior goal. That is to say, the target 
approach might require making a step backwards here and now, in order to make two 
steps forward in the future (Simmons 2010, Gilabert 2009). Such consequence is 
necessary given the logical structure of the method so far outlined: since reforms are 
ultimately justified in light of the ideal, provisional suboptimal results ought to be 
accepted as part of the process. 
Ingrid Robeyns (2008) offers a useful metaphor to understand both the structure 
and the risks of  the target view. She explains that interpreting non-ideal theory as a 
transitional theory means to conceive political theory as a map. In this map, which 
contains all the elements of  a political theory, the Paradise Island is the product of  the 
ideal theory, and the route to get there exemplifies the results of  the non-ideal theory. 
However, as she correctly points out, “in some seas it is dangerous, indeed impossible, 
to just sail straight in the direction of  the destination” (Robeyns 2008, 345). Hence, the 
route traced by non-ideal theory might be complex and thorny, and might require 
efforts and sacrifices. 
According to the target interpretation, then, the problem of  the unfeasibility of  
ideals is readily solved by interpreting ideals as endpoints of  political action, which 
indirectly set the direction of  feasible reforms. Could a similar solution be adequate for 
political realism? Can realist ideals be conceived as endpoints of  political agency? 
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Unfortunately, the answer must be negative, and there are two reasons which explain the 
incompatibility between the target approach and realist theorising. 
For one thing, within a realist paradigm, the target approach would result an 
irrational interpretation of  the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. In order 
to understand this first reason of  rejection, we must bear in mind what are the main 
features of  a realist approach to political theory. As we have seen, political realism 
employs a bottom-up procedure in normative political theory. This means that realist 
ideals are context-dependent, meaning that their justification is based upon some 
features of  the context in which it is elaborated (specifically, upon an interpretation of  
the selected practices according to the beliefs of  their participants). It is the bottom-up 
methodology that disqualifies the target method as a good interpretation of  the 
relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory for political realism. 
Indeed, the fact that the justification of  ideals is context-dependent implies, by 
definition, that realist ideals are not universal, nor stable. Realist ideals change as soon as 
the relevant features of  the context change. Moreover, similar contextual changes might 
happen for the most diverse reasons. Realists are usually keen to emphasise that the 
beliefs people happen to hold in a certain context are the product of  historical 
circumstances and of  the cultural environment (Geuss 2008, 3-4; Williams 2005, 36-39). 
Hence, the theorist admittedly can have only a partial and limited role in shaping a 
political culture: despite being able to contribute to the public discussion and to the 
formation of  political ideas, contextual changes will be external to her control and, for 
the most part, beyond her capacity of  prevision. Therefore, a realist theorist can only be 
particularly attentive to contextual changes and re-elaborate political ideals accordingly 
(Prinz and Rossi 2017). In sum, realist ideals cannot be fixed once and for all: the 
theorist is unable to dictate the ideal, as she partly receives it from reality84.  
This feature, as I am about to explain, makes the target method hardly compatible 
with a realist approach to political theory. Let us have a look, indeed, at the structure of  
political theorising that would be generated by mixing the target method with a context-
dependent approach. In a similar scenario, on the one hand, we would have that the 
relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is conceived as a means-ends 
                                                 
84 Williams is explicit on this point: “there is no way in which theory can get all the way ahead of  practice 
and reach the final determination of  what can make sense in political thought; it cannot ever, in 
advance, determine very securely what direction might count as “ahead.”” (2005, 26). 
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relationship. On the other hand, given the context-dependent approach, we would have 
to concede that the ideals we strive for might change over time. So, the point is that the 
context-dependent approach radically modifies the structure through which the target 
view organises political thought. Indeed, in a context-dependent framework, a target 
approach to political thought would still interpret the relationship between ideal and 
non-ideal theory as a means-ends relationship, but the ends themselves would be 
unstable. The target approach justifies the pursuit of  a possibly long and costly chain of  
reforms in light of  the final attended achievement that would repay the efforts. But 
when the goal is unstable, such a justification becomes suddenly weak and objectionable. 
In fact, as a goal might change, all the costs sustained for its pursuit could suddenly 
loose sense: we could find ourselves in the middle of  a path which is meant to take us 
nowhere and that has required us much effort to follow. If  the methodological approach 
is context-dependent, organising political agency as a series of  non-ideal steps towards 
the ideal is an irrational practical strategy, because, since our goal is not fixed, it is not 
worthwhile to organise our actions to the end of  reaching it. So, when associated with a 
context-dependent approach, the target method ceases to represent a compelling or 
plausible way to conceive the structure of  political theory and the conduct of  political 
reasoning. 
Yet, the critique against the target approach just outlined sounds compelling only 
insofar as the target view comes to be associated with a context-dependent method. As 
the critique so far discussed hinges on a previous acceptance of  the realist paradigm, the 
target approach could still be considered a plausible interpretation of  the relationship 
between ideal and non-ideal theory by all those who do not share the same realist 
methodological commitment. However, I opened this paper claiming that an inquiry 
into the relationship between feasibility and political realism is not supposed to interest 
only those who align themselves with the realist party. In fact, as I am about to show, 
political realism has good arguments against the target approach even if  the context-
dependent assumption were suspended. So, it is possible to reconstruct a second line of  
critique against the target approach by recalling arguments typical of  the realist tradition. 
Even assuming – as said – ideals as fixed target-points, realists would find deeply 
objectionable the idea of  organising political agency as a chain of  steps towards the 
fulfilment of  an ideal. This is because, in a realist perspective, even keeping the endpoint 
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fixed, it is impossible to say whether we will ever be able to reach it. Notice that this is 
something different from claiming that the endpoint is outside the feasible set – i.e. 
outside the set of  states of  affairs we could in principle reach. The issue realist would 
raise is another one. The crucial point is that, despite their alleged feasibility, in politics 
we can never know whether a chain of  actions will manage to reach its goal, and this 
fact has a huge impact on the methodology of  political theory – among which the 
rejection of  the target approach. 
The impossibility of  knowing whether a chain of  actions will lead to the aspired 
goal is a pivotal theme in the realist literature. Realists usually explain this fundamental 
impossibility to fully govern political outcomes by pointing at two factors which 
essentially characterise the political domain: the complexity of  political phenomena and 
the unpredictability of  human motivation. On the one hand, political outcomes are the 
product of  layers of  causal factors that make prediction and control hard tasks to 
pursue (Geuss 2010, Ch. 1). On the other hand, realist often urge political theorists to 
take into account the high complexity of  human psychology (Galston 2010, 398; Geuss 
2008, 9-10). Humans are far from being fully rational actors ready to follow collectively 
a common goal (Philp 2007, 12). Together, these factors make politics a domain largely 
dominated by contingency. 
Why would contingency matter in the context of  political theory? Is not political 
theory supposed to guide us through contingency defining a clear goal? In a realist 
perspective, the weight of  contingency in politics should crucially affect political 
theorising itself  (Bourke and Geuss 2009, 1-26). If  a goal requires a chain of  actions 
sufficiently complex to make it impossible to establish whether we will be able to reach 
that goal, that is a reproachable strategy to pursue. For a realist, the crucial point to note 
at this point is that political actions are not simply moves in a game on which we can 
freely bet: the political strategies we pursue have profound impact for us and for those 
around us (Philp 2007, 11). Hence, there is a special responsibility that weights on the 
political agent. For this reason, when the success of  a course of  action is improbable or 
highly uncertain, the efforts required to pursue that goal might not be a price worth to 
pay, given the special onuses that acting politically entails. 
Therefore – this second realist objection to the target approach would go – 
establishing what ought to be done in concrete circumstances ought to entail an 
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attentive assessment of  the feasible options available and their relative prospects of  
success. So, it is not enough to claim that an ideal is in principle feasible to go for its 
pursuit, if  its probability of  realisation is low, we might be required to break the chain 
towards the ideal and orient our actions differently. Overall, describing concrete political 
action as an instrument of  the ideal represents both an irresponsible and a naïve 
interpretation of  political agency. As a consequence, the target approach ought to be 
regarded as an unacceptable interpretation of  the relationship between the ideal and the 
non-ideal. 
The argument so far outlined does not imply that ideal theory cannot have a role 
in realist theorising, though. By addressing the target approach, I just excluded a first 
possible interpretation, but I also had the chance to start clarifying the realist approach 
to feasibility. The rejection of  the target approach merely asserts that non-ideal theory in 
a realist vein needs to involve an assessment of  relative probabilities, and that – 
correspondingly – realist ideals cannot be interpreted as targets. However, as I said, the 
target approach it is not the only available interpretation of  the role of  political ideals, 
so let’s proceed with our inquiry. 
 
3.2. Ideals are benchmarks 
I just argued that, despite its failure, the argument for ideals as targets teaches us 
something: the probability of  success of  political reforms ought to have some weight in 
non-ideal theorising; therefore, whenever an ideal is unlikely to obtain, it might be the 
case to turn our sight to the states of  affairs that are concretely accessible to us and seek 
to reach one of  those by ranking their relative desirability. The second interpretation of  
the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory – that I am about to introduce – 
precisely recognises the role of  assessments of  practicability in non-ideal theory and re-
thinks the function of  political ideals accordingly. 
I am referring to the interpretation which sees political ideals as benchmarks for 
non-ideal theory (Wiens 2015a, 440). Indeed, according to this common interpretation, 
political ideals are interpreted as standards that should guide our practices by defining 
the principles that ought to govern our conducts, rather than goals that ought to be 
actively pursued. The merit of  ideals lies in the fact that – by allowing us to imagine 
what perfect political conditions would entail – they provide us with a clear and 
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undistorted picture of  the principles that ought to govern political practices. Ideals, in 
this sense, are seen as theoretical constructs which define the criteria through which we 
ought to compare and evaluate feasible options, not as teleological theories. (Gilabert 
2012; Sangiovanni 2009; Stemplowska 2008; Swift 2008). 
In fact, such understanding of  the role of  ideals has been usually put forward as a 
reaction to those criticism which saw the gap between ideal theory and non-ideal theory 
far too wide to provide any meaningful, or practicable, insight with respect to what 
ought to be done in concrete circumstances (Goodin 1995, Sen 2006). For those who 
endorse the benchmark interpretation of  the role of  ideals, it is not the case that non-
ideal theory ought to trace a transitional route towards the ideal. Rather, non-ideal 
theory is supposed to proceed a more articulated way. In a first stage, non-ideal theory 
should assess which is the set of  states of  affairs that are attainable from our current 
standpoint; namely, what are the accessible political alternatives at our disposal85. That is 
to say, non-ideal theory is supposed to trace a feasibility threshold more restrictive than 
the one that applies to political ideals: the selected states of  affairs must prove to be 
likely enough to be considered concretely realisable. In a second stage, non-ideal theory 
ought to identify, among the selected states of  affairs, the one that represents the most 
desirable alternative given the ideal principles identified (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 
2012; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012).  
Then, in a realist perspective, the benchmark approach – by conducting non-ideal 
theory through the identification of  feasibility thresholds that take into account the 
probability of  achievement of  the political goals – certainly represents a better 
interpretation of  the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. However, despite 
offering a more convincing account of  the structure of  political theorising, there are 
reasons to believe that the benchmark approach would be incompatible with political 
realism.    
So, why is the idea of  selecting the courses of  action that are available to us by 
referring to the criteria defined in ideal theorising inadequate for realist political theory? 
The answer lies on what is possibly the fundamental vocation of  realist theorising: the 
                                                 
85 Defining what is politically accessible is a highly controversial issue. For my present purposes, though, I 
do not need to define political accessibility. Here, my interest lies exclusively in pointing out that the 
benchmark approach conceives non-ideal theorising as an attempt to select the most desirable 
accessible alternative given the normative conclusions reached in ideal theory. For accurate discussions 
on feasibility in non-ideal circumstances see Lawford-Smith 2013a and Wiens 2015b. 
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central commitment to develop a conception of  political judgment adequately sensitive to 
the specificities of  political reality. For realists, political judgments must be adequately 
political. This does not simply mean – as Raymond Geuss efficaciously points out – that 
realist political judgments must be judgments about politics; rather, it means that they 
must show a political character. For Geuss, political judgments must be construed as to 
appropriately respond to the complexity of  political reality: “To say that a judgment 
“has a political character” […] means that someone can look at it in a certain way, namely 
as an action with implications for further instances or forms of  collective human 
action” (Geuss 2010, 10, emphasis in original). Geuss is here suggesting that political 
judgments are truly political when they are adequately sensitive to the complexity of  the 
context of  action in which they take place. To formulate a political judgement means to 
assess courses of  action by carefully taking into account a number of  contingent factors 
that characterise their context: such as the possibilities, the risks, the consequences 
involved (Geuss 2010, 1-16).  
Hence, the idea of  assessing what ought to be done by referring to an ideal 
benchmark is doomed to be rejected by realists on the basis that political reality is far 
too complex to be adequately oriented by merely applying an ideal on it. Given the 
complexity and specificities of  political reality, realists argue that, by simply applying 
some ideal requirements to political circumstances, it is far from clear that we would 
reach the best outcome. 
This is something Mark Philp also makes clear in his works on the assessment of  
political conduct. Philp explains that, in order to appropriately judge what ought to be 
done in political circumstances, it is required a particular attention to several factors like 
– among others – the interests at play, the circumstances of  action, the capacities of  
those involved, the possibilities open to us, and the consequences that actions are likely 
to have (Philp 2010). It is worth quoting his own words:  
One reason […] for resisting the view that the principles of  that ideal 
provide an appropriate standard of  evaluation is that […] we have to ask 
what those principles demand (and with what realism) in terms of  the 
motives and ambitions of  their members, and we have to recognize that the 
process through which institutions are created, interpreted, and 
progressively reworked is itself  a political process, rather than a merely 
deductive one. […] As political problems they call for political solutions, and 
political solutions, even when they are inspired by grand ideals, have a local 
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and contextually shaped character. (Philp 2007, 239, emphasis added) 
Philp here is suggesting that, in political circumstances, assessing what ought to be 
done cannot be a mere exercise of  bridging the gap between ideal and reality (i.e. a 
deductive process), but it must always be the fruit of  a contextual assessment of  all the 
variables at play. The specificities of  the circumstances under exam might require a 
departure from what the ideal would counsel, because the pursuit of  the ideal could be 
politically unwise: it could be dangerous, unsettling, or simply too costly, to act in 
accordance to the demands of  the ideal theory. 
Williams’ observations about the politics of  human rights provide a useful 
example of  how a realist would examine and problematise the gap between the 
requirements of  the ideal and the constraints posed by reality (Williams 2005, 18-28, 62-
74). As Williams explains, human rights theories vividly show the complexity of  
applying a theoretical framework to reality, because of  the kind of  practical demands 
they impose on political practices. In political practices, Williams points out, declaring 
that some right is a human right implies that it has a fundamental and inviolable stance. 
Human rights are uncompromising: “the charge that a practice violates fundamental 
human rights is ultimate, most serious of  political accusations” (Williams 2005, 72). This 
is a crucial feature of  human rights discourses in Williams’ view. The point is that 
talking about human rights is not supposed to be a mere theoretical exercise, but it 
brings with it all sorts of  political consequences, and philosophical reflection ought to 
seriously recognise this fact and be conducted accordingly. Indeed, because of  their 
political importance, denouncing a violation of  human rights can foster a process of  
severe reform of  the status quo; for this reason, defining the set of  human rights that 
are valid in some context, is not a choice that can be made irrespective of  the political 
circumstances upon which the theory is supposed to apply. Hence, Williams emphasises, 
human rights discourses can be either dangerous or flawed if  the theory is not tailored 
to the specific circumstances of  application. On the one hand, human rights might 
foster conflictual relationships, whenever their defence is at stake. So, the set of  what we 
proclaim “human rights” ought to be traced pretty carefully: claiming that something is 
a human right signifies choosing enemies and friends, and which battles ought to be 
fought. On the other hand – somewhat paradoxically – given their potential effect, the 
political inopportunity to define some claim as grounded on a defence of  a human right 
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might lead to a substantive revision of  the meaning of  the concept of  human right 
itself, depriving it of  its very reformist power. In fact, when the set of  rights we dub as 
human rights comes to be unduly extended, we might end up by undermining its 
political seriousness. Given their uncompromising nature, “it is a mark of  philosophical 
good sense that the accusation should not be distributed too inconsiderately” (Williams 
2005, 27). Williams is explicit on this point when he says that “since in many cases 
governments cannot actually deliver what they peoples are said to have a right to, this 
encourages the idea that human rights represent simply aspirations” (Williams 2005, 64). 
Hence, Williams underlines, “whether it is a matter of  philosophical good sense to 
treat a certain practice as a violation of  human rights, and whether it is politically good 
sense, cannot ultimately constitute two separate questions” (Williams 2005, 72). 
Whether it is the case to invoke a conception of  human rights in a certain context ought 
to depend on the particular circumstances at play. If  we simply apply an ideally defined 
set of  human rights to concrete circumstances, we might either foster unwanted 
consequences or we might deprive human rights of  their very original meaning and 
power; in a nutshell, we might come to pursue a course of  action which is inappropriate 
or practically irrelevant. Therefore, to recall Philp’s words, merely deducing the 
consequences of  a theory to reality cannot be an adequate procedure in political theory. 
Ultimately, political realism raises sceptical complaints against the idea of  approximating 
reality to theory – i.e. choosing to pursue the state of  affairs which mostly satisfies the 
ideal – because what ought to be done in concrete political contexts depends on a 
careful evaluation of  the all the variables at play. “No political theory […] can determine 
by itself  its own application” (Williams 2005, 28). 
Therefore, for realists, what it makes sense to do must make sense politically. This 
is the reason why the benchmark interpretation of  the relationship between ideal and 
non-ideal theory cannot be accepted in a realist perspective. For a realist, the task of  
non-ideal theory cannot consist in a mere effort to approximate the ideal. Rather, non-
ideal theorising ought to be conducted by taking into account the specificities of  the 
context at stake. Selecting what is the best course of  action to pursue in concrete 
circumstances is a much more complex exercise than the one portrayed by the 
benchmark approach.  
What could then be the role of  the ideal in realist thought? Does ideal theory 
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retain some function in realist political theory or, rather, political action ought to be 
entirely judged from a non-ideal perspective? After all – it could be argued – if  what 
ought to be done must always be the fruit of  a contextual assessment, we might well get 
rid of  political ideals and focus on what makes sense to do given some specific 
circumstances. In fact, someone has suggested that this is the direction in which the 
methodological debate should go (Wiens 2015a). Since, however, I believe that ideal 
theorising maintains a crucial role in realist political theory, let me first address this 
alternative point of  view – the view that interprets ideals as useless theoretical exercises 
– to better explain why it should be rejected on realist grounds, and what form a realist 
interpretation of  the relationship between the ideal and the non-ideal should, instead, 
take.  
 
3.3. Ideals are useless 
I just argued that political realism maintains that understanding what ought to be 
done in concrete circumstances should be the fruit of  a context-sensitive analysis, and 
should not consists in a mere application of  a set of  ideal principles to reality. How is 
non-ideal theory supposed to relate to ideal theory, then? 
A somewhat largely criticized, or otherwise neglected, reading of  the problem I 
am discussing maintains that – given the fundamental context-sensitive character of  
political judgments – judgments about what ought to be done here and now do not 
require any prior understanding about what ought to be done in ideal circumstances. 
According to this unorthodox view, non-ideal theory would be entirely independent 
from ideal theory. In fact, those who have defended a similar thesis have defined ideal 
theory as either “unnecessary” (Sen 2006, 222) or “utterly uninformative” (Wiens 2015a, 
434). However, this last interpretation of  the relationship between ideal and non-ideal 
theory has not received the attention it deserves, particularly in its last developments 
(Wiens 2012 and 2015; except from Jubb 2016b). When political realism is at stake, this 
lack of  engagement becomes especially surprising, though. Despite sharing a similar 
context-dependent take on political theorising, realists – as I recalled – push themselves 
as far as proclaiming that political realism can demand the impossible, thereby radically 
distinguishing their approach from non-ideal theorising (Rossi 2015). So, realists 
certainly need to defend themselves against this possible challenge – at least if  they wish 
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to maintain a distance from non-ideal theorising. Hence, in the following, I will outline a 
realist response to those who claim that political ideals are unnecessary. This will allow 
me to further clarify the realist position within the methodological debate, and to finally 
outline, in the next section, a proper realist interpretation of  the role of  ideal theory and 
of  its relationship with non-ideal reasoning. 
Let us begin, then, by introducing this dissenting interpretation. The first and 
most discussed contribution in this sense is due to Amartya Sen. In his much-cited, and 
much-criticised, article “What Do We Want from a Theory of  Justice?” (2006), Sen 
provocatively argues that political theory has, up to that point, been conducted in the 
wrong way. In his opinion, all the efforts that theorists have put on clarifying political 
ideals have been pointless: this is because ideal theory is “neither sufficient nor 
necessary” for understanding what ought to be done in concrete circumstances (2006, 
219-22). Hence, the conduct of  political theorising ought to be radically reformed. Here, 
we are not much concerned with the “sufficiency thesis”: a realist would not deny that 
political ideals, by themselves, cannot provide all the answers we need about concrete 
political agency – after all, realists put a lot of  efforts in contextualising their claims. 
Rather, it is the “necessity thesis” which might cause troubles. Sen explains the point in 
the following way. Ideal theory is not necessary because we can perfectly manage to 
compare two states of  affairs and decide which is the better one without the need to 
know how a perfect world would look like: “We may indeed be willing to accept, with 
great certainty, that Everest is the tallest mountain in the world, completely unbeatable 
in terms of  stature by any other peak, but that understanding is neither needed, nor 
particularly helpful, in comparing the heights of, say, Kanchenjunga and Mont Blanc. 
There would be something very deeply odd in a general belief  that a comparison of  any 
two alter natives cannot be sensibly made without a prior identification of  a supreme 
alternative” (Sen 2006: 222). Sen’s point is that we can know when something is going 
wrong, and hence ought to be remedied, even if  we do not know what a fully perfect 
world would require (2006: 224). In Sen’s opinion, it is rather worrying the tendency of  
philosophers to indulge in ideal theorising, when urgent injustices ought to be overcome 
(2006, 228); and in order to identify recognise injustices, Sen argues, we certainly do not 
need a sophisticated account of  what perfect justice would require us to do. Non-ideal 
theory, then, can be conducted without looking at ideals, since we are able to engage in 
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comparative political judgments; besides, it must be also regarded as a more compelling 
endeavour to pursue. Therefore, according to Sen, ideal theory is certainly unnecessary, 
since for practical purposes a comparative analysis will be sufficient. 
Since its publication, it has been extensively argued that Sen’s proposal proves to 
be fragile on multiple fronts86; still, it contains a fundamental insight that ought to be 
taken seriously. Indeed, David Wiens has recently followed Sen’s original provocation 
and has reframed it by building a compelling challenge against ideal theorising. It is, 
then, against Wiens’ rephrase of  Sen’s claims that argumentative efforts in support of  
ideal theorising should be directed. And yet, as I said, Wiens’ arguments have not 
received the attention they deserve. In “Against Political Ideals” Wiens sets itself  the 
task of  demonstrating that “political ideals contribute nothing to our reasoning about 
what to do amidst nonideal circumstances” (Wiens 2015a, 434). The analysis elaborated 
by Wiens is complex and detailed, but its core thesis can be summarised in the following 
way. Wiens’ entire argument hinges on a specific interpretation of  the structure of  
political theories. According to Wiens’ view, political theories are structured around 
three fundamental elements: directive principles, basic evaluative criteria, and empirical 
constraints (2015, 435-37). Directive principles are those principles which define what 
ought to be done under certain circumstances. Basic evaluative criteria express the 
values that ground the theory, and which allow to rank the diverse political possibilities. 
And, finally, empirical constraints define those facts that the theory must take as fixed, 
i.e. those constraints that trace the set of  worlds that the theory can consider feasible. 
Given these core elements, Wiens explains that in normative political theory “a set of  
directive principles is justified in virtue of  the fact that it optimally reflects certain basic 
evaluative criteria given a set of  empirical constraints” (2015, 437). In other words, in 
Wiens’ interpretation, the directive principles that are supposed to apply in a certain 
context are those which to greatest extent fulfil the basic evaluative criteria endorsed by 
the theory, given the states of  affairs that (by assumption) can be realised. Wiens takes 
this structure to offer a general model of  normative political theorising87. 
                                                 
86 Attentive analyses and criticism can be found in Gilabert 2012; Robeyns 2012; Sangiovanni 2009; Swift 
2008; Valentini 2011. 
87 For example, Wiens explains that Rawls’ comes at his two principles of  justice by employing the kind 
of  reasoning just outlined. As Wiens explains, in the case of  Rawls’ (1999) theory, the basic evaluative 
criteria are freedom and equality, and the empirical constraints are material scarcity, the fact that the 
society ought to be conceived as closed, and a sense of  justice by those who will be subjected to the 
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Then, if  Wiens is correct in portraying the conduct of  normative political 
theorising as he does, it suddenly becomes clear why ideal theory ought to be considered 
“utterly uninformative” in order to establish what ought to be done in concrete 
circumstances. Since directive principles are strictly dependent upon the feasibility set 
considered, ideal theory cannot be relevant in non-ideal circumstances. Normative 
political reasoning derives principles by applying evaluating criteria to a given context. 
Hence, precisely because the empirical constraints are different in ideal and non-ideal 
circumstances, ideal theory is useless at best, and misguiding at worst. Therefore, we 
need to focus exclusively on non-ideal theorising. 
So, could realists share Sen’s and Wiens’ insights? Should political realism be 
understood as an elaborated form of  non-ideal theorising? Recall indeed that my first 
objective is to clarify how realist theories can be relevant in non-ideal circumstances and, 
given the survey of  the debate so far conducted, it might turn out that realism should 
entirely dismiss ideal theorising. 
In some sense, as we have seen, realism does share many of  the concerns that 
motivate Sen’s and Wiens’ projects. In particular, realists emphasise that the specificities 
of  political circumstances must play a crucial role in determining what ought to be done 
in a given context. Realism regards political judgments as context-sensitive both in the 
sense that they need to take into account the feasibility of  reforms, and in the sense that 
they cannot be merely deductive (because they need to be tailored to the circumstances 
at hand). Hence, realists would agree with Wiens when he points out that empirical 
constraints fundamentally shape the practical conclusions we reach. But they would also 
share Sen’s concern about the need to ground theory in reality. While we look at ideals, 
we risk losing a clear sight on actual failures and problems; therefore, we need to be 
                                                                                                                                          
norms identified. Then, Rawls’ reasoning to identify the directive principle that ought to apply in 
those circumstances is construed with the precise aim of  abiding by the said criteria and constraints. 
The theoretical device Rawls employs to solve his inquiry – namely, the original position – is modelled 
as an imaginary deliberative process conducted by agents which are ignorant about their status within 
society, but that are motivated to define the terms that will allow to build and maintain a system of  
mutual cooperation under the empirical constraints outlined. According to Wiens, “the veil of  
ignorance is introduced to situate parties fairly with respect to each other, to ensure that the chosen 
principles eschew “arbitrary distinctions…between persons in the assigning of  basic rights and 
duties,” (Rawls 1999, 5) thereby respecting individuals’ freedom and fundamental moral equality” 
(Wiens 2015a, 436). Then, in Wiens’ reading, Rawls precisely follows the general process to identify 
directive principles above-mentioned: through the original position, Rawls defines the two principles 
of  justice as those principles which at best reflect some evaluative criteria given certain empirical 
constraints (2015, 436-37). 
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primarily interested in carefully examining the circumstances in which political action 
takes place. However, this is still far from saying that realists can stay content with non-
ideal theorising. In fact, there are also reasons to suspect that realists would not be 
satisfied by Sen’s and Wiens’ methodological analyses.  
The main complaint that a realist would advance against Sen’s and Wiens’ analyses 
would certainly amount to an accuse of  offering an overly simplistic account of  the 
structure and conduct of  normative political theory. For one thing, realists would 
certainly share the critiques of  those who point out that Sen’s non-ideal methodology 
can work only in very simple circumstances (namely, in circumstances in which injustice 
is clear and the hierarchy of  values is simply definable) but is unable to assist practical 
choice in complex scenarios. Sen’s account would need to offer a more developed 
theory of  values and of  their priorities (Sangiovanni 2009). This is a problem shared by 
Wiens, which nowhere seems to explain how we are supposed to identify the relevant 
values in particular circumstances, nor how we are supposed to rank them88. There are 
reasons to believe that to clearly understand our evaluative commitments some form of  
ideal theorising would be required (Jubb 2012; Swift 2008). However, this is not the line 
of  criticism I presently want to follow. For our purposes, it is more relevant to 
emphasise another shortcoming: in Sen’s and Wiens’ accounts, the discussion of  
feasibility constraints appears excessively schematic and static. Wiens and Sen discuss 
empirical constraints treating them as clear and absolute boundaries. But this an 
unrealistic and naïve interpretation of  empirical constraints.  
Wiens, for example, employs the notion of  empirical constraints defining them as 
“certain assumptions about which states of  affairs can be realized” (2015: 436). Here, 
the notion of  empirical constraints Wiens employs seems, oddly enough, to allude to the 
ultimate border of  practical possibilities – that is to say, to the limits of  what is 
achievable through human action (Jensen 2009, 168). This is an interpretation hardly 
compatible with an approach that intends to offer non-ideal guidance, though. 
Admittedly, the lexicon does not help us here, so it is time to disambiguate a bit. 
Feasibility, as it has often been argued, can indicate both soft and hard empirical 
                                                 
88 Wiens does not address the issue of  the justification and assessment of  our evaluative commitments 
even when he positively explains how non-ideal theorising ought to be conducted (see Wiens 2012). In 
“Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory” he defines values as “moral ideals in the ordinary 
sense” (2012, 55). 
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constraints (Gilabert 2009, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012). Hard feasibility 
constraints are those which divide the possible from the impossible, i.e. the practically 
possible from the outright unreachable. Soft feasibility constraints are those which 
divide the probable from the improbable, i.e. they select some levels of  probability are 
normatively relevant. Wiens does not take into consideration these different meanings in 
his analysis. Yet, it is crucially important to keep these two meanings of  feasibility in 
mind, when we are trying to get a sense of  relationship between ideal and non-ideal 
reasoning in political theory. Indeed, Wiens construes his argument by treating every 
feasibility constraint as a hard constraint. His argument sounds appealing when hard 
feasibility constraints are considered. After all, realists as well clearly explain that 
normative reasoning should be tailored to political reality: we ought to reason in light of  
the concrete possibilities open to us and the ways required to reach them. However, it 
seems that the lexicon of  hard constraints does not really suit concrete political 
scenarios. In concrete circumstances – the realm of  non-ideal theorising – our sight is 
short and obfuscated. We often cannot know how to reach a certain goal, nor what kind 
of  obstacles we will have to face, and not even the costs we will incur into. But these are 
not hard constraints: in concrete circumstances, we deal with probability thresholds. 
This is one of  the reasons why realists would regard ideal theorising as a necessary 
part of  political theory. Indeed, since feasibility thresholds are mutable and relative 
(rather than fixed and absolute), in order to appropriately understand what ought to be 
done here and now, it is essential to know what political desirability would entail if  hard 
constraints were taken into account. That is, in a realist perspective, exploring the limits 
of  practical possibilities to gain a sense of  what political perfection would consists in 
proves to be a fundamental theoretical exercise to guide non-ideal political action. 
This is due to the fact that soft constraints, being probability thresholds, are 
established not simply discovered. In non-ideal theory, we actively decide to impose some 
probability threshold as relevant for normative reasoning. Hence, defining which 
feasibility constraints do count as relevant in non-ideal theory is the fruit of  an 
evaluation: we actively establish that non-ideal political theory ought to be conducted as 
if certain improbable goals were utterly unachievable. This is a crucial feature of  soft 
empirical constraints. Indeed, being actively chosen and not simply discovered, soft 
feasibility thresholds involve costs: by imposing a certain degree of  probability of  
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success as normatively relevant, all those alternatives judged too far from us to be 
achievable are discarded – even those that represent highly desirable states of  affairs89. 
Given this understanding of  soft feasibility constraints as probability thresholds, 
there are three reasons a realist would regard as fundamental a research into political 
desirability given the limits of  practical possibilities. First of  all, as realists are keen to 
emphasise, theories are not constructs detached from reality; rather, they are part of  the 
context and have a practical impact (Geuss 2008, 29-30). To know what is left outside 
our reach, what are the shortcomings of  our world and the actual wrongs that remain 
unanswered, can actively affect political culture, and transform some goal from being 
unreachable to be included within the set of  the achievable alternatives90.  
Secondly, given the fact that soft feasibility thresholds are imposed, not merely 
discovered, in order to establish what is the relevant threshold to consider we need to 
know what ideal political arrangements would look like. Political decisions are extremely 
complex: deciding to pursue a course of  action rather than others depends, among 
other things, on the balance between gains and losses at play. When the political options 
that are easily accessible are highly disadvantageous, it might be preferable to pursue a 
course of  action which has a low prospect of  success (Geuss 2010, 12-16). Political 
actors might choose to set the bar of  the feasibility threshold quite low, given the 
balance between gains and losses at stake. Hence, reasoning on ideal desirability proves 
to be crucial in order to decide which feasibility threshold would be appropriate to set.  
Thirdly, since the goals that are relatively probable to achieve change over time 
and through contexts, it means that it is possible to work on the political circumstances 
to make them more favourable to the ideal (Geuss 2016, 44-45). 
In all these three cases, knowing what is ideally desirable plays a fundamental 
practical role. For all these tasks, ideals are required, because we need to know what 
desirability demands bracketing assessments of  probability – that is, when the limits of  
practical possibilities are considered.  
                                                 
89 To be aware of  what is left behind, of  the costs and renunciations, is crucial to conserve a disenchanted 
and truthful knowledge of  political reality – this is something realists would certainly judge valuable. 
However, a being aware of  what could be regarded as desirable to achieve outside the soft constraint, 
is not merely epistemically relevant for a realist. What does matter for our present purposes is to show 
that an inquiry into political desirability which considers the limit of  practical possibility can be 
relevant for guiding concrete political action. 
90 See Geuss 2016, 44: “there are things that can become possible only if  enough people want them (and 
pursue them) in the right way, and that otherwise are “impossible.”” 
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For all these reasons, I maintain that ideal theory – meant as that form of  
reasoning which explores what desirability entails within the ultimate limits of  practical 
possibilities – must be regarded as a fundamental dimension of  realist political thinking. 
Sen and Wiens, by failing to consider the distinction between soft and hard constraints, 
outline an unconvincing account of  political theorising. As a consequence, they are 
unable to provide adequate tools to understand political action in non-ideal contexts, 
which requires a more complex analysis than the one they outline. 
At this point, however, it seems that we have reached a deadlock. On the one 
hand, I have just claimed that ideal theorising is a fundamental component of  realist 
thought. On the other hand, the interpretations of  the relationship between ideal and 
non-ideal theory that have been proposed so far seem to be incompatible with realist 
political thought. Must we conclude that political realism is a project doomed to fail? In 
the next section, I explain that it is possible to interpret the role of  ideals in a way that is 
consistent with realist political theory. Indeed, I will argue that realist political ideals 
ought to be interpreted as models. So, let me turn to this final possible interpretation of  
the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. 
 
3.4. Ideals are models 
We have come to a point in which we are looking for an interpretation of  realist 
ideal reasoning which is consistent with the conclusions reached so far; namely, realist 
ideals cannot play the role of  targets, nor that of  benchmarks, and yet they seem to 
actively inform non-ideal political action. If  the function of  realist ideals cannot be 
explained in those terms, how can it be interpreted?  
I want to suggest that realist ideals ought to be interpreted as models; where, by 
“model”, I do not mean “standard” or “blueprint” – an interpretation, this one, that 
would bring us back to the benchmark approach. Here – somewhat usually – I employ 
the notion of  model drawing from the conceptual tools which belong to the philosophy 
of  science91. A model, as understood in the studies of  scientific methods, is usually 
                                                 
91 This is not so unusual though. In fact, James Johnson, in his “Models Among the Political Theorists”, 
has persuasively argued that political theorists could benefit from analysing their methods in light of  
the conceptual tools provided by the philosophy of  science (Johnson 2014). The attempt I here make 
to explain realist ideals as models takes inspiration from his original work and tries to develop a similar 
insight. 
147 
taken to refer to a simplified version of  the part of  the world under exam, which helps 
to reach a better understanding of  it by playing some specific epistemic and heuristic 
function (Frigg 2009)92. Let me disambiguate a bit by applying the concept to realist 
political theory. As I understand political realism, realist ideals ought to be interpreted as 
theoretical devices which, by focusing on a simplified version of  the problem under 
exam, are able to provide some specific information that contributes to a clarification of  
the problem. Specifically, realist ideal reasoning contributes to a clarification of  what 
ought to be done in concrete circumstances by providing a better understanding of  the 
politically desirable, and it seeks such understanding by simplifying the subject under 
exam – i.e. bracketing relative probabilities and focusing on specific parts of  the larger 
problem at stake. I will shortly turn to a better specification of  the structure, function, 
and use, of  ideals as models. Before saying more, though, let me introduce an example 
of  realist ideal reasoning to facilitate my task. 
Once again, I will make use of  Williams’ work because it provides the most 
systematic discussions of  the realist methodology. In “From Freedom to Liberty: The 
Construction of  a Political Value” (2005, 75-96), Williams sets himself  the goal of  
answering an abstract and fundamental question: he wonders what pursuing freedom in 
political contexts might entail.  
 “From Freedom to Liberty” is a dense and thought-provoking essay. For the 
purposes of  the present discussion, unfortunately, many of  the insights Williams argues 
for in that essay need to be left aside. Here, I am mainly interested in the structure of  
his analysis; so, this will be my narrow focus. While introducing the problem at stake – 
i.e. the interpretation of  freedom in political circumstances – Williams programmatically 
declares: “we will not understand our own specific relations to that value unless we 
understand what we want that value to do for us – what we, now, need it to be in 
shaping our own institutions and practices” (2005, 75). What is Williams suggesting 
here? He is claiming that, if  we want to understand what does it mean to strive for a 
certain value in a given context, and when it is appropriate to do so, it is necessary to 
check what are the general purposes of  our practices, and how our values can fit in that 
                                                 
92 I am conscious that the debate around the interpretation of  models in the philosophy of  science is 
extremely wide and that I am somehow proposing a simplistic definition of  the concept. However, 
this is usually taken to be the most basic and shared definition of  models in the philosophy of  science 
(see Frigg 2009 and Morrison 2016). Moreover, for my purposes I only need to build a notion of  
models which suitably explains the role of  realist ideals in political theory. 
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broader framework. To this purpose, Williams explains that freedom has an intuitive, 
common-sensical, meaning: when we usually refer to freedom we mean something like 
“being unobstructed in doing what you want by some form of  humanly imposed 
coercion” (2005, 79). So, for Williams, the central question to investigate is whether 
freedom could be an appropriate evaluative concept to employ in political circumstances 
and what would it eventually entail. Can we complain in political circumstances when 
our primitive freedom is violated? Should such violations be remedied? As I pointed 
out, Williams invites us to turn our sight to our practices and their general purposes, 
when such questions need to be addressed. 
Williams’ reflection, then, consists in an attempt to understand what are the values 
that ought to be taken as primarily important in the practical context under exam. As 
already recalled, Williams argues that in political contexts “the securing of  order, 
protection, safety, trust and the conditions of  cooperation” (2005, 3) are the most 
important values to safeguard, since disagreement and conflict are ineliminable facts of  
the world as we know it. Therefore, since it guarantees a legitimate use of  coercion, 
Williams explains that the creation and maintenance of  a political system is the primary 
goal we ought to strive for – a goal which is primary in the sense of  being the condition 
of  possibility of  the cultivation of  all other values (2005, 3). For Williams, from this 
understanding of  political practices a number of  things follow with respect to our 
comprehension of  freedom and its political demands. Indeed, because it ought to be 
understood as a political value, primitive freedom must be regarded as an untenable 
concept in political contexts. Primitive freedom is, by definition, incompatible with the 
conditions that make politics possible: while politics employs and disciplines coercion, 
primitive freedom would in principle justify complaints against any form of  coercion.  
Does this mean that we ought to entirely avoid invoking freedom in political 
circumstances? We certainly could not and should not. Williams is keen to emphasise 
that no legitimate government could ignore freedom as a basic human need. However, 
given the incompatibility highlighted, freedom should be re-interpreted according to 
political standards. When it comes to be so reinterpreted, freedom comes to be dubbed 
as liberty by Williams (2005, 83). In particular, Williams concludes that liberty in political 
contexts can be invoked just as long as the use we make of  that concept does not 
subvert the supposed hierarchical order of  our evaluative commitments: in a nutshell, “a 
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practice is not a violation of  liberty if  it is necessarily involved in there being a state at 
all” (2005, 90). Does this imply that anytime a claim in liberty is compatible with the 
conditions outlined by Williams politics ought to be reformed accordingly? In fact, 
when Williams hints at possible concrete applications of  his analysis around liberty as a 
political value he is clear to point out that, under the conditions specified, “if  someone 
feels that some action or arrangement imposes on him a cost in liberty, then it does 
indeed do so. This does not mean, of  course, that the action or arrangement should not be allowed: 
the cost in his liberty is very often outweighed by the values served by the action or 
arrangement. Moreover, it need not justify or call for any compensation. He need not have a 
claim in liberty in any court. But a cost in liberty is still what it is” (2005, 91, emphasis 
added). Therefore, the analysis conducted by Williams allows to better understand when 
we could complain about a cost in liberty. However, whether we should actually do so, 
would require another kind of  judgment. Williams is clear on this point: political 
decisions must be political – i.e., in concrete circumstances, what ought to be done ought 
to be fruit of  an independent political assessment. 
I have made quite a long digression into Williams’ discussion of  liberty as a 
political value. However, this should be useful to understand the features I attribute to 
realist ideals that make them conveniently interpretable as models. I will proceed in 
order by explaining the structural characteristics, the epistemic function, and the proper 
use, of  realist ideals respectively. 
As far as the structure is concerned, as we have just seen, the theoretical 
machinery Williams employs is abstract and makes an accurate use of  simplifications. In 
particular, two kinds of  simplifications seem to be involved in Williams’ reasoning. For 
one thing, Williams analyses a very specific normative problem, and he does so by 
focusing solely on those aspects of  political normativity that he takes to be relevant for 
his case: he analyses liberty with respect to the purposes of  political practices, and draws 
some normative consequences from this (relatively) simple focus. Secondly, Williams 
avoids discussing issues of  concrete application of  his normative conclusions; rather, he 
points out that concrete circumstances require a further analysis into the context and the 
possibilities at stake. So, his reflections are meant to have a general relevance and are 
conducted abstracting from the contingencies characterising the singular contexts. 
Hence, the theoretical structure deliberately makes schematic and tractable some aspects 
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of  a much bigger problem – namely, political normativity – and it does so for epistemic 
and heuristic purposes, to which now I turn. 
As we have seen, Williams’ intent is to clarify what does it mean, for us, to be 
actually free under political institutions. In this sense, Williams’ analysis is meant to be 
an inquiry into political desirability. Indeed, Williams does not deal with utopian 
fantasies, nor with singular applications of  the value of  liberty. Rather, he defines in 
general what does it mean for us to be fully free within political contexts. Complaints 
about liberty which eschew the conditions of  validity he identifies are simply not 
complaints about liberty; hence, there are no better arrangements with respect to liberty 
than the one he outlines. It is worth quoting another passage which emphasises the 
point I am making: “a practice is not a limitation of  liberty if  it is necessary for there to 
be any state at all. But it is also not a loss of  liberty if  it is necessary for the functioning 
of  society as we can reasonably imagine it working and still being ‘our’ society” 
(Williams 2009, 200). Williams, therefore, is providing us with some tools to understand 
what a political arrangement which perfectly safeguard liberty would consist in. 
Now, we come to the crucial aspect of  the present analysis. How is this 
knowledge supposed to be employed in practical reasoning? I have formerly argued that 
the knowledge of  full desirability plays several crucial functions in normative political 
theory. I have explained that being aware of  what the ideal does entail might play a role 
in choosing what kind of  objectives it would be wise to pursue in the face of  uncertain 
outcomes. Furthermore, the ideal might foster the pursuit of  political actions aimed at 
creating circumstances more favourable to the achievement of  the political desirable. 
However, discussing Williams’ essay, some other functions have emerged. By employing 
some suitably specified simplifications which make the theoretical problems more 
tractable, ideal reasoning allows to reach a better understanding of  our evaluative 
commitments. In this way, ideal theorising proves to play a fundamental heuristic and 
practical function, since it allows us to interpret more clearly the normative elements at 
play in concrete circumstances. And finally, as Williams points out and as I previously 
emphasised, ideals are fundamental to get a proper sense of  the costs of  political actions, 
which is essential to act consciously and responsibly. As Williams underlines, a cost in 
liberty “is still what it is” and must be recognised as such, even if  the wisest political 
strategy might demand to ignore that cost.  
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Someone at this point might wonder whether I am mixing up benchmark and 
target arguments – thereby replicating their shortcomings – by listing these possible 
functions of  ideals among the ones relevant for realist normative thinking. The answer 
is negative, though. Indeed, there is something else that ought to be specified. Since the 
ideal is a simplified, partial, and abstract, study into political normativity which has a 
specific epistemic function, it ought precisely to be managed as being a structure of  this 
kind. This means that the ideal does not, and cannot, set by itself  what ought to be 
done. Practical reasoning requires to balance theoretical considerations and the 
observation of  reality. The ideal brings to the table only a piece of  information that 
needs to be balanced with all the others at our disposal. This means that the ideal is not 
the sole normative authority: it is, though fundamental, a piece of  a puzzle. However, it 
is not simply that the ideal informs, though partially, the non-ideal: the ideal too can be 
revised and reformed in light of  our appraisal of  reality. Recall, indeed, that political 
realism endorses a bottom-up methodology; therefore, as soon as some features of  
reality change or come to be better understood, our ideals might change too (Williams 
2005, 93). Hence, the ideal and the non-ideal work together to inform each other and to 
reach sensible and sound answers to our practical questions. As Geuss efficaciously 
points out: practical reasoning is a craft, there is no systematic way to conduct it (2008, 
15). This is the most important contribution that the notion of  model brings into this 
theoretical context. In fact, one of  the ways to explain the role of  models in normative 
political theory, as I just did, it is to confront this concept with one close to it: the 
concept of  theory. By theory I intend a system of  laws which, deductively, is able to 
explain the phenomena belonging to a certain part of  the world93. Interpreted in this 
way, while models represent a limited study, which ought to contribute to a larger 
theoretical endeavour, theories are more ambitious. By employing the concept in an 
analogous manner, one of  the core methodological thesis of  political realists consists in 
claiming that normative reasoning ought not to take the form of  theories; namely, of  
systems of  laws which are able, deductively, to tell us what ought to be done in specific 
circumstances (Geuss 2010, 31-42 and 2016, 28-18; Williams 2006, Ch. 16; 2011, Ch. 
10). Therefore, explaining ideals as models we are able to honour this core realist 
insight, and to explain how realists could theorise normatively avoiding “theories”; 
                                                 
93 For an introduction about the relationship between theories and models and their diverse 
interpretations, see Morrison 2016. 
152 
namely, avoiding normative “systems”. 
After all, all the critiques realism would move against the target and benchmark 
approaches seem to all come from a similar unease: they are all meant to stress the 
inadequacy of  seeking systematisations of  political normativity, which end up by 
focusing solely on theory, while ignoring reality. Interpreting ideals as models, though, 
gives us a chance to explain and save the role of  ideal theory in realist thought. Now, as 
a final step, we have to clarify what is the relationship between realist political ideals and 
feasibility.  
 
4. Conclusion: Feasibility constraints on realist ideals 
Up to this point I tried to show that political realism ought to be conceived as a 
complex approach to normative political theory which requires both ideal and non-ideal 
theorising. I also explained that realism is able to do maintain both levels of  theorising 
by conceiving political ideals as models. Therefore, we are now also in the position to 
get a better understanding of  the relationship between feasibility and political realism.  
At the beginning of  this paper, indeed, I explained that much contemporary 
literature around political realism has struggled to demonstrate that normative political 
theory cannot be reduced to a mere non-ideal theorising, i.e. to a set of  techniques that 
would tell us what ought to be done here and now. Realist proposals – it has been 
argued – far from being primarily interested in what can be concretely achieved, can 
even “demand the impossible” or turn out to be “utopias”. So, according to the recent 
literature, there are (at least some) levels of  realist thought that are unconcerned by 
action guidance. As I argued, however, this was an obscure thesis both because it was 
remained unspecified how levels of  theorising unconcerned by considerations of  
implementation were supposed to be relevant for guiding concrete action, and because it 
was largely unclear what “impossible” or “utopias” meant in that context. Hence, I 
claimed, if  we want to make better sense of  the idea that realist political theory might 
demand the impossible, we ought first to explain how levels of  theorising unconcerned 
by what can be done here and now can prove to be relevant for assessing political action 
in concrete circumstances. Without such a preliminary inquiry into the structure of  
realist thought, I pointed out, any comment about the relationship between realist 
normative theory and feasibility constraints would have been baseless. In order to affirm 
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that realism can reflect on unfeasible states of  affairs we need first to show how, and 
why, that kind of  reasoning is relevant in realist political thinking: an issue that – given 
the discussion conducted so far – proves to be far more challenging than usually 
recognised. 
Now that I have clarified the scenario and argued that realist normative thought 
can, and must, include a reflection around political ideals (namely, around perfect, and 
possibly unfeasible, political states of  affairs) which conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to the feasibility constraints that apply to political realism? How should the idea 
that realism can demand the impossible be understood? Since, in the analysis developed 
so far, I tried to define the role and structure of  realist ideals, the discussion conducted 
already contains some elements to provide a cogent answer. Let me collect and put in 
order what has been said so far with respect to the relationship between realism and 
feasibility, then. 
Discussing the interpretation of  ideals as useless theoretical constructs, I argued 
that realist inquiries into political desirability ought to bracket probability assessments, 
and should be conducted by taking into account the limit of  practical possibilities. I 
motivated this claim by explaining that the knowledge of  possibly perfect political 
arrangements would play some fundamental functions in realist theorising. In particular, 
exploring the limits of  practical possibilities allows to get a realistic sense of  the costs 
incurred by choosing some course of  action over others; moreover, it allows to orient 
concrete practical action, by providing some tools to decide which probability 
thresholds ought to be taken as relevant. 
Still, claiming that realist ideals ought to be constructed by taking into account the 
limits of  practical possibility does not tell us the whole of  the story. Should we conclude 
that realism can pick any world as desirable within the set practically possible worlds? A 
similar conclusion would let many perplexed. Remember, however, that political realism 
endorses a bottom-up approach for the construction of  political normativity. I have said 
something about the bottom-up methodology at the beginning of  this paper, and we 
had the chance to see one of  its possible applications while discussing the Williams’ 
analysis of  liberty as a political value. Such a methodological choice has a crucial impact 
on the set of  the possible worlds that realism would be able to define as desirable. In 
fact, realist ideals need to give us a sense of  how our practical world ought to look like 
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if  the purposes of  actual practices were fully met. Realism starts from the actual beliefs 
and practices that characterise a specific context and tries to understand what it would 
mean to fully satisfy the evaluative commitments that we happen to hold. Desirability is 
therefore constrained by some features of  the context in which the ideal is supposed to 
be applied: political ideals will have to portray a reality which successfully instantiates 
our evaluative commitments and their priorities. Hence, how much distance between the 
actual and the possible realism can admit? Certainly, as said, such theoretical endeavour 
will have to abide by the limits of  practical possibility and, within these limits, realism 
ought to pick the alternatives which satisfy the bottom-up procedure mentioned. So, 
there is something more to be said. A great deal to establish the distance between the 
actual and the possible realism could admit depends on which arrangements would 
prove to be able to instantiate the relevant evaluative commitments. This is a question 
which is highly speculative nature and which involves asking to what extent a practice 
could be varied, and still be perceived by its participants to be a practice which defends 
the relevant evaluative commitments. Williams explains this requirement saying that 
normative relevant possibilities ought to “practically intelligible”: 
 
Resentment about the loss of  liberty, like resentment about anything else, 
implies the thought of  an alternative world in which that loss does not 
occur, and just because liberty is a political value, the distance of  that 
possible world from the actual world must be measured in terms of  political 
consideration of  relevance and practical intelligibility. (Williams 2005, 92) 
 
What practical intelligibility would entail is an issue that certainly cannot be 
clarified here, but pointing at the importance of  this requirement helps us to get a sense 
of  the distance between the possible and the actual realist political ideals would admit, 
and this is enough for our purposes. 
How to make sense, then, of  the claim that political realism might “demand the 
impossible”? The phrase is inherently ambiguous, because “possibility” might be 
intended in different ways. Indeed, in a first a sense, the claim is certainly false: realism is 
crucially interested in understanding the boundaries of  practical possibility and 
interpreting political action given those boundaries. However, this is an implausible 
reading of  that claim. In a second sense, though, that claim points at something true: 
realist political ideals might demand the pursuit of  “improbable” states of  affairs. Since 
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I explained the structure of  realist ideal theorising as a theoretical endeavour that 
brackets assessments of  probability, realist political theory might actually demand the 
“improbable”. So, that claim ought to be correctly understood: interpreted as a thesis 
about highly improbable states of  affairs, it grasps something true. 
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that, as the former analysis has showed, 
realist normative thinking is a complex, multi-layered, reasoning in which both ideal and 
non-ideal theorising play a fundamental role in establishing what ought to be done. 
Hence, as said, what it might be appropriate to do in concrete circumstances might 
severely depart from what the ideal would demand. In non-ideal circumstances, a series 
of  additional considerations linked to the risks entailed by the different courses of  
action must enter into play. One of  the merits of  realism is to reminds us that political 
decisions ought to be taken responsibly; therefore, on the non-ideal level, the 
improbability of  success of  a certain goal might push us to revise our objectives. Then, 
the claim that realism might “demand the impossible”, ought to be interpreted very 
carefully and ought not distract us from a full appreciation of  the complexity of  realist 
normative thought. So, in a specific sense and in particular circumstances, political 
realism might indeed “demand the impossible”. But, as argued, such claim must be 
handled cautiously.  
What about utopias, though? Indeed, I also recalled that political realism has been 
defined as a form of  possibly utopian political thinking. However, taking about 
“utopias” does not necessarily coincide with talking about the “impossible”. “Utopia” 
can be used in a quite specific and different sense, so let me clarify this further issue. 
Utopias might indicate fully articulated images of  a perfect political world94. For this 
reason, the use of  the word “utopia” in realist normative thinking might be misleading95. 
In fact, as we have seen, realist ideals are not thought as fixed images of  a perfect world, 
but – being models – they are always open to possible revisions in light of  the new 
information acquired in concrete circumstances. As I understand it, realist normative 
thinking is suspicious about defining once and for all what would be desirable to do 
politically; therefore, the word “utopia” might be an unfortunate one to employ in this 
                                                 
94 Thomas More’s Utopia (2002) is exemplary in this sense. 
95 Geuss is well aware of  this fact and he specifies that its own use of  the concept of  utopia does not 
mean to indicate a fully specified image of  how politics ought to be organised (2016, 45). He is rather 
talking about impossibilities. In any case, I am suggesting that utopia and utopianism are conceptual 
tools that should be employed carefully in realist thought. 
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context96.  
Finally, an entirely different question arises, instead, with respect to which 
interpretation ought to be assigned to the limits of  political possibility; that is, to which 
criteria ought to define the boundary between the practically possible and the practically 
impossible. To appropriately answer such a question, it would be required to delve into 
the substantive meaning of  practical possibility97. This an issue that I have not clarified, 
and that I could not resolve here. However, since my objective was to provide a first 
study into the relationship between feasibility and political realism – namely, to argue for 
a better understanding of  both the relationship between ideal and non-ideal in realist 
theorising and the feasibility thresholds that ought to interest political realists – delving 
into this further controversial issue would bring me beyond my immediate purposes. 
 
 
                                                 
96 By this I do not mean to say that political realism cannot make a good use of  utopias. Indeed, as it has 
been often suggested, utopian thinking might exercise a fundamental role in criticising our political 
beliefs and evaluative commitments by pushing us to see our political world from a different 
perspective (Geuss 2016, 4). Hence, utopias might play a crucial role in realist thought; however, not a 
directly prescriptive one. 
97 For specific studies on this methodological problem see Estlund 2011, Jensen 2009, Lawford-Smith 
2013a and 2013b, Wiens 2016. Hawthorn 1991 offers a detailed study into the use of  counterfactuals 
in social sciences. 
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